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Introduction 
 
Russian foreign policy-making under President Vladimir Putin has amounted to a black 
box with unpredictable outcomes.1 Moscow’s decision-making processes with regard to 
NATO enlargement, Georgia and the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the US 
military presence in Central Asia, Moldova and the Transnistria dispute, the Middle East 
conflict, the U.S. war against Iraq, presidential elections in the Ukraine, the energy 
conflicts with Kiev and Minsk, talks with Hamas, Kosovo’s legal status or Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions - only to name the most thorny issues – have regularly astonished observers. 
Three structural and procedural aspects in particular appear to be ambiguous and vague: 
firstly, it is unclear which actors are involved in the decision-making networks. Secondly, 
it is nebulous what kinds of interaction mechanisms between network-members are in 
place. And thirdly, it is unknown whether decision-networks in Russian foreign policy are 
similarly shaped, or if significant variations exist depending on the policy problem. 
There is hardly an observer, who is able to say with a reasonable amount of certainty 
which actors are behind Moscow’s foreign policy decisions. Putin’s position and role in 
particular has been assessed again and again from different perspectives and with different 
verdicts: Some critical – often Western - observers concluded that Putin has to be 
perceived as an aspiring dictator on top of a massive nation state, trying to regain world 
power status.2 As a matter of fact, since the presidency was handed over to Vladimir Putin 
on December 31st 1999, the former KGB-agent managed to gradually discipline, centralise 
and rationalize decision-making after years of chaos under Yeltsin.3 This development 
may be explained by a rising number of siloviki4 and a concurrent declining influence of 
                                                 
 
1  This statement corresponds with conventional wisdom. See, for instance, Federation-Council (2004) or 
Carnegie (2004). 
2  See, for instance, Fischer (2004), Kagan (2004), Lucas (2006). 
3  Representatively, see Fischer (2003), Sapper (2004) and Lo (2003). 
4  This is a Russian expression for people, who have their roots within the security sector (army, police, 
intelligence services, border guards and other security-related units). As an illustration, in 2002, 26,6% 
of Putin’s team had a military background compared to 6,7% in 1993 Kryshtanovskaja (2005: 269). 
Further illuminating contributions have been provided by Lo (2003), Mukhin (2002), Shevtsova (2005). 
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liberal-economic actors within Russia’s political elite.5 Additionally, Putin’s consolidation 
of power is caused by an enlargement of the St. Petersburg-Clan around the president.6 
One by one, he expelled members of the ‘Yeltsin Family’ from the Kremlin and 
surrounded himself with trusted comrades.7 
At the other end of the spectrum, Putin is sometimes described as a puppet, 
controlled by ‘people in grey’, who define the Kremlin’s course of action.8 Proponents of 
this view believe that Putin only fulfils a marketing function to mask a gigantic 
administration managed by a network of powerful apparatchiki9 and polittekhnology.10 
Yet, in between those two poles – dictator and puppet - there exist literally hundreds of 
interpretations.11 Reduced to the smallest common denominator, Russian foreign policies 
are supposed to be made by restricted decision-making networks of actors that are 
inscrutable and unstable with regard to their size, composition and distribution of power. 
A lot of uncertainties have remained with regard to interaction mechanisms that 
affect the preparation, taking and implementation of foreign policy decisions. On the one 
hand, some experts believe that such procedures do not exist at all.12 In their view, a 
complete lack of institutions is accountable for many unpredictable foreign policy 
outcomes. Decisions seem to be dependent on the moods of a super-president possessing 
most of the constitutional powers. On the other hand, it may be argued that strong 
institutions do exist in terms of informal rules of interaction between members of 
decision-making networks. These kinds of institutions are supposed to be deeply rooted in 
Russian culture.13 Since nearly every single foreign policy decision has caused a battle 
                                                 
 
5  See, for instance, Kononenko (2005), Miljutenko (2003). 
6  This stand point has been convincingly and representatively outlined by Makarkin (2003), Borisov 
(2004), Bernstein (2002), Mukhin (2002), Shevtsova (2005). 
7  Representatively, see Primakov (2001). Even if a comparison between Yeltsin’s and Putin’s clan is 
hardly feasible, the expression “Putin Family” has appeared lately. See Sudin (2004). 
8  See, for instance, Dresen (2004), Shipitsyna (2004). 
9  This Russian term stands for the classic bureaucrat as inherited from the Soviet times. 
10  This Russian expression describes Kremlin-affiliated political advisors who have the task to literally 
construct political reality. 
11  See, for instance, Bernstein (2002), Edwards, Kemp, et al. (2006), Feifer (2002), Rivera and Rivera 
(2006). 
12  Representatively, see Carnegie (2004), Federation-Council (2004), Korobeinikov (2005). 
13  See, for instance, Steen (2003). 
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between competing elite groups, a Russian way of checks and balances is somehow 
constantly provided.  
On top of these confusing interpretations, network variations are a constant focal 
point of political analysts. It is uncertain whether decision-making networks are more or 
less similar, or if actors and their interaction mechanisms vary depending on the policy 
problem. Some observers interpret current developments in Moscow as a reversion of 
Czarist court rule.14 They estimate that all of the important domestic and international 
issues – be it health care, unification of regions, the stabilization fund, oil pipeline routing, 
talks with North Korea or arms exports – are decided by an invariable handful of 
individuals around Putin. However, there is also strong evidence that foreign policy 
making in Moscow is by no means different than in any other capital around the world: 
the fields of foreign and security policy are considered to be high politics and thus an 
executive reserve by nature (Keck and Sikkink 1998). But this fact does not exclude the 
involvement of interested governmental, parliamentary, economic or societal actors in 
decision-making. Additional, non-executive actors may be included in decision-making on 
a case-by-case basis according to the issue or policy area addressed. 
 
Question 
The present study aims at taking a closer look at the above-described aspects by 
reconstructing, analyzing and comparing Russian foreign policy networks. The 
overarching question shall be formulated as follows: what types of decision-making 
networks define Russia’s foreign policies under Putin and to what extent, how and why do 
they vary depending on the policy problem? 
This query triggers a sequence of sub-questions. With regard to theory and 
methodology: on what theoretical, methodological and practical grounds can networks be 
used to further enhance an understanding of Russian foreign policy-making? With regard 
to the contextual background of Russian foreign policy-making: what kinds of political 
                                                 
 
14  See, for instance, Schumatsky (2004), Kryshtanovskaja and White (2005). 
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settings influence the form of decision-making networks? With regard to the analysis of 
networks: what kinds of network appearances and qualities emerge in terms of specific 
Russian foreign policy issues? With regard to the comparison and embedding of networks 
into a larger context: to what extent do decision-making networks vary and fit into a 
greater structural and procedural setting of Russian foreign policy-making? 
 
Theory and hypothesis 
The focus of the present study may be located on the interface between two subdisciplines 
in political science: international relations (IR) and public policy analysis (PPA). It 
identifies with IR insofar as a respectable amount of neo-liberal and constructivist 
literature in this field has addressed the genesis of foreign policy within the domestic 
political arena. The present study also refers to PPA, since most theoretical approaches 
about policy-making have been formulated in this field.15 In fact, traditional boundaries 
between IR and PPA have been gradually blurred over the last years (Coles 2000, Klöti, 
Hirschi, et al. 2005: 45-49, Rosenau 1989, 1990, 2000). This development reflects 
profound qualitative changes in politics caused by increased globalisation processes in 
recent times. In contrast to the previous clear distinction between high and low politics16 
in former decades, foreign and domestic politics have become highly intertwined 
(Goetschel, Bernath, et al. 2002). Today, foreign policy-making is a relatively open, 
flexible, dynamic and complex process including executive, legislative and non-state 
actors at multiple levels. 
In light of these circumstances, this paper adopts an alternative research perspective 
by relying on social network theories and methods inspired by, and rooted in, sociology 
and mathematics. This choice has two major advantages over traditional IR or PPA 
approaches: on a theoretical level, it adds an important dimension to classic state theories 
such as elitism, pluralism and Marxism: it considers the relationships between state and 
                                                 
 
15  See, for instance, Dunn (1994), Prittwitz and Wegrich (1994), Schubert and Bandelow (2003), Von 
Beyme (2000) and John (1998), who comprehensively outline a wide range of PPA approaches. 
16  This distinction is often used to describe the differences between foreign and domestic politics. 
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interests within civil society (Daugbjerg and Marsh 1998: 55) by focussing on links 
between actors from all spheres and levels. On a methodological level, social network 
analysis (SNA) quantitatively combines two basic components of social reality, i.e. 
structure and process. It allows the identification of organisational or individual actors 
with their specific positions and attributes as well as the relationship between them 
(Jansen 2003: 58-68). Thus, from a SNA perspective, state as well as non-state actors on 
multiple levels are supposed to be part of the Russian foreign policy-making process. 
Also, actors and interaction mechanisms are not viewed as two separate entities, but as 
two inherent elements of decision-making networks. Most scholars in the field of PPA 
refer to such networks as policy networks. A policy network may be defined as “(more or 
less) stable patterns of social relations between interdependent actors, which take shape 
around policy problems and/or policy programmes” (Kickert, Klijn, et al. 1997: 6). 
This study is based on the analytical concept according to David Knoke and Franz 
Urban Pappi et al. (1996). The basic unit of analysis in the organisational state17 is the 
policy domain. A policy domain is a complex social organisation “identified by a 
substantively defined criterion of mutual relevance or common orientation among a set of 
consequential actors concerned with formulating, advocating, and selecting courses of 
action (i.e. policy options) that are intended to resolve the delimited substantive problems 
in question” (Knoke and Laumann 1982: 256). They also assume that every policy domain 
contains several specialized subfields that allocate policy interests to particular actors. 
Subfields can be specified according to technological, geographical, economic or social 
cleavages running across policy domains. Finally, every subfield contains different issues 
and events. 
Knoke and Pappi’s model further suggests that each domain, subfield, issue and 
event attracts the interest of a specialized audience (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 83). 
Therefore, one might expect that policy networks vary depending on the domain, 
                                                 
 
17  The organisational state approach is an orienting analytic framework that views modern state-society 
relationships as “increasingly blurred, merging into a mélange of interorganisational influence and power 
relations”. See Knoke, Pappi, et al. (1996: 3). 
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subfield(s), issue(s) or event(s) involved.18 This assumption stands in line with Lowi’s 
(1964, 1972) observation that policies define politics. Furthermore, it has been confirmed 
by other authors, who adapted Lowi’s theory for the purposes of SNA (Serdült 2002, 
Smith 1993). Therefore, this study does not exclusively use networks as a tool to analyse 
actors and their interactions in decision-making; policy networks are also considered as a 
dependent variable. 
In order to analyse and compare policy networks as a dependent variable, this study 
addresses the theoretical concept of Marsh and Rhodes (1992). It treats policy networks as 
generic constructs encompassing all types of networks ranging from policy communities to 
issue networks as the end points of a continuum. According to their typology of policy 
networks, a policy community is characterised by a limited number of participants, 
frequent interaction between all members, consistent values and a balance of power 
among members. In contrast, issue networks are described as large entities with many 
actors representing a wide range of interests, maintaining only fluctuating relations with 
each other. 
There exists a long series of policy network analyses. Case studies investigated 
different policy domains and their networks: U.S. energy (Laumann and Knoke 1987), 
British agriculture (Smith 1992), German chemical legislation (Schneider 1988), British 
civil nuclear power (Saward 1992), German telecommunications (Schneider and Werle 
1991), British sea defence (Cunningham 1992), British tobacco (Read 1992), Swiss 
energy (Jegen 2002) - just to name a few. They were all able to identify the existence of 
policy networks. The concept of policy network has turned out to be a useful tool for 
understanding policy-making (Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 189). Also with regard to foreign 
policy-making, the network approach has already been applied; Klöti, Serdült, Hirschi et 
al. (2005, 2000) demonstrated that it is possible to reconstruct foreign policy networks in 
detail based on case studies. 
                                                 
 
18  Smith (1993: 58) confirms that relationships in policy networks vary from one policy sector to another 
policy sector. 
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However, a number of key questions remain unanswered. In particular, it is unclear how 
and why networks change over time and which interests are dominant in the networks. 
Moreover, how networks affect policy outcomes has never been convincingly proven 
(Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 188). The present study will neither address nor answer these 
questions. It only considers the above-mentioned basic and less-disputed theoretical 
approaches. With adjustment, they become pertinent to the analysis of Russian foreign 
policy-making. 
The described analytical concept is applied as follows: the Russian foreign policy 
field does indeed correspond to a policy domain according to Knoke and Pappi’s 
approach. It encompasses a diversity of controversial policy matters and numerous 
claimant groups and public authorities, each seeking to influence decisions (Knoke, Pappi, 
et al. 1996: 9). Also, diverse basic, overlapping and specialized subfields may be 
identified within Moscow’s foreign policy domain: near abroad,19 far abroad,20 security 
and economy. In fact, participants of these subfields adopt diverse socially constructed 
world views. They may be differentiated along the two major cleavages running 
perpendicularly throughout the Russian foreign policy domain.  
First, the near and far abroad spheres in Moscow can still be considered as two 
separate planets (Pravda 2001: 215). Although 17 years have passed by since the break-up 
of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation continues to perceive, to assess and to 
qualitatively handle the post-Soviet space in a different way than other world regions and 
states. The character of the relationships between Moscow and CIS-member states can be 
described as rather emotional, direct, informal, instant, personal and sometimes even 
irrational. Russia’s bi- and multilateral interactions with CIS-members seem to have kept a 
certain domestic character. In contrast, Moscow’s relations to far abroad countries are 
based on a stable and long-lasting Soviet foreign policy tradition. They could be labelled 
as rather business-like, diplomatic, formal, planned, institutionalized and rational. 
                                                 
 
19  The term ‘near abroad’ stands for the former Soviet Republics, who gained independence after the 
breake-up of the USSR. Except the Baltic’s, they are united within the CIS since January 22, 1993. 
20  The notion ‘far abroad’ describes other world nations or international organisations. 
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Second, security and economy seem to constitute two poles apart within the political arena 
(Alexandrova 2001: 464-465). Even if these matters often merge, Moscow seems to treat 
security and economic-related issues in a different way. As Putin continues to securitize 
its foreign policies (Lo 2003), economic issues or aspects are ultimately handled as a 
second priority. With the rising influence of siloviki and the weakening position of 
economic and liberal forces since the year 2000, security-related, strategic and geopolitical 
deliberations have clearly returned to the top of the Kremlin’s agenda. 
In light of these cleavages within the Russian foreign policy domain, this study 
hypothesizes that Russian foreign policy networks significantly vary depending on the 
involvement of the four subfields: near abroad, far abroad, security and economy. It 
thereby argues that the often-postulated view of Putin as an unchallenged super-president 
in foreign policy is overrated. Rather, he plays the role of a mediator between different 
actors and interests. He is constantly forced to take into account a varying group of actors, 
depending on the subfields involved. Whereas security-related far abroad issues tend to be 
addressed by small and homogenous networks with a strong position of the executive 
authority, the decision-making patterns of economic-related near abroad affairs are large 
and less centralised. Apparently, the picture that foreign policy decisions in Moscow are 
undertaken by an established handful of individuals around Putin has to be differentiated. 
 
Methodology 
Based on the above-described theoretical concept, four case studies have been selected. 
Each case study involves two subfields, since the geographical cleavage (near and far 
abroad) and the sectoral cleavage (security and economy) perpendicularly span the 
Russian foreign policy domain. In addition to this criterion, the cases fulfil a temporal and 
a formal requirement: all four cases represent multilateral issues involving one single 
decision taken during Vladimir Putin’s first term between 2000 and 2004: 
Introduction  9 
 
 
• Far abroad & Security: 
The establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC, 2001-2002) 
• Near abroad & Security: 
The transformation of the Collective Security Treaty into an international 
organisation (CSTO, 2001-2003) 
• Far abroad & Economy: 
The development of the Common European Economic Space (CEES, 2000-
2003) 
• Near abroad & Economy: 
The formation of the Single Economic Space between Russia, Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus (SES, 2000-2004) 
 
Indeed, the selected case studies are neither salient nor prominent at all. They do not 
represent milestones in Russia’s foreign affairs, nor did they bring about major changes 
with regard to specific issues. The cases have been chosen deliberately as they clearly 
reflect everyday, and therefore, average decision-making in Moscow. 
The case analysis is based on instruments and approaches frequently used in SNA.21 
It proceeds in four steps: initially, the network is delimitated by identifying the most 
important players involved in decision-making. This selection is carried out with the help 
of a reputational approach.22 Thereby, five experts (bureaucrats, scientists, journalists etc.) 
provide their assessment on the influence of organisational actors.23 Focussing on 
organisational, rather than on individual network members is the result of the following 
deliberations: the making and implementation of foreign policy is fundamentally 
                                                 
 
21  These tools are described in detail by Wasserman and Faust (1994). 
22  This procedure has been described in detail by Serdült (2006). See also VonBeyme (2001). 
23  The involved actors are selected from a greater ‘population’ encompassing all potential players of the 
Russian foreign policy domain. The basic ‘population’ can be determined with the help of various 
manuals and documents. Maximov (2003), for instance, provides a detailed overview of governmental 
units. Trenin and Lo (2005) assess the influence of various actors. 
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conceived as ‘a group or organisational enterprise’ (Yetiv 2004: 13). Individuals 
participate as agents of formal organisations, since they lack the resources to follow and 
effectively influence the policy-making process (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 12). In fact, 
numerous interviews conducted by the author in Moscow have shown that individuals 
usually cover-up their personal activities and prefer to act on behalf of an official 
organisation. Conversely, any Russian organisation and its activities depend, to a large 
extent, on the individual on top of it. This study perceives policy-making as an interplay of 
organisational units, which serve as formal façades of their leading exponents. 
In a second step, network interactions are specified. Another five experts assess the 
interaction frequency and intensity between the most influential actors. Hence, 10 
interviews are required to determine the policy network actors and their ties. In a third 
step, the network parameters are calculated. These indices are needed in order to classify 
and compare the networks in accordance with the theoretical model. Finally, the resulting 
decision-making procedures and structures can be visualised. The SNA software UCINET 
6 and its accessory NetDraw support the illustration of networks. 
The reconstruction of the four policy networks is performed with the help of 40 
standardised interviews (see Appendix II) conducted in Moscow by the author of this 
study. This quantitative analysis is useful as it provides a detailed snapshot of decision-
making structures and procedures between 2000 and 2004. In particular, it allows 
comparing the four case studies in terms of important data such as number of actors, 
network density or quantity of resources. However, pure quantitative data does not reveal 
crucial aspects about foreign policy-making. Namely, concrete case-related activities of 
network-members, specific relationships or major decision-making events cannot be 
traced. Therefore, quantitative data is complemented by a qualitative analysis of decision-
making patterns. With the help of open source information, the four policy networks are 
embedded into the larger context of the issues. Moreover, the qualitative investigation 
contributes to a better understanding of Russian foreign policy-making in general. By 
tracing the four different decision-making processes, specific features and common 
characteristics of Moscow’s policy-formulation can be highlighted. 
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In order to collect qualitative data about the case studies, this study’s author conducted 
another 60 non-standardised face-to-face interviews (see Appendix II) in Moscow. At the 
request of most interviewees, their names are not published in the present study. 
Nonetheless, the institutional affiliation of the experts and the interview dates are always 
indicated. In addition to the interviews, the author has carried out a comprehensive study 
of Russian, English as well as German documents and literature in order to bring together 
the required information. 
 
State of research 
In the field of Russian international relations, foreign policy outcomes have always been 
soundly analysed and discussed. However, post-Soviet studies have so far – in contrast to 
academic research between 1960 and 1991 - paid only little attention to the genesis of 
foreign policy. The question of how policies are generated and developed within the 
Russian domestic sphere has mostly been avoided after the fall of the USSR. Nonetheless, 
very limited literature has been produced. Probably the most recent and concise study in 
this area is ‘The Landscape of Russian Foreign Policy Decision-Making’ by Dmitri Trenin 
and Bobo Lo (2005). They provide accurate insights on institutions, ideas, interests and 
external factors. 
Although research performed by Russians is scarce in this field, some experts have 
contributed instructive material. Very precious information can be extracted from the three 
expert round table discussions about mechanisms in foreign policy decision-making, held 
in Moscow 2004 (Carnegie 2004, Federation-Council 2004) and 2005 (Carnegie 2005). O. 
Kryshtanovskaja’s study (2005) about the anatomy of the Russian Elite provides an up-to-
date and concise overview of the core decision-makers and their environment. Further 
insights into Putin’s political system are provided by L. Shevtsova (2005), A. Mukhin 
(2002), A. Makarkin (2003), A. Migranjan (2005) and R. Medvedev (2004). A. Degtjarev 
(2004) covers theoretical aspects of decision-making, whereas E. Tregubova (2003) 
reveals some entertaining insider stories about activities behind the Kremlin walls. 
The larger portion of literature in English has been enriched by Lo, who contributed 
“Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy” (2003) and “The 
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Securitization of Russian Foreign Policy under Putin” (2003) – two analyses, which inter 
alia carefully track changes in decision-making over the past few years. Andrew Jack 
(2004) describes the general ambience “Inside Putin’s Russia”, whereas Donald Jensen 
(1998) focuses on Yeltsin’s presidency. Jensen argues in “How Russia is ruled – 1998” 
that Russian decision-making is dependent on the potential costs and benefits of the actors 
involved. Earlier, N. Malcolm, A. Pravda, R. Allison and M. Light (1996) have 
contributed an analysis about “Internal factors in Russian Foreign Policy”. 
In Germany, a small number of experts have dominated the subject: M. Mommsen 
(2004) describes actors as well as their changing roles and identities, whereas E. Schneider 
(1998, 2001, 2002) mainly focuses on institutional aspects of decision-making. H. Pleines 
and H.-H. Schröder (Pleines and Schröder 2003, Schröder 2001) have both conducted 
numerous studies, usually with regard to the Russian business elite and their impact on 
policy-making. Earlier, K. Segbers (2001) explained post-Soviet ‘patchworks’ of actors 
and institutions. 
The quoted existing literature is marked by two shortcomings: firstly, it lacks 
detailed empirical and comparative studies based on specific cases.24 So far, the analysis 
of Russian foreign policy-making has been conducted on a more abstract and superficial 
level, investigating only the surface of a deep ocean. This metaphor extends beyond the 
prevailing dark waters. Apparently, it seems to be unrewarding, useless or even dangerous 
to delve into. Secondly, Russian decision-making has hardly been systematically analysed 
based on existing political theories and methods. Studies by and large remained 
descriptive and policy-oriented. 
 
Ambitions and limits of this study 
This study aims at filling the above-mentioned gaps by systematically, empirically and 
comparatively analyzing Russian foreign policy-making, in the light of specific political 
                                                 
 
24  VonBeyme (2001) also observes a lack of case studies tracing the genesis of foreign policy decisions. So 
far, only few case studies are available. See, for instance: Schmedt (1997), Grinevsky (1998), Baev 
(2005). 
Introduction  13 
 
theories and with the help of case studies. Above all, it aspires to expand knowledge about 
foreign policy decision-making in contemporary Russia. The analysis of policy-making 
structures and processes leads to a better understanding of Moscow’s behaviour within the 
international community, because activities beyond national boundaries are deeply 
anchored within the domestic sphere. Additional knowledge in this field may also lead to a 
clearer identification of shortcomings and of the potential measures necessary in order to 
improve the decision-making mechanisms. 
Furthermore, this study seeks to contribute towards an academic discourse that has 
recently fallen silent. Scarce literature and a general lack of data make the analysis of 
foreign policy-making under Putin a complex venture. As G. Allison (1971: 184) stated in 
his ground breaking analysis about U.S. decision-making during the Cuban missile crisis, 
the use of public documents, newspapers, interviews of experts and participants to piece 
together the bits of information available is a difficult task. It is additionally complicated 
by the fact that research activities in this field have become a politically delicate 
undertaking within Russia. As soon as domestic politics is concerned, the Kremlin reacts 
decisively to public criticism, be it articulated through media or research. Russian citizens 
daring to openly disagree with the official opinion may face, at least, serious discomfort.25 
Nevertheless, the assessment of Russian foreign policy-making is a task that cannot be left 
out or ceded to intelligence agencies.  
Finally, by applying theories and methods of SNA, new insights might emerge. The 
frequent ratings of the most influential politicians in Russia26 as well as research based on 
the network idea in theoretical terms27 may not suffice. Identifying and comparing actors 
and their interactions with regard to specific foreign policy issues may reveal or confirm 
general patterns in decision-making. 
This study definitely has its limits. There is little hope that the Russian foreign 
policy black box can be completely cracked. Decision-making processes – especially with 
                                                 
 
25  This opinion has been informally advanced to the author by different Russian researchers (Feb 2006). 
26  Various press products like Vlast, Politicheskii Klass and Nezavisimaja Gazeta regularly publish such 
ratings. 
27  See, for instance, Pleines (2002), Segbers (2001). 
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regard to the behaviour of individual actors - ultimately remain enigmatic. The 
reconstruction of policy networks constitutes an approximation to the real world. 
Moreover, the analysis will not allow tracing any changes of policy networks over time. 
Hence, a comparison between Putin’s first and second term, or the assessment of today’s 
Kremlin decision-making from a historic perspective is not possible. Apart from that, no 
answers can be given to the impact of policy networks on policy outcomes, as this 
correlation has remained disputed and insufficiently discussed in theory. The present study 
therefore only cursorily touches upon this matter within the framework of the concluding 
remarks. Last but not least, there is always the flipside of the coin when using theoretical 
concepts: the analysis runs the risk of being a prisoner of its two-dimensional hypotheses. 
The real world is far more complex. 
 
Contents 
Part I defines the theoretical and methodological framework of this current study. It first 
focuses on general characteristics of the foreign policy-making process and discusses the 
usefulness and implications of SNA to analyse Moscow’s decisions. Subsequently, the 
analytic concept, its application on Russian foreign policy-making, hypotheses and the 
methodological arrangement is outlined. 
Part II describes the contextual background. An overview of Russia’s foreign 
policies during Putin’s first term is provided in order to allow a more accurate location of 
the case studies. The four issues – the NRC, the CSTO, the CEES and the SES - have its 
origins in Russia’s jeopardised influence within the post-Soviet space and in considerable 
institutional changes within the far abroad. Part II also analyses the potential players of the 
Russian foreign policy domain. In particular, it explains and discusses the positions and 
roles of presidential, governmental, parliamentary, economic and other actors. 
In Part III, the four different case studies and their policy networks are reconstructed 
and analysed one-by-one. The calculation of network parameters and the visualisation of 
decision-making procedures and structures constitute the centre pieces of each chapter. 
Additionally, all four issues and their major events are presented in a qualitative manner to 
provide the policy-formulation context. 
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Finally, Part IV aggregates empirical findings and closes the research cycle. First and 
foremost, hypotheses are verified based on the comparison of network patterns. These 
results are complemented by a qualitative assessment of Moscow’s activities in global 
affairs. Beside the discussion of the main characteristics of Russian foreign policy-
making, great importance is attached to policy-relevant statements. Therefore, concrete 
consequences for Russian policy-makers as well as for international actors are outlined 
and explained at the end of Part IV. 
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Part I. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The present study aims at investigating Russian foreign policy-making with the help of 
network-related theoretical approaches and methodological tools. This first part sets up the 
framework for analysis by posing the following question: on what theoretical, 
methodological and practical grounds can networks be used to further enhance an 
understanding of Russian foreign policy-making?  
There exist good reasons to take advantage of existing academic models and 
proceedings instead of analysing Russian foreign policy-making without theoretical and 
methodological reference. The fields of IR and PPA offer a wide range of useful concepts 
that may contribute to new insights. As most of these approaches have emerged from 
Western traditions in political science, they have rarely been applied to Russian politics. 
This opens up promising prospects to view the object of investigation from different 
angles and to gain new insights. 
The adoption of a network-oriented perspective creates additional possibilities. It 
has many advantages over more traditional IR and PPA approaches. As mentioned in the 
introduction, it allows investigating actors including their interactions from various social 
spheres and levels. This comprehensive approach ultimately makes it possible to 
determine, visualise and compare structural and procedural patterns of decision-making 
networks.  
Part I of this study consists of four chapters. The first one defines the foreign policy-
making process, its distinctive features and common characteristics with domestic policy-
making. The second chapter presents the network perspective more in-depth and explains 
the independent and dependent variable. Chapter 3 shows the application of the analytical 
concept to the Russian foreign policy domain. In particular, it introduces the case studies 
and formulates the hypotheses of this study. Finally, the methodological approach is 
presented in Chapter 4. 
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1. The Foreign Policy-Making Process 
 
The first chapter of this study is dedicated to the theoretical aspects of foreign policy-
making. Thereby, the term ‘foreign policy-making process’ will be defined and discussed. 
Obviously, foreign policy-making cannot be treated as an isolated category. Reference has 
to be made to public policy-making in general and to domestic policy-making in 
particular. Therefore, the sections 1.2 and 1.3 will focus on differences and similarities 
between foreign and domestic policy-formulation. The clear definition of the foreign 
policy-making process will lay the ground for further theoretical and methodological 
deliberations.  
 
 
1.1 Definition 
 
At first glance, it appears to be misleading to refer to the foreign policy-making process. It 
suggests that there exists only one single and unitary process. In fact, foreign policy-
making varies in three ways: first, decision-making depends on the nation state, its historic 
traditions and cultural features. This point is essential for this study because Russian 
foreign policy-making has its idiosyncrasies and may only partially be compared to other 
decision-making styles. Second, processes may also differ according to the policies 
addressed. Actors and patterns of interaction can significantly change depending on 
geographical or sectoral factors. This study focuses exactly on this variation. As argued in 
Chapter 3, Russian policy-making differs as Moscow addresses near or far abroad issues, 
security or economic issues. Third, the foreign policy-making process also varies over 
time. As a wide range of investigations about the U.S. decision-making processes has 
shown, every president has his own personal style of management (Mitchell 2005). 
Different political leaders or simply different political eras have an impact on the making 
of foreign policy. 
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For the above-mentioned reasons, it is feasible to regard foreign policy-making as 
manifold with many highly dynamic processes. Yet, from a theoretical point of view, it is 
also justified to conceive foreign policy-making as a single construct. It has certain 
characteristics which remain constant irrespective of nation, policy area or time period. 
The present study adopts this perspective and identifies common, theoretically less 
disputed aspects. To begin with, the term foreign policy-making process shall be clarified. 
Joshua Goldstein (1996: 176) suggests the following definition: 
 
The Foreign Policy process is the set of procedures and structures that states use to arrive at 
foreign policy decisions and to implement them. 
 
The key elements of this useful definition are the expressions procedures and structures. 
Procedures may encompass a variety of aspects: institutions in the form of written and 
unwritten laws, rules, norms, behaviour of organisations or individuals, interactions, 
mechanisms, actions, relations. Briefly, a procedure is a formal or informal order or way 
of doing things. In contrast, structures describe the way in which something is organised, 
built or put together. They may be understood as certain systems or patterns containing 
elements in a specific order. The elements have particular characteristics and attributes, 
which are essential parts of structures. Even if a structure may change over time, it is 
conceived as a fixed situation at a given moment. For the purpose of this study, these two 
cardinal dimensions of the foreign policy-making process provide a useful tool to 
categorise the main characteristics of decision-making. 
Goldstein also conceives foreign policy-making as a process and hence a series of 
actions over time, which ends with a decision and its implementation. Apparently, 
Goldstein’s definition refers to the policy-cycle concept initially elaborated by Harold 
Lasswell (1956). He distinguishes different stages of the public policy-making process and 
creates an ideal model of rational decision-making. Brewer (1974) adjusts Lasswell’s 
proposition and suggests six phases of decision-making: initiation, estimation, selection, 
implementation, evaluation and termination. Even if the concept of the policy-cycle was 
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repeatedly criticised for being too simplistic, ideal and descriptively invalid,28 it has, 
nevertheless, the advantage of providing an analytical framework (Klöti, Serdült, et al. 
2000: 39-40, Widmer and Serdült 1999: 22-24). In this study, Russian foreign policy-
making is analysed only with regard to the phases of initiation, estimation and selection. 
Processual elements like problem framing, agenda setting, formulation of objectives, 
acquisition of information, elaboration of policy options, comparison and assessment of 
options as well as the final selection do matter, however the phases of implementation, 
evaluation and termination are disregarded. Decision-making shall encompass the whole 
process until the adoption of a framework agreement. 
Based on this definition, the main characteristics of foreign policy-making will 
subsequently be discussed. Thereby, the profile of foreign policy-making can be more 
clearly drawn and clarified if it is contrasted with the domestic policy-making process. In 
section 1.2, differences between high and low politics are traced, whereas section 1.3 
focuses on similarities and on the convergence of the two fields. 
 
                                                 
 
28  See, for instance, Jann (1998), Schreyögg (1996). 
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1.2 Distinctive features and demarcation from domestic policy-making 
 
Table 1 outlines differences between foreign and domestic policy-making processes. 
These opposed particularities collected from a wide range of literature have to be 
understood as stereotypes. However, in reality, they cannot be consistently confirmed. 
Rather, they represent tendencies, qualitative poles at both extremes. 
 
 Foreign policy-making Domestic policy-making 
reactive policy-making proactive policy-making 
unpredictable policy environment predictable policy environment 
short time frames available long time frames available 
interactions not institutionalized interactions highly institutionalized 
confidential interactions public interactions 
Procedure 
intense and frequent interactions fluctuating and occasional interactions 
dominant executive bodies dominant legislative bodies 
few actors involved many actors involved 
small range of represented 
interests/values 
broad range of represented 
interests/values 
Enhanced competition among actors 
for access to decision-making 
Lower competition among actors for 
access to decision-making 
Structure 
fluctuating roles and influence of actors constant roles and influence of actors 
Table 1: Stereotypical differences between foreign and domestic policy-making 
 
With regard to procedures, foreign policy-making is mostly reactive (Coles 2000: 11). It 
often responds to events happening outside of national boundaries, whereas domestic 
policy-making may sometimes actively address not yet urgent problems. Also, 
unpredictability is more dominant in foreign policy-making than in most other areas of 
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government (Coles 2000: 11). There are more exogenous variables, which often render 
foreign policy-making an adventurous guessing. In addition to that, high politics is 
characterised by relatively short time frames available for a response. As a British senior 
diplomat put it: “Our difficulty was largely a matter of available time. We had little 
enough time for policy-thinking itself let alone for considering at any length the criticisms 
of outsiders” (Coles 2000: 15). In contrast, less serious consequences are to be expected if 
a domestic policy is delayed, or sometimes even postponed for years. Furthermore, the 
policy-formulation process is usually less institutionalized in terms of written rules and 
laws.29 Often, a few constitutional articles delegate international relations to the state’s 
executive without defining the policy-making process further in detail (Hess 2001). 
These characteristics have serious consequences concerning interactions between 
foreign policy actors. Often, policy-formulation happens by random-like processes or can 
be heavily dependent on the personality and management capacities of a nation’s leader 
(Mitchell 2005). Hence, domestic policy-making is more institutionalized than its 
counterpart (Klöti, Serdült, et al. 2000: 18). Also, interactions between foreign policy 
actors are mostly confidential (Klöti, Serdült, et al. 2000: 16). This may be explained by 
frequent negotiations on the international level, implicating strict coordination and 
secrecy. And last but not least, interactions are often intense and frequent in light of the 
short time frames and required quality of policies. In comparison, domestic policy-making 
processes might tend to involve more institutionalized, public, fluctuating and occasional 
interactions. 
Differences between foreign and domestic policy-making can also be identified with 
regard to structures. Thereby, policy-making structures are understood as actors’ 
constellations within the political arena. The most striking feature of foreign policy-
making is the dominance of executive bodies (Hess 2001, Klöti, Serdült, et al. 2000: 16). 
Foreign affairs have remained more or less an executive reserve (Keck and Sikkink 1998) 
with exceptional powers held by the president (Lentner 2006: 173). Non-state and 
                                                 
 
29  Gürbey (2005: 364-368) refers to this fact as constitutional defects in decision-making. See also Yetiv 
(2004: 129-146). 
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particularly parliamentary actors usually have no substantial influence on foreign policy 
formulation, since they could endanger international negotiations (Linder 1999: 203-204) 
or remarkably prolong the decision-making process. This distinctiveness of foreign policy-
making stands in stark contrast to domestic politics. The terms ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics30 
definitely reflect this fact. 
As Table 1 further illustrates, fewer actors are involved in foreign than in domestic 
policy-making. This assumption is based on previously mentioned deliberations. Even if 
popular and elite support for the president is highly important (Hess 2001), closed 
networks seem to define a country’s foreign policies (Kevenhörster 2003: 414). 
Consequently, actors involved in decision-making represent a smaller range of interests 
and values than within the domestic sector. This again leads to enhanced competition for 
access to foreign policy-making processes. Actors do have an interest in placing their 
imprints on the nation’s conduct abroad (Yetiv 2004: 247-380). Indeed, political factors 
are very important in making foreign policy decisions (Mintz 2003: 6). Accordingly, the 
roles and influence of foreign policy actors fluctuate (Coles 2000: 83). 
Given the above-stated differences, it may well be argued that the foreign and 
domestic spheres constitute two separate worlds. Baylis and Smith (2001: 9) for instance 
point out that globalization is a myth. According to their view, these processes have been 
existent all through history. Also, it might be stated, that the nation state has not lost its 
useful functions in terms of jurisdiction, problem solving and democracy. Therefore, 
domestic politics will and shall continue to play an important and different role than 
foreign affairs (Wolf 2002). Additionally, the traditional and ongoing gap between high 
politics and low politics has conceptual reasons. In contradistinction to the domestic field, 
foreign policy can only be effective if it is unitary, coherent, confidential, flexible and 
dynamic (Goetschel, Bernath, et al. 2002: 27, Williams 2004: 911). The same holds true 
for policies that have always played a special and crucial role for nation states: security 
and defence matters. These issues are usually detached from the domestic arena and 
located within the foreign policy sphere (Seidelmann 2001: 21). Often enough, security 
                                                 
 
30  This distinction is often used to describe the difference between foreign and domestic politics. 
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and defence policies are treated as integral elements of foreign affairs (Gürbey 2005: 364-
368). Therefore, it is assumed that security and defence policy-making accounts to foreign 
policy-making. However, contrary to all these reasons, it may just as well be argued that 
foreign and domestic policy-making have merged over the past few years. This point of 
view will be dwelled on in the next subchapter. 
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1.3 Common characteristics and convergence with domestic policy-making 
 
With good reasons, it might also be assumed that foreign and domestic policy-making 
have a lot in common and that the two fields have gradually converged over the last 
decades (Rosenau 1980, 1989, 2000). Every internal issue contains a global dimension and 
cannot be treated in isolation from the outside world. Synchronically, foreign affairs are 
progressively more dependant on the domestic political landscape. Citizens have become 
increasingly aware of international and global issues (Klöti, Hirschi, et al. 2005: 20). They 
have noticed that foreign policies are significant as an important tool to shape their 
external environment. Thus, the traditional distinction between domestic and foreign 
policy-making may also be considered as void (Goetschel, Bernath, et al. 2002, Rosenau 
1987). 
 
 
Foreign policy-making 
& 
Domestic policy-making 
Procedure 
Management & presentation have 
become most important 
Actor’s involvement expanded on a 
vertical scale 
Structure 
Actor’s involvement expanded on a 
horizontal scale 
Table 2: Stereotypical similarities between foreign and domestic policy-making 
 
In Table 2, some stereotypical, procedural and structural similarities between foreign and 
domestic policy-making are listed. It does not claim that the mentioned common 
characteristics are exhaustive. Definitely, management and presentation have become 
important in both fields. The scope of governmental responsibility has expanded and the 
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complexity of public affairs has increased (Campbell, Baskin, et al. 1989: 86). As Coles 
(2000: 10) puts it with regard to foreign policy, “time spent on management, on 
presentation, on digesting information, on responding to the day-to-day and often 
unpredictable demands of government is time lost for policy-thinking, for planning, for 
the formulation and orderly pursuit of policy objectives.” This point has far reaching 
implications on capacities of various ministries. Another similarity between foreign and 
domestic policy-making can be unearthed in connection with the composition of decision-
making actors. The range of actors involved in policy formulation has expanded in the 
vertical as well as in the horizontal direction. Vertically, decision-making today involves 
organisations or individuals from various levels (Smith 1993: 65). With the rise of 
international organisations and supranational communities, actors range from local 
political arenas and administrations to international and global actors. This vertical 
expansion has also been labelled as ‘multi-level governance’ (Wallace and Wallace 2000: 
31-32). On a horizontal scale, policy-making processes nowadays include diverse state 
and non-state actors and interests (Heclo 1978). The distinction between state and civil 
society has become blurred (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 4-9). Especially through NGO’s, 
civil society seems to have an enhanced direct influence to political processes. Also, 
economic actors are more largely represented compared to earlier times (Risse 2002). 
Thus, the vertical and horizontal expansion of actor’s participation has made foreign, as 
well as domestic, decision-making circles less homogenous. They have therefore also 
become more complex and supposedly more conflictive. 
What kind of intermediary conclusions can be drawn from these theoretical 
deliberations? Obviously, the differences between foreign and domestic policy-making 
outweigh the similarities. Therefore, it seems to be reasonable to continue treating high 
and low politics as two different worlds. Even if they have converged over the last few 
years, foreign and domestic policy-making processes seem to follow their own specific 
logics. Evidently, political mechanisms, their traditions and cultures have evolved in two 
dissimilar spheres over past decades. They seem to persist today and possibly will 
continue to do so in the future. 
This subchapter has traced major characteristics of the foreign policy-making 
process by contrasting it with domestic policy-formulation. Thereby, differences and 
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similarities between high and low politics have been described in order to contribute 
towards achieving two aims: first, by differentiating the two fields, the definition of the 
foreign policy-making process has become more transparent and clear-cut. It has served as 
a tool to comprehensively circumscribe foreign policy-making. Second, the delimitation 
has laid the primary theoretical ground for this study. Subsequently, reference will often 
be made to dissimilarities and similarities between the two political areas. The next 
chapter heavily depends on these deliberations as it introduces the analytical concept of 
this study. 
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2. Analytical Concept: Policy Domains and Policy Networks 
 
The last chapter has defined and described the foreign policy-making process. It provides 
the theoretical fundament for this chapter, in which the analytical concept of this study 
will be elaborated and explained. It has to be stated here, that this chapter will exclusively 
discuss theoretical aspects. The translation of the analytical concept into a practical 
framework will only be performed in Chapter 3. It will then be demonstrated how the 
analytical concept can be applied to Russian foreign policy-making during Putin’s first 
presidential term. 
This chapter first outlines the theoretical focus of this study. It explains to what 
extent and why a social network perspective is useful for the analysis of foreign policy-
making. Subsequently, the independent and dependent variables will be introduced. How 
policy networks depend on policy domain subfields and their characteristics will be 
pinpointed. Whereas some elements of existing theoretical approaches may be directly 
integrated into the concept, others will have to be adjusted. 
 
 
2.1 The network perspective 
 
Motivation to adopt a network perspective 
Based on the previous chapter, the theoretical orientation of this analysis will here be laid 
out and explained. Goldstein’s definition of a foreign policy process (see 1.1) has proved 
to be useful, because it distinguishes between procedural and structural aspects of policy-
making. In fact, the two dimensions – procedures and structures - do not only provide a 
convenient analytical tool. It is of utmost importance to analyse both dimensions in order 
to fully understand foreign policy-making. Therefore, the main criterion for the 
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theoretical focus of this study is that it simultaneously considers procedures and 
structures. This restriction a priori excludes traditional institutional approaches31 
understanding decision-making processes in terms of constitution and law or theories. It 
also rules out rational actor’s approaches focusing on individual behaviour and centralised 
power structures.32 
Another criterion emerges from previous discussions. As has been noted, the actor’s 
participation in decision-making processes has expanded on a vertical and horizontal 
scale. Governance today is no longer conceived as an exclusive state matter, but integrates 
civil society and economy. Hence, the theoretical orientation needs to take into account 
societal and economic actors. This criterion implies that classic state theories like 
corporatist approaches are not appropriate for this analysis. Rather, the focus has to be 
shifted to modern governance theories involving societal integration mechanisms 
(Schneider 2005: 32). 
A third criterion takes into account the specific characteristics of foreign policy-
making reflected above. It is obvious that policy-making, understood as an interplay 
between different actors, cannot be analysed on a macro level.33 Thus, the theoretical 
approach has to concentrate on the micro or meso level of analysis. Macro-analysis like 
system theories or realist approaches in international relations would not be suitable to 
investigate decision-making processes. 
Given these three criteria, one theoretical focus seems to be especially promising: 
the network perspective, which conceives public policies as results of web-like human 
interactions. The term network perspective has been deliberately chosen because it has two 
meanings.34 In political science, it stands for a variety of theories and methods (Knill 
2000, Pappi 1993, Serdült 2002: 127-128). Used in a rather metaphorical manner (Van 
Waarden 1992: 30), the network view has become popular in contemporary state 
                                                 
 
31  See, for instance, Friedrich (1950) or Schneider (1998) 
32  Von Beyme (2000: 136-150) provides a good overview over different rational choice approaches. 
33  See also Schneider (2005). 
34  Serdült (2002: 127) even identifies a third meaning. Network approaches adopt a constructivist view of 
social reality. 
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theories.35 They qualitatively identify ‘nerves of governance’ by tracing interactions 
between different actors. Those are manifold, omni directional and they run through 
different levels, sectors and units (Von Beyme 2000: 289). Used as a method, social 
network analysis (SNA) offers various quantitative instruments allowing to empirically 
reconstruct networks (Scott 2000: 37, Wasserman and Faust 1994). This study is based on 
specific network-related theories (see Chapter 2) and methodologically takes advantage of 
instruments developed within the field of SNA (see Chapter 4). 
 
Potential of the network perspective on public policy-making 
Numerous research projects have been performed in the past to answer the ever-attracting 
question of ‘who governs’. Whereas decision-making processes have been analysed in 
different contexts such as corporate governance and associational governance for instance 
(Schneider 2004) - the focus here shall be turned towards public policy-making. In this 
specific sector, the network perspective has three major assets. 
First, many authors have referred to networks as social structures (Jansen 2003, 
Knoke 1990, Schneider 1992). However, networks describe social structures in a different 
way than traditional approaches in sociology did. Social structures are not conceived as a 
bundle of intuitive natural ideas and concepts about behaviour in social relations among 
people. Rather, they are understood as social patterns (Brown 1965) including a dynamic 
component that is simultaneously the result and origin of human action (Burt 1982). The 
main characteristic of networks is their ability to seize interactions between social units – 
be it administrational units, organisations, companies, groups, families or individuals. 
Consequently, networks do not only reflect social structures but also procedures. Actors 
and their individual choices, relations and behaviours are embedded in a larger context of 
social structures (Granovetter 1985). Networks encompass the characteristics of the actors 
involved as well as the interactions between them with regard to a specific issue. The 
linkage between structures and procedures provides a favourable precondition for the 
analysis of public policy-making which is unmatched by traditional state theories. 
                                                 
 
35  See, for instance, Héritier (1993), Mayntz (1993) and Pleines (2002). 
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Secondly, the network perspective conceives policy decisions as the result of interactions 
between numerous and manifold actors (Schneider 2005). It thereby clearly distinguishes 
itself from two other theoretical strands. On the one hand, it rejects the assumption that 
public policy is centrally created by a single, monolithic state. On the other hand, the 
network perspective also discards the view of a multi-actor, bottom-up policy-formation 
(Kickert, Klijn, et al. 1997). Pluralist approaches seem to neglect the fact that in 
contemporary policy-making, oligopoly has replaced the competition in the political 
marketplace (Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 201). A network-related view implies that public 
policy-making includes a wide range of diverse actors from all levels and sectors. In fact, 
as public and private spheres gradually blur (Wilensky and Turner 1987: 10), new forms 
of governance arise. Organised societal and economic interests become increasingly 
represented in public policy-making. As a result, networks become highly heterogeneous 
actor communities (Heclo 1978).  
Thirdly, the network perspective allows the analyses of complex and dynamic 
structures and processes in detail. Unlike traditional state theories, network approaches 
trace the interactions of the social units at any desired level. According to the researcher’s 
needs, actors may be individuals, groups, organisations or any other social entity. Due to 
this flexibility, network approaches have become highly popular among political scientists 
(Von Beyme 2000). Particularly with regard to public policy-making, network 
perspectives have helped to reconstruct decisions and their genesis at a micro level. 
Thereby, the term policy network has become a popular construct to describe “(more or 
less) stable patterns of social relations between interdependent actors, which take shape 
around policy problems and/or policy programmes.” (Kickert, Klijn, et al. 1997: 6). 
During the past two decades, a remarkable number of studies have quantitatively 
identified and reconstructed policy networks from specific national policy areas:36 in the 
U.S., the two sectors energy and health have been compared (Laumann and Knoke 1987), 
whereas in Germany, decision-making networks in the areas of chemical legislation 
(Schneider 1988), videotext introduction (Schneider 1989) and telecommunication reform 
                                                 
 
36  Schneider (2005) provides a nice overview of policy-making network analysis. 
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(Schneider and Werle 1991) have been revealed. Intersectoral comparisons have identified 
network differences with regard to US agriculture, energy, health and labour (Heinz 
1993), British agriculture (Smith 1992), civil nuclear power (Saward 1992), sea defence 
(Cunningham 1992), tobacco (Read 1992) and more. Also within the field of foreign 
policy-making, the network approach has already been applied. Klöti, Serdült, Hirschi et 
al. (2005, 2000) demonstrated that it is possible to reconstruct foreign policy networks in 
detail based on case studies. 
 
Shortcomings of the network perspective 
The adoption of a network perspective also has its disadvantages. Primarily, network 
approaches are derived from quantitative methods originally founded in sociometry.37 
Therefore, the pure network view provides essentially no more than a metaphorical picture 
of social reality. Whereas a theory usually explains a relationship between two variables, 
the genuine network view rather delivers a tool to describe and formalize specific 
circumstances. Network concepts alone basically operate in a vacuum. Hence, if networks 
are used as either a dependent or an independent variable, network approaches have to be 
theoretically embedded and used in conjunction with social theories (Jegen 2002: 17-25, 
Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 202, Serdült 2002: 130). 
Another problem is that policy change can hardly be described and explained by 
network concepts. In fact, most scholars compare networks across different sectors and 
consider policy networks as a source of policy inertia, not innovation (Rhodes and Marsh 
1992: 196). There exists a general lack of investigations following dynamic changes 
within networks over time.38 
An additional weakness of network approaches investigating public policy-making 
is particularly unsatisfactory. It seems as if any scholar so far has been able to 
convincingly prove and thoroughly explain the effects of policy networks on policy-
outcomes. Findings that policy networks foster incremental outcomes and reinforce the 
                                                 
 
37  Moreno (1953) has further developed basic deliberations of Simmel. 
38  One of the rare studies in this respect has been provided by Doreian and Stokman (1997). 
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status-quo (Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 197-198) have for the most part remained on the 
surface. The question about how patterns and shapes of networks may translate into policy 
outcomes has ultimately remained unanswered.39 
Nevertheless, the network perspective seems to be the most suitable for the purpose 
of this study. The next subchapter introduces the analytical concept that shall be applied in 
order to examine Russian foreign policy-making. 
 
 
                                                 
 
39  See also Smith (1993: 77). 
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2.2 Independent variable: policy domain subfields and specialized audiences 
 
As stated in Chapter 1, the foreign policy making process has become gradually more 
dynamic and complex. Accordingly, policies tend to be made within increasingly 
fragmented and specialized arenas with a limited number of participants (Campbell, 
Baskin, et al. 1989). It seems as if in reality, different group or government relationships 
exist depending on the policy arena (Smith 1993: 76). These developments have led to the 
creation of the notion of a subgovernment in the United States (Ripley and Franklin 1980). 
It was assumed that most decisions on non-controversial issues are made within small 
groups, that are “clusters of individuals that make decisions in a given substantive area of 
policy” (Ripley and Franklin 1980: 8). British scholars preferred the expression policy 
communities (Jordan and Richardson 1987, Richardson and Jordan 1979). According to 
their view, policy is made between a myriad of interconnecting and interpenetrating 
organisations. 
On the basis of these concepts, Laumann and Knoke apply the term policy domain. 
It is defined as a complex social organisation “identified by a substantively defined 
criterion of mutual relevance or common orientation among a set of consequential actors 
concerned with formulating, advocating, and selecting courses of action (i.e. policy 
options) that are intended to resolve the delimited substantive problems in question” 
(Knoke and Laumann 1982: 256). In short, a policy domain is “a set of actors with major 
concerns, whose preferences and actions on policy events must be taken into account by 
other domain participants” (Laumann and Knoke 1987: 10). 
This study’s analytical concept adopted and adjusted a theoretical framework that 
further clarified the policy domain concept:40 Knoke and Pappi (1996) proclaimed that 
every complex industrial society gives rise to numerous and relatively autonomous policy 
domains “…organised around some central substantive concerns or set of societal 
                                                 
 
40  Knoke, Pappi, et al. (1996) comprehensively analysed and compared the labour policy domains in the 
US, Germany and Japan. 
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problems and their proposed solutions, with which the domain’s participants must deal on 
a continuing basis” (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 9). A policy domain’s boundaries are not 
synonymous with formal state ministries. Rather, “all domain boundaries are more or less 
fuzzy and porous, allowing various participants, problems, and policy proposals to enter 
and leave in disorderly fashion” (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 10). According to Knoke and 
Pappi, a policy domain consists of four components: policy actors, policy interests, power 
relations and collective actions. 
 
Policy actors 
Policy actors constitute the first component of a policy domain (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 
11-13). Similarly to previous studies (Laumann, Heinz, et al. 1991, Laumann and Knoke 
1987), Knoke and Pappi focus on public and private organisations and not on individual 
persons. They believe that only organisations can mobilise sufficient resources to follow 
and influence the policy-making process. Individuals are considered to be agents of formal 
organisations such as interest groups, peak associations or government institutions. Knoke 
and Pappi also stress that only influential organisations shall be taken into account, as 
“perhaps thousands of organisations express some interest in a given domain’s policy 
outcomes, but far fewer make discernable impacts” (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 13). 
This study shares Knoke and Pappi’s conceptual deliberations. The making and 
execution of foreign policy is fundamentally conceived as “a group or organisational 
enterprise” (Yetiv 2004: 13). As will be shown in Chapter 3, these theoretical thoughts 
stand in line with circumstances within the Russian foreign policy arena. 
 
Policy interests 
As a second component of a policy domain, Knoke and Pappi analyse policy interests as 
nested sets at three levels: subfield, issue and event (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 13-17). 
According to their view, any domain affaire is surrounded by a specialized audience 
(Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 83): 
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Constrained by narrow mandates and limited resources, most organisations cannot afford to 
devote extensive attention to many concerns at one time. Consequently, the spatial 
arrangement of labour policy subfields and issues should resemble donuts – rim or circle 
structures with hollow centres – indicating that most domain affairs attract the interest of 
specialized audiences. Each segment along the circumference consists of topics closely 
resembling one another in the kinds of organisations that express passion or indifference about 
them. 
 
Every policy domain may contain several subfields. There are actors concentrating on one 
subfield according to cost-benefit calculations or their ideological orientation. But actors 
may also be specialized in two or more specific subfields and have an interest in others. 
Therefore, subfield boundaries are permeable, overlapping and changing over time. It is 
not easy to clearly identify subfields. A policy domain may show up one or more 
cleavages with regard to technology, economy, geography, population, history or other 
factors.  
On a lower level, every subfield again contains several issues. An issue can be 
defined as a “set of substantive matters that attract the attention of some domain actors” 
(Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 14). Issues are framed and followed by interested 
domain/subfield actors in a highly dynamic process (Kingdon 1995). Issues may be linked 
with each other, brought to the attention of other actors, addressed by formulating concrete 
policy proposals, delayed or even deleted on the agenda.  
Finally, the domain subfield actors, engaged in an issue, may have an interest in 
specific events. An event is a “critical, temporally located decision point in a collective 
decision-making sequence that must occur in order for a policy option to be finally 
selected” (Laumann and Knoke 1987: 251). An event can be of a judicial, executive or 
legislative nature or may also be classified according to the policy-cycle scheme (Lasswell 
1956). Events can take the form of crises or disasters and attract the complete and 
immediate actor’s attention (Kingdon 1995).  
It is noteworthy that the actors may be tentatively interested in a specific subfield, 
issue or event. Therefore, such communities or networks feature a core and a periphery 
(Smith 1993: 81): 
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A policy community tends to have a core and periphery (Laumann and Knoke 1987) or, in 
other words, a primary and secondary community. The primary core contains the key actors 
who set the rules of the game, determine membership and the main policy direction of the 
community. 
 
This study will fully apply Knoke and Pappi’s policy interest concept as recapitulated and 
visualised in Figure 1. Subfields, issues and events attract a specialized audience, which 
leads to variations in policy networks. This argumentation stands in line with Theodor 
Lowi’s (1972) proposition. He observed that policies determine politics by distinguishing 
distributive, redistributive and regulative policies. Depending on these categories, he 
characterised political processes as consensual, conflictive or as marked by changing 
coalitions (Lowi 1972: 299). For these reasons, this study treats policy networks as a 
dependent variable.41 It assumes that even in the small and restricted world of foreign 
policy-making, policy networks vary depending on the specialized subfield actors. 
Chapter 3 will explain how this relationship suits Russian foreign policy-making. It 
prepares the ground for the main hypotheses (see 3.3). 
 
Figure 1: Subfields, issues and events 
                                                 
 
41  See also Jegen (2002). 
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Power relations 
The third component of a policy domain concerns power relations. According to Knoke 
and Pappi (1996: 17-19), it is a critical objective to observe power relations in a policy 
domain. For them, information (scientific, legal, political or other knowledge) and 
resources (money, labour power, facilities and more) are the most important factors for 
organisational actors to successfully participate in policy-making processes. In order to 
exercise power, actors are required to interact within networks of exchange relations 
(Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 18).  
The emergence of stable exchange networks in a policy domain reflects the differing 
capacities of actors to gain access to resources essential for participating in and shaping policy 
decisions. […] Access to resources and their exchange confer unequal positional advantages, 
which can be represented as the actors’ locations either near the centres or on the peripheries 
of resource networks’ social space. 
 
For this present study, power relations are of utmost importance. Based on Knoke and 
Pappi’s concept, that focuses on exchange networks of information and resources. 
However, it does not treat these factors as two separate networks. Rather it assesses the 
intensity of the relationship between organisational actors in terms of information and 
resources within one network. 
 
Collective actions 
As a fourth component, Knoke and Pappi define collective action as “three or more 
organisations working together in an effort to obtain their preferred policy event outcome” 
(Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 20). Thereby, they distinguish three different types of 
collective action: mobilisation, publicity and lobbing. Furthermore, they focus on coalition 
building by identifying jointly occupied positions within networks. Whereas an issue 
public consists of all organisations expressing similar interest in all policy domain issues, 
an event public expresses interest only in a specific event. Even more rigorous are 
advocacy circles, which are represented by three or more formal organisations closely 
cooperating in order to achieve certain policy event outcomes. The most stringent 
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coalitions are action sets consisting of advocacy circle members consciously working 
together. 
As this study treats a rather sensitive topic, it only partially takes into account 
collective actions. The types of collective action will not be traced, as particularly 
mobilisation and lobbying processes in foreign policy-making are highly difficult to 
uncover. Also, Knoke and Pappi’s categories of jointly occupied positions cannot be 
applied in full. Three of four nested positions are defined in relation to events (Knoke, 
Pappi, et al. 1996: 21-22). This study, however, focuses on issues (see 3.2) that stretch 
over a longer period of time. It treats events as single and short happenings that have a 
certain impact on the final policy-decision. Therefore, coalitions within networks will be 
considered as a result of actor communities interested in subfields, which may take the 
form of Knoke and Pappi’s issue publics. Even if tighter coalitions cannot be excluded, 
this study considers collective action only at the level of issue publics (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 
1996: 21): 
[…] an issue public is very likely to encompass many organisations that take opposing sides 
on specific policy proposals relevant to the issues in which they are interested. Hence an issue 
public resembles a ‘social circle’, whose members also share a common orientation toward 
some substantive matter without necessarily agreeing about what is to be done. 
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2.3 Dependent variable: policy networks and their characteristics 
 
In the previous subchapter, the independent variable has been described. It has been stated 
that subfields, issues and events attract a different community of actors, which may lead to 
variations of policy networks within one and the same policy domain. In this subchapter, 
the dependent variable – the shape of policy-networks - shall be portrayed in-depth. It is 
specified to what extent and how policy networks may change. 
In the past, policy networks have been characterised and categorised in various 
ways. The advantage of these classifications is that they may be used as a diagnostic tool 
to compare different policy areas or countries. Particularly, four concepts have influenced 
research in this field. Rhodes (1986) suggests five types of networks ranging from stable 
and stringent policy communities to loose issue networks.42 However, Rhodes 
characterisation is not detailed enough. Wilks and Wright (1987) offer an alternative 
concept, which distinguishes three different levels: policy universe, policy community and 
policy network sector. But unfortunately, their terminology is pre-empted (Jordan 1990: 
335). A third typology of policy networks is provided by Van Waarden (1992) who 
describes not less than eleven different types. The problem of his concept is that it is too 
sophisticated. In contrast, Rhodes and Marsh (1992) developed a pragmatic and flexible 
solution. They formulated four network dimensions and defined coherent policy 
communities and loose issue networks as end points of a continuum. Rhodes and Marsh’s 
typology is the result of extensive UK fieldwork and allows the comparison of policy 
areas (Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 186). 
For the following reasons, the present study will rely on Rhodes and Marsh’s model: 
first, it is a simple, sufficiently concise and flexible model, which plays a useful diagnostic 
role. For the purpose of the present study it can be easily adjusted to analyse Russian 
foreign policy-making. Second, the model has been used for a wide range of case studies 
                                                 
 
42  The issue network concept has been created originally by Heclo (1978). 
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in the fields of agriculture, civil nuclear power, youth employment, smoking, heart disease 
and health services, sea defences information technology and exchange rate policy (Marsh 
and Rhodes 1992). Hence, it seems to be a reliable and established concept for practical 
use. Subsequently, Rhodes and Marsh’s concept shall be outlined in more detail. 
Rhodes and Marsh distinguish four different network dimensions: membership, 
integration, resources and power (Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 186-188). These dimensions 
and their subcategories (see Table 3) allow a comprehensive characterisation of any policy 
network. It is important to note that the authors conceive a policy network as a generic 
term encompassing all types of networks. Based on this set-up, Rhodes and Marsh identify 
and describe two policy networks as opposite end points of a continuum. Whereas a policy 
community is viewed as a small and stable network with a limited number of participants 
and with some groups consciously excluded, issue networks are large, instable and marked 
by a large number of actors representing a wide range of interests and fluctuating contacts 
(Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 187).  
 
Dimension Policy community Issue networks 
1. Membership   
a) Number of participants Very limited number, some 
groups consciously excluded 
Large 
b) Type of interest Economic and/or professional 
interests dominate 
Encompasses range of 
affected interests 
2. Integration   
a) Frequency of interaction Frequent, high-quality, 
interaction of all groups on all 
matters related to policy issue 
Contacts fluctuates in 
frequency and intensity 
b) Continuity Membership, values and 
outcomes persistent over time 
Access fluctuates significantly 
c) Consensus All participants share basic 
values and accept the 
legitimacy of the outcome 
A measure of agreement 
exists but conflict is never 
present 
3. Resources   
a) Distribution of resources (within 
network) 
All participants have 
resources, basic relationship is 
an exchange relationship 
Some participants may have 
resources, but they are limited 
and basic relationship is 
consultative 
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Dimension Policy community Issue networks 
b) Distribution of resources (within 
participating organisations) 
Hierarchical, leaders can 
deliver members 
Varied and variable 
distribution and capacity to 
regulate members 
4. Power   
 There is a balance of power 
between members. Although 
one group may dominate, it 
must be a positive sum game  
Unequal powers, reflects 
unequal resources and 
unequal access. It is a zero-
sum game 
Table 3: Dimensions and types of policy networks according to Rhodes and Marsh 
 
Rhodes and Marsh stress the diagnostic role of their typology (Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 
187). In practice, most policy networks might be located somewhere between these two 
poles. Additionally and inevitably, no policy area will conform exactly to either list of 
characteristics. Therefore, Rhodes and Marsh’s typology will subsequently be adjusted for 
the purpose of the present study. 
Rhodes and Marsh’s continuum from policy communities to issue networks is 
striking, because it unconsciously and subtly reproduces differences between foreign and 
domestic policy-making structures and processes specified in Chapter 1. It stands out that 
characteristics of policy communities theoretically reflect foreign policy-making, whereas 
features of issue networks may be found within the domestic arena. Clearly, both 
comparisons are stereotypical, purely diagnostic and extreme. Nevertheless, they may be 
helpful to analyse and categorise policy networks in the field of foreign policy-making. 
In Table 4, aspects of the foreign and domestic policy-making comparison43 are 
merged with Rhodes and Marsh’s model. Policy communities adjusted to foreign policy 
networks are opposed to modified issue or domestic policy networks. With regard to 
membership, a small number of executive authority interests dominate in policy 
communities, whereas issue networks encompass a wide range of interests. Concerning 
integration, the subdimension ‘continuity’ has been removed, as memberships, values and 
outcomes cannot be observed over time (see 2.1). In contrast, the subdimensions 
‘centralisation’ and ‘executive authority’s position’ add two important aspects to Rhodes 
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and Marsh’s model. Whereas policy communities are highly centralised around executive 
authorities, issue networks are considered as remote.  
The resource dimension can only be analysed with regard to the network, while the 
intra-organisational distribution of resources has to be ignored. However, a distinction is 
made between the quantity and the distribution of resources. These aspects have to be 
analysed separately. The same holds true for the power dimension. 
 
Dimension Policy community 
(foreign policy network) 
Issue networks 
(domestic policy network) 
1. Membership   
a) Number of participants Very limited number, some 
actors consciously excluded 
Large 
b) Number of interests Small range of interests Encompasses wide range of 
affected interests 
b) Type of interest Executive authority interests 
dominate 
Economic and legislative and 
other bodies are involved 
2. Integration   
a) Frequency of interaction 
(information and resources) 
Frequent, high-quality, 
interaction of all actors on all 
matters related to policy issue 
Rather low, contacts 
fluctuates in frequency and 
intensity 
b) Centralisation High Low 
c) Executive authority’s position Central position of executive 
authority 
Non-central position of 
executive authority 
3. Resources   
a) Quantity of information (scientific, 
legal, political or other knowledge) 
and resources (money, labour power, 
facilities and more) within network 
Generally high Generally limited 
b) Distribution of information 
(scientific, legal, political or other 
knowledge) and resources (money, 
labour power, facilities and more) 
within network 
Information and resources 
among participants are more 
or less evenly distributed 
Information and resources are 
unequally distributed 
4. Power   
a) Quantity of power within network Generally high Generally limited 
b) Distribution of power within 
network 
There is a balance of power 
between members, even if 
some actors may dominate the 
network. 
Unequal powers, reflects 
unequal access 
Table 4: Adjusted dimensions of policy networks 
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This subchapter described and modified Rhodes and Marsh’s typology of policy networks. 
The adjusted model outlined in Table 4 is very essential, because it allows at a later stage 
to formulate hypotheses (see 3.3) and to operationalise them (Chapter 4). Yet, before that, 
it has to be explained how the analytical concept developed here can be applied to Russian 
foreign policy-making. This will be done within the next chapter. 
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3. Applying the Concept: The Russian Foreign Policy Domain 
 
In Chapter 2, the analytical concept of this study was laid out. Based on Knoke and 
Pappi’s policy domain model, organisational actors, policy interests, power relations and 
collective actions have been introduced and partially modified. Also, Rhodes and Marsh’s 
typology of policy network was introduced and adjusted in order to provide a clear 
concept for the analysis of foreign policy-making. 
In this chapter, it shall be explained how the developed concept may be applied to 
Russian foreign policy-making. The first part presents the Russian foreign policy domain 
and its subfields. Subsequently, the case studies will be introduced before the hypotheses 
are formulated in the last part. 
 
 
3.1 The Russian foreign policy domain and its subfields 
 
In the Russian Federation, relatively few people are interested in foreign policy. And even 
fewer people are involved in foreign policy-making. As a relatively closed system, the 
Russian arena of foreign affairs may be considered as a policy domain according to Knoke 
and Pappi’s definition.44 Even if the domain boundaries are not synonymous with formal 
state ministries (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 10), Russian foreign affairs are clearly 
separated from any other public policy field and decision-making obviously attracts 
relatively fixed circles of actors, be it within the Kremlin, in the White House, in the 
federal assembly, in economic or societal spheres. 
Following Knoke and Pappi’s model, this study considers Russian foreign policy 
domain actors to be organisations, not individuals. Certainly, this crucial and highly 
sensitive assumption needs a more thorough discussion. In fact, as numerous interviews in 
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Moscow have shown, the role of institutions and individuals in decision-making is 
disputable. On the one hand, many experts believe that policy formulation – and foreign 
policy formulation in particular - is predominantly a matter of personal relations. They 
argue that political fights, interactions and coalition building between individual elite 
members are deeply rooted in Russian culture.45 Consequently, the influence of an 
organisation mostly depends on the individual on top of it.46 The Foreign Ministry, for 
instance, had more institutional weight under Evgenij Primakov (1996-1998) than under 
Igor Ivanov (2000-2004) or Sergej Lavrov (2004-present).47 Another indicator for 
personalised decision-making is the transfer of policy responsibilities irrespective of the 
functional position. For example, the former chief of staff Dmitri Medvedev – the 
President’s main advisor with regard to Ukrainian matters – kept this role when he was 
assigned to the post as vice-Premier, which usually implies more domestic oriented 
tasks.48 In sum, the individual perspective pronounces the influence of character, 
personage and mood of distinct human beings. 
On the other hand, many observers conceive policy-making in Moscow as an 
interplay between various organisations. Decision-making processes mainly involve 
institutions, which constrain, streamline and direct the behaviour of the involved 
individual actors. Also, individuals usually cover their personal role behind official fronts 
and act on behalf of an official organisation.49 This strand of argumentation would rather 
justify the focus on organisational actors. In reality, the truth lies probably somewhere in 
between the two poles. Organisations and individuals both matter and vary from case to 
case. Whereas some issues are strongly influenced by a few personal relationships, other 
issues have a more institutional touch.50 Sometimes, actors hide themselves behind 
institutional walls and sometimes official bodies are not organised properly, which 
                                                 
 
45  See, for instance, Steen (2003), who has analysed Russian decision-making cultures. 
46  Representatively: Expert interview, PIR-Center, Moscow: 22.04.2005. 
47  Expert interview, The Moscow Times, Moscow: 29.04.2005. 
48  Expert interview, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 29.03.2005. 
49  Representatively, Expert interview, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 04.07.2005. 
50  Expert interview, independent analyst, Moscow: 29.04.2005. 
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enhances the role of individuals.51 Therefore, it may be assumed that institutional and 
individual action is more or less balanced. 
In addition to these interpretations, practical deliberations have to be taken into 
account before deciding about this essential theoretical aspect. Individual action in 
particular is highly difficult to trace within the framework of empirical research. 
Especially in Russia, personal relationships are secretive and hardly perceivable for the 
public. Also, personal interactions would be too complex to reconstruct for research 
purposes. The irrational, emotional and volatile nature of personal liaisons would render 
an implementation of the above-mentioned analytical framework nearly impossible. For 
all these reasons, this study adopts an institutional perspective and considers organisations 
only as foreign policy actors. 
After having clarified this important question, the attention shall now be drawn to 
the Russian foreign policy domain as such. As Knoke and Pappi stated, it is not easy to 
specify the policy domain and its subfields (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 14). However, with 
regard to the Russian foreign policy domain, two cleavages are clearly visible: the first 
one divides the domain on the basis of a geopolitical factor, whereas the second trench 
separates the Russian foreign policy domain in terms of a sectoral factor.  
With regard to the geopolitical divide, Russian near and far abroad problems may be 
distinguished. The term ‘near abroad’ stands for the former Soviet Republics, who gained 
independence after the brake-up of the USSR. Except for the Baltics, they are united 
within the CIS since January 22, 1993. In contrast, the notion ‘far abroad’ describes other 
world nations or international organisations. The divide is insofar geopolitical as it in fact 
describes not the geographical, but the political distance to Russia. For instance, whereas 
Turkmenistan, which has no common boundaries with the Russian Federation, is 
considered a near abroad state, Finland – a neighbouring country – belongs to the far 
abroad (Alexandrova 2001: 457). 
                                                 
 
51  Expert interview, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 04.07.2005. 
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Concerning the sectoral divide, world politics from an accentuated Russian perspective is 
divided into security and economic matters. Subsequently, it shall be explained in more 
detail to what extent the Russian foreign policy domain can be considered as containing 
four different subfields. 
 
The geopolitical divide: near- and far-abroad 
The Russian Federation perceives, assesses and handles near- and far abroad issues 
qualitatively in a different way. As an example, the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict in 
January 2006 illustrates the rather emotional, direct, informal, instant, personal and 
sometimes even irrational character of relationships between Moscow and CIS-member 
states. As the Soviet Union imploded, domestic ties between Moscow and its federal 
periphery transformed literally over night into foreign relations among sovereign and soon 
emancipated states. However, Russia’s bi- and multilateral interactions with CIS-members 
like Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia – to name 
Moscow’s most important partners – seem to have kept a certain domestic character. This 
may be explained by political, economic and social interdependencies, geographical and 
cultural closeness as well as common historic experiences.  
In contrast, Moscow’s relations to far abroad countries are based on a stable and 
long-lasting Soviet foreign policy tradition. They could be labelled as rather business-like, 
diplomatic, formal, planned, institutionalized and rational. This divide between near and 
far abroad is reflected in Russia’s current foreign policy concept (Rossiiskaja-Federatsija 
2000) approved by President V. Putin on June 28, 2000. Part IV prominently covers CIS 
matters and attaches top regional priority to its former republics. It rationally defines 
objectives and means in order to integrate the CIS-space on a multilateral basis or in order 
to develop mutually beneficial bilateral relations. As Alex Pravda (2001: 215) stated, “in 
the near abroad Moscow has clearer foreign policy interests and hegemonic ambitions 
which it typically pursues proactively even where hampered by major resource 
constraints. Further afar Russia’s aims are more ambivalent, its capabilities more limited 
and its policies more reactive.” 
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The sectoral divide: security and economy 
For various reasons, a security-economy cleavage spans the Russian foreign policy 
domain. Under Boris Yeltsin, the political elite were by and large dominated by oligarchs 
and a wider business community (Mommsen 2004, Shevtsova 2005). However, since the 
presidency has been handed over to Vladimir Putin, a gradual rise of siloviki has changed 
the balance of power behind the Kremlin walls. As an illustration, in 2002, 26,6% of 
Putin’s crew had a military background compared to 6,7% in 1993 (Kryshtanovskaja 
2005: 269). Increasingly, sectors of strategic importance52 have been used as a tool of 
Russian foreign policy and security-related deliberations have returned on the top of the 
Kremlin’s agenda.  
However, despite the securitization of Moscow’s foreign policy (Lo 2003), a liberal 
economic bloc has kept an influence on policy-making processes (Feifer 2002). Contrary 
to Kryshtanovskaja and White (2005), Sharon and David Rivera (2006) even argued that 
between 1993 and 2002, business representation within the political elite arose more 
rapidly than the security establishment. Whichever interpretation applies, a security-
economy front is clearly discernible within Putin’s court. Even if boundaries between 
economic and political spheres in Moscow are often blurred, two different communities 
continue to worry about two often diametrically opposed objectives: the warranty of 
reliable security and the creation of a steady economic development.53 
 
Characterisation of the four policy domain subfields 
Obviously, the four above-described subfields and their interested communities are not 
similar to each other. But, to what extents do near and far abroad, security and economic-
related circles vary? In order to answer this question, the network dimensions of Rhodes 
and Marsh’s (1992) network typology (see 2.3) shall be used in a broader sense. Although 
the two authors establish the dimensions in order to describe policy networks, their criteria 
                                                 
 
52  The Kremlin has introduced a list of strategic enterprises and strategic joint stock companies by order of 
the President of the Russian Federation No. 1009 of August 4, 2004.  
53  See part I of Russia’s current foreign policy concept: Rossiiskaja-Federatsija (2000). 
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provide a good analytical tool to characterise interested communities as quasi-networks. 
Subsequently, each subfield will in turn be qualified by referring to Table 4 in subchapter 
2.3. Thereby, it has to be stressed that the stereotypical characterisation of these subfield 
communities corresponds to the analytical concept. The generic and pure coloration of a 
subfield does by no means exclude exceptions and deflections. 
It has to be assumed that the far abroad subfield is relatively small in size. 
Proportionately, only few actors in Moscow worry about far abroad issues, since these 
problems simply do not matter that much in a country stretching over two continents and 
not less than eleven time zones. Indeed, Russia’s relations with China, the US or the 
Middle East – to name a few – are highly important. Nevertheless, only a small number of 
specialized actors have the interest and competence to follow or even influence these 
matters.54 The far abroad players are very well accustomed to Western or Asian culture, 
they fluently speak English or other world languages and have a rather liberal and open 
minded attitude. Consequently, the far abroad subfield seems to consist of a small, 
consistent and chosen community, which crystallizes around executive authorities. 
Information and resources seem to be more or less equally distributed among 
organisations interested in fanciful far abroad issues and events.  
In stark contrast, the near abroad subfield is vast, heterogeneous, complex and 
loose. Communities specialized, for instance, in relations to Central Asian or Caucasian 
states are deeply rooted in Russian culture. They stereotypically continue to consider other 
CIS states as peripheral and somewhat committed to obedience. These circles usually do 
not speak foreign languages and their resources are often scarce and unequally distributed. 
As near abroad issues and events often involve an emotional component, interactions 
between subfield members fluctuate in frequency and intensity. 
With regard to the sectoral divide, the picture looks similar, even if the constellation 
is completely different. The security subfield seems to be comparatively small in size, as 
the understanding of external security requires a specific background as well as skills and 
special knowledge. Usually, actors interested in foreign security issues and events have 
                                                 
 
54  Informal statement by expert, Carnegie Moscow Center, 1.2.06. 
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kept a great power mindset. Their worldview is dominated by the wish to restore Russia’s 
global power that it was able to exert during the Soviet past.55 The typical national 
security establishment member would not ignore any possibility to enhance Moscow’s 
position abroad, irrespective of political mid or long-term cost and benefit considerations. 
Accordingly, these tight circles of actors frequently interact and gather around executive 
authorities. 
In contrast, the economic subfield seems to be huge, manifold and uncoordinated. 
The state, business corporations and crime groups are closely entangled (Orttung 2006: 
41) having a significant impact on Moscow’s foreign relations (Wenger, Perovic, et al. 
2006). Some actors may be driven by a liberal interest to integrate Russia as quick and 
smooth as possible into global economic institutions. Others may just seek rear cover of 
the state for their predatory business activities abroad. Contacts among economic subfield 
members are rare and unsteady. Typically, interests, information and resources are 
dispersed and unevenly distributed. 
To what extent is it appropriate to consider these four subfields as independent 
variable? The answer to this question has a theoretical and a practical component. 
Theoretically, the domain of international affairs is simply too large and complex to be 
handled by one community only. Multi-faceted world politics requires a wide range of 
actors with special knowledge (Risse 2002: 263-264). This leads inevitably to nested sub-
communities within the domain (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 13-17).  
Practically, the distinction in near and far abroad, security and economy subfields 
makes sense, because it is reflected within the Russian society. From a public perspective, 
issues and events within the post-Soviet space matter much more than politics farther 
abroad. While newspapers are full of stories about Ukraine, Kazakhstan or Belarus, 
comparatively few articles cover Russian-related developments in Western Europe or 
Japan. Also, a clear parting line between security and economy runs through the Russian 
                                                 
 
55  See, for instance, the statements made by Oleg Morozov (Chair United Russia), who advocates a historic 
Russian revenge after Russia has disintegrated in 1991. (“Ruling elites in search of an ideology”, 
Kommersant 01.08.2006). 
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public. Whereas military might, power and brute force have always been well known 
categories for Russian citizens, economic liberalization, foreign investment, financial 
markets or trade facilitation are unfamiliar and external terms. Despite widespread 
growing economic competence, the cleavage remains up to date.  
Evidently, as the cleavages perpendicularly span the Russian foreign policy domain, 
the four subfields overlap. Moreover, it is essential to stress that subfields do not have 
clear-cut boundaries. They are fuzzy, porous and even conflating on some specific 
locations. Figure 2 illustrates the overlapping subfields and depicts the comparatively 
smaller and tighter far abroad and security communities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Russian foreign policy domain subfields 
 
 
So far, it has been discussed how the policy domain and subfield concept corresponds to 
Russian reality. In the next subchapter, the focus will be shifted to the issues and events. 
Thereby, the case studies will be introduced and explained. 
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3.2 Issues and Events: selection of case studies 
 
As mentioned earlier, the two subfields boundaries perpendicularly divide the Russian 
foreign policy domain. Therefore, the four subfields - far abroad, near abroad, security and 
economy – overlap to a high degree. This study concentrates on four issues and treats 
them as policy network case studies. As stated in Chapter 2, an issue is defined as a 
‘broadly characterised set of substantive matters that attract the attention of some domain 
actors’ (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 14). Subsequently, the criteria for the selection of the 
issues shall be specified. 
The selection of the cases is based on three criteria: First, each issue shall lie within 
the sphere of influence of a geographical as well as a sectoral subfield. Hence, each case 
study shall be located at the intersection of two different subfields. This criterion will 
allow policy network cross-comparisons between near and far abroad issues as well as 
between security and economic issues. Second, all four cases shall represent decisions 
taken during President Vladimir Putin’s first term between 2000 and 2004. This temporal 
delimitation renders policy networks comparable. Third, all case studies are multilateral 
foreign policy decisions. Either bilateral issues or a mix between bi- and multilateral cases 
would significantly reduce comparability. The next section will present the selected issues 
one-by-one. 
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The establishment of the NATO-Russia council (NRC, 2001-2002) 
As Figure 3 shows, this issue is located at the intersection of the far abroad and security 
subfield. The establishment of the NATO-Russia council started on September 11th 2001, 
as Vladimir Putin immediately manifested solidarity with the U.S. These events were a 
major impetus for NATO-members to integrate Russia on a larger scale within northern-
atlantic security structures. The NRC was established on May 28th, 2002 in Rome and 
replaced the Permanent Joint Council (PJC), which has provided the framework for 
cooperation between Russia and NATO since 1997. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: NATO-Russia Council (NRC) subfields 
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The transformation of the Collective Security Treaty into an international organisation 
(CSTO, 2001-2003) 
This issue is located within the spheres of the near abroad and security subfield as 
displayed in Figure 4. It has its roots in 1992, when the Collective Security treaty (CST) 
was signed between Russia and 8 CIS-member states. However, the decision to transform 
this treaty into an international organisation was taken only on May 14th, 2002, as U.S. 
troops gained grounds in Central Asia and in the Caucasus in order to fight terrorism and 
to support operations in Afghanistan and Irak. Subsequently, the constitutional documents 
were negotiated between Russia, Kyrgisia, Tadjikistan, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Belarus 
and entered into force on September 18th, 2003. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) subfields 
 
56 Applying the Concept: The Russian Foreign Policy Domain 
 
The development of the Common European Economic Space (CEES, 2000-2003) 
Last but not least, this issue involves the far abroad and economic subfields as illustrated 
in Figure 5. It encompasses the decision to establish a common economic space between 
Russia and the EU. Brussels’ gradual eastern enlargement enhanced the necessity for a 
closer cooperation with the Russian Federation. It was therefore decided on May 17th, 
2001 to replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), that has existed since 
1994, with a new framework of collaboration. After a long drawn-out negotiation process, 
the two sides agreed on November 6th, 2003 on four areas of closer cooperation: Trade and 
economy (blueprint of CEES), internal security, external security (EUROPOL) as well as 
joint scientific research and education. 
 
 
Figure 5: Common European Economic Space (CEES) subfields 
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The formation of the Single Economic Space between Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and 
Belarus (SES, 2000-2004) 
This foreign policy-making process involves the near abroad and economy subfield as 
depicted in Figure 6. It stands in line with other Russian efforts to economically integrate 
the post-Soviet space. The Presidents of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus decided 
on the creation of the Single Economic Space, on February 23rd, 2003. As a 
complementary project to the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), the SES’s goal 
was, in particular, to involve Ukraine. Although talks between the four biggest economies 
within the soviet-space have not yet concluded, the basic documents entered into force on 
May 20th, 2004. 
 
 
Figure 6: Single Economic Space (SES) subfields 
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Indeed, the four selected case studies are not very spectacular. They didn’t have a major 
impact on Russia’s foreign affairs or on public opinion. Also, the four issues did not 
fundamentally change any relationship between Russia and its near or far abroad. 
Nevertheless - or precisely therefore - they represent attractive cases. They are chosen 
deliberately, because they reflect ordinary decision-making in Moscow. Foreign policy-
making structures and processes are presumably better framed and compared if they are 
not stirred up by outstanding and all-dominant events. Knoke and Pappi (1996: 20) 
confirm this argumentation as they discuss events: 
Most researchers resort to purposively selecting only highly visible and controversial events, 
where core actor participation is exceptionally great. However, overemphasizing exciting 
rather than routine events risks distorting how policy participation occurs. 
 
In contrast to Knoke’s and Pappi’s work, this study considers issues as the central object 
of investigation. Every issue ultimately leads to a policy proposal (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 
1996: 14) and contains a series of events as specific happenings within a case’s 
chronology. According to the definition mentioned in subchapter 2.2, an event is a 
‘critical, temporally located decision point in a collective decision-making sequence that 
must occur in order for a policy option to be finally selected’ (Laumann and Knoke 1987: 
251). The events of the four issues, (NRC, CEES, CSTO, SES), are traced by four detailed 
time-event matrices. For each case study, the decision-making process is reconstructed. 
With the help of qualitative face-to-face interviews, press documents, electronic media, 
chronologies and literature, every single event (meeting, statement, conference, phone call 
etc.) within the case study’s time frame is integrated into a matrix. This laborious research 
activity leads to a detailed chronology of the four foreign policy-decisions, which is 
important to assist in the understanding of major developments, actors and general 
process-related and structural patterns. 
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3.3 Hypotheses 
 
After having outlined the analytical concept and its application, the hypotheses shall be 
derived within this section. To this end, the main research question of this study is 
recapitulated here: What types of decision-making networks define Russia’s foreign 
policies under Putin and to what extent, how and why do they vary depending on the 
policy problem? Based on the analytical concept applied to Russian circumstances, the 
hypotheses will subsequently be formulated. 
 
Main hypothesis 
Russia’s foreign policy domain consists of four basic overlapping subfields: near 
abroad, far abroad, security and economy. The involvement of these subfields 
determines the shape of policy networks dealing with specific issues. 
 
This main hypothesis is deliberately formulated in a generic way. It links the independent 
with the dependent variable as developed in Chapter 2. However, the correlation between 
policy networks and involved subfields has to be further specified. Based on the previous 
theoretical deliberations, three sub hypotheses can be formulated. Thereby, the numbers at 
the end of each line correspond to the numbers used in Table 4. 
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Sub hypothesis A 
If a Russian foreign policy issue is addressed by the far abroad and security 
subfields, policy networks tend to take the shape of policy communities 
characterised by… 
• a limited number of participants (1a); 
• a small range of interests (1b); 
• a domination of executive authority’s interests (1c); 
• frequent and high-quality interactions of all actors (2a); 
• high centralisation (2b); 
• central position of the executive authority (2c); 
• a generally high quantity of information and resources (3a); 
• a more or less even distribution of information and resources (3b); 
• a generally high quantity of power (4a); 
• a balance of power between network members (4b). 
 
Sub hypothesis B 
If a Russian foreign policy issue is addressed by the near abroad and economic 
subfields, policy networks tend to take the shape of issue networks characterised 
by… 
• large number of participants (1a); 
• wide range of affected interests included (1b); 
• the involvement of economic, legislative and other bodies (1c); 
• low interactions fluctuating in frequency and intensity (2a); 
• low centralisation (2b); 
• a non-central position of the executive authority (2c); 
• a generally limited quantity of information and resources (3a); 
• unequally distributed information and resources (3b); 
• a generally limited quantity of power (4a). 
• unequal powers between members (4b); 
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Sub hypothesis C 
If a Russian foreign policy issue is addressed by any other subfield combination, 
policy networks tend to develop into hybrid forms, which may incorporate 
features from both extreme policy network types. 
 
Figure 7 is a key table of this study, because it visualises sub hypothesis A, B and C. 
It illustrates the theoretical assumptions and the expected shape of policy networks in 
Russian foreign policy making. Theoretically, security-related far abroad issues are 
supposed to be addressed by policy communities. As the two involved subfields are 
relatively small and homogenous, policy networks dealing with specific issues tend to be 
stringent. The characterisation of policy communities in sub hypothesis A fully 
corresponds to the analytical concept developed in subchapter 2.3. By contrast, economy-
related near abroad issues are supposed to be tackled by issue networks. Two vast and 
complex communities coalesce to rather large and loose policy networks. Again, the 
circumscription of issue networks in sub hypothesis B reflects theoretical deliberations 
made earlier. Sub hypothesis C states that any other policy domain subfield combinations 
usually leads to hybrid forms of policy networks. Accordingly, Figure 7 shows that 
security-related near abroad issues and economy-related far abroad matters tend to be 
addressed by mixed types. 
Although all three sub hypotheses contain a clear statement, they are formulated 
with great caution. The described correlations have to be conceived as general tendencies, 
not as compelling laws. This understanding entirely stands in line with Rhodes’s and 
Marsh’s perception that no policy area will conform exactly to the extreme types (policy 
communities and issue networks). In their view, it is “important to focus on trends in a 
given policy area, to explore the extent to which it is becoming more or less integrated or 
an interest is becoming more or less dominant” (Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 187). 
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Figure 7: Hypothetical form of Russian foreign policy networks 
 
 
How can all these statements be verified? The operationalisation of the hypotheses 
requires an ample discussion of delicate methodological procedures. Therefore, these 
questions will be addressed in a separate section. Chapter 4 presents the methodological 
approach of this study. In section 4.3, various appropriate parameters will be assessed, 
which allow the determination of policy networks and the testing of the hypotheses. 
Thereby, the focus will remain on sub thesis A and B, as the main hypothesis represents a 
rather qualitative and generic statement. 
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4. Methodological Approach 
 
The past three chapters focused on the theoretical aspects of foreign policy-making, 
developed a specific analytical framework and explained its application to the Russian 
reality. Based on these elements, palpable hypotheses have been deviated and formulated 
in subchapter 3.3. In this section, attention will be drawn to methodological aspects and 
specific procedures will be presented, which allow testing of the hypotheses.  
The first subchapter addresses the issue of policy network delimitation. It explains 
the methods used to specify network boundaries. In subchapter 4.2, the focus is turned on 
network interactions. Ties among network actors are determined according to specific 
procedures. After that, network dimension parameters are established and described in 
subchapter 4.3. With the help of methods used in social network analysis, the hypotheses 
can be operationalised. Subchapter 4.4 outlines the way networks are visualised. It covers 
methodological aspects with regard to network design and layout. Finally, subchapter 4.5 
discusses the qualitative analysis of decision-making processes. It identifies the major 
elements, which have to be registered along the time line. 
 
 
4.1 Delimitation of networks 
 
The reconstruction of social networks is a complex task that requires well-defined 
procedures. Therefore, it will be split-up in four different working stages. These will 
sequentially be presented and explained within the next subchapters. Initially, the focus 
shall be directed on the definition and identification of all potential policy domain actors 
(working step 1) and on the specification of the policy network boundaries (working step 
2). 
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Working step 1: definition and identification of potential policy domain actors 
The first step to reconstruct policy networks consists in defining and identifying potential 
policy domain actors. Wassermann and Faust (1994: 30-35) use the word ‘population’ as a 
generic term describing the entire sphere of interest. With regard to the definition of the 
population, it is important to stress that this study considers Russian domain actors only. 
Hence, all kinds of foreign, global and international units will be excluded from 
investigation. Western state leaders, the CST General Secretariat, the EU Commission, 
NATO or regional organisations like the Shanghai five or EurAsEC – only to name a few 
- cannot be taken into account. Certainly, these players may all have a considerable 
influence on Moscow’s foreign policies. However, this study deliberately focuses on 
domestic sources of Russian decision-making. 
Which methodological principles and tools are applied to identify potential domain 
actors? Initially, it is necessary to collect all organisational actors potentially interested or 
involved in Russian foreign policy-making. The actor’s name, function and incumbency 
need to be properly registered in order to have a complete basis for the following working 
steps. The listing requires intense research efforts and access to information sources about 
the Russian state, economic and societal spheres. It is complicated by the fact that 
governmental structures in Moscow were largely reorganised in February 2004. Hence, 
the contemporary Russian foreign policy domain looks remarkably different than it did 
during Putin’s first term; the decisive period selected for the case-studies. 
Data was retrieved from different open sources. The basic list, valid for August 
2001, was extracted from a detailed database (Grankin 2001). This abstract was adjusted 
and amended with the help of a reference book and telephone directory, valid for 2003 
(Maximov 2003). Finally, it resulted in a structurally ordered spreadsheet with five 
different actor’s categories: 
• Presidential actors 
• Governmental actors 
• Parliamentary actors 
• Economic actors 
• Other actors 
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All in all, 128 potential actors have been identified (see Appendix I). Thereby, units have 
been included top-down until the level of departments within ministries, commissions 
within the parliamentary chambers or single companies within the economic sphere. At 
this stage, the presentation of these actor’s categories as a cursory overview shall suffice. 
The different actors will be described in detail within the framework of Chapter 6. At that 
stage, Russian foreign policy domain actors at the time of Putin’s first term will be 
discussed in terms of their function and potential influence on decision-making processes. 
 
Working step 2: network boundary specification 
As a second step, the network boundaries have to be specified. Obviously, the domain 
population defined and identified in the first working stage is too large. Contacts among 
its members are usually too occasional and unspecific. Interactions only become intense 
around issues or events. In this case, a limited number of influential actors form a policy 
network. Apparently, not all policy domain members have an interest and sufficiently 
available resources to actively take part in all the policy development processes. They may 
be focussed on one or two issues only. Consequently, for every issue or event, the 
specialized audience has to be elicited. Who are the influential actors? How can policy 
network boundaries be specified?56 
Within the framework of the present study, the terms influence and power are not 
used as synonyms, although common characteristics have been debated during the past 
fifty years.57 For the purpose of this study, influence shall be defined as the broader term. 
It describes the possibility of an actor to manipulate other actors or events. In contrast, 
power shall be understood as the potential access of an actor to other network members. 
Whereas the term power will be discussed more in detail at a later stage (see 4.3), the 
focus shall here be turned to the differentiation between influential and non-influential 
actors. Commonly, three different methods are used to identify core decision-makers or to 
specify network boundaries respectively.  
                                                 
 
56  Comprehensive overviews with regard to the boundary specification problem have been written for 
example by Laumann, Marsden, et al. (1992) as well as by Jansen (2003). 
57  Serdült (2006) provides a survey of this debate. 
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The positional approach refers to formally defined positions or group memberships (Scott 
2000: 55, VonBeyme 2001: 66). It assumes that actors are influential by virtue of their 
official location within organigrams or institutional hierarchies. This method is relatively 
easy to perform, but it misses informal actors and those who are influential, thanks to their 
capacities and resources. The decision-making approach58 follows a different logic. It tries 
to reconstruct decision-making processes and identify their main actors. Based on 
interviews, documents, media and other sources, this method seems to be promising, but 
highly difficult to implement (Hudson and Vore 1995: 211, Seidelmann 2001: 21-22, 
VonBeyme 2001: 65-66). Last but not least, the reputational approach (Laumann and 
Knoke 1987: 152-189, Scott 2000: 56, VonBeyme 2001: 65) provides an alternative when 
comprehensive listings and dependable information sources with regard to decisions are 
scarce. Selected informants are asked about the most influential actors of a particular 
decision. Even if this method is laborious to apply, it seems to include the whole range of 
participants. However, the image may be distorted by media-affected individual 
perceptions of the informants. 
The present study relies on the reputational approach, because extensive data about 
Russian decision-making processes are hardly available.59 With the help of expert 
opinions, the policy networks can be delimited and determined. Thereby, the selection of 
informants as well as the establishment of boundary criteria are matters of crucial 
importance (Scott 2000: 56). Subsequently, these questions and the concrete proceeding 
will be explained in more detail.  
In 2005 and 2006, the author of the present study spent nine months in Moscow and 
performed five quantitative face-to-face interviews per case study (see questionnaire in 
Appendix II). For the following reason, this number can be considered as sufficient. Three 
expert assessments would constitute the absolute minimum, as it allows equilibrating two 
extreme opinions. With a fourth and a fifth rating, the average value attains sufficient 
                                                 
 
58  See for, instance, Allison (1971), Snyder, Bruck, et al. (1954). 
59  In fact, reputational methods are popular in Russia. Newspapers and magazines regularly publish polls of 
the most influential politicians and compare those over time. See, for instance, ‘Nezavisimaja Gazeta’ or 
‘Politicheskii Klass’. 
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stability and significance. Serdült (2006: 1) confirms that ‘reliable results can be obtained 
with at least five experts’.  
The main selection criterion, with regard to the informants, was a high affiliation 
with the issue in question. Furthermore, the informants had to be experts in the appropriate 
field. Hence, the author of this study interviewed a broad range of government officials, 
diplomats, military officers, experts within international organisations, members of 
parliament, political advisors, academics and journalists. It is important to stress that these 
experts were not selected according to the ‘snowballing’ technique (Scott 2000: 56). 
Rather, actors were mostly identified and contacted based on their profile, involvement 
and knowledge with respect to a particular case. 
During the interviews, the informants were confronted with the entire list of 
potential foreign policy actors (see Appendix I) in order to allocate ratings with regard to 
one particular decision-making case60: 1 (no influence), 2 (minimal influence), 3 
(considerable influence) and 4 (high influence). After that, the average (arithmetic mean) 
was calculated for each actor and issue. Subsequently, the actors were put in a hierarchical 
order for every single case. These four case lists reflect the rated influence reputation of all 
domain actors. 
Obviously, not all actors appearing on these lists had an influence on decision-
making in reality, since roughly half of the actors were rated with 1. Therefore, it is 
necessary to clearly specify the network boundaries. For the purpose of this present study, 
this limit shall be fixed at the value of 2.75. Actors are only considered to be part of a 
policy network if their average influence rating lies at or above this value. This boundary 
makes sense, because it includes in the policy network all key actors having a nearly 
considerable influence on the issue. Simultaneously, it excludes the bulk of actors, whose 
influence may be marginalized. 
                                                 
 
60  The rating corresponds to a questionnaire developed in 2004 by M. Jegen, Department of Political 
Science at the University of Geneva. See appendix II. 
68 Methodological Approach 
 
 
4.2 Specification of network interactions 
 
Once the network boundaries are specified, it might be assumed that the identified core 
actors somehow played an essential role with regard to the issue in question. However, 
their high average influence rating alone does not allow detailed statements about their 
role in decision-making. Therefore, it is necessary to determine and assess interactions 
between the most influential actors. Only these two working steps allow reconstructing 
and analysing the policy networks. 
 
Working step 3: determination of network interactions 
In subchapter 2.2, the term ‘interaction’ – or tie, relation, degree, lines link61 - has been 
already introduced. According to Knoke and Pappi (1996: 17-19), power relations consist 
of two factors: information (scientific, legal, political or other knowledge) and resources 
(money, labour power, facilities and more). For the purpose of this study, information and 
resources are taken together. Interactions are considered as exchanges of all kinds of 
resources with regard to a specific issue. 
The network determination for the four case studies was performed analogue to the 
boundary specification presented in the previous subchapter. Based on the reputational 
approach, the author performed a second round of quantitative face-to-face interviews in 
Moscow62. He asked another five informants per case study about the interactions among 
the identified key actors. Thereby, the author consulted not the same experts who already 
rated the actor’s influence in round one. Mostly, new informants valued the interactions 
according to the following scale: 0 (no or low interaction during the appropriate decision-
making process), 1 (medium interaction during the appropriate decision-making process) 
and 2 (intense interaction during the appropriate decision-making process). It is 
                                                 
 
61  In social network analysis, various terms have been used to describe the interlinkage between network 
units. 
62  Based on Serdült’s assessment, five informants should be enough to achieve stable results and to 
determine the network Serdült (2006). 
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noteworthy, that the new informants had no objections to the list of influential actors 
presented to them. Often, they explicitly agreed to the boundary specification performed 
earlier. 
Subsequently, the individual expert ratings were registered in four different case-
matrices that confront identified key actors with each other. Then, the values were 
cumulated (mathematic sum) for each case and for each interaction. This data processing 
resulted in an accumulated matrix with values ranging from one to ten. The maximum 
average interaction rating signifies an intense bilateral exchange of resources with regard 
to the issue in question. In contrast, a relationship between two actors labelled five times 
zero is apparently non-existent.  
 
Working step 4: assessment of network interactions 
Theoretically, the accumulated interaction rating would allow setting up the four policy 
networks. However, these values are not always appropriate for calculation and 
visualisation, as they are differentiated and sometimes confusing. Hence, for specific 
calculation or visualisation purposes it is necessary to find methods for a more reasonable 
assessment of network interactions. In this study, two additional data sets will be created: 
 
• Dichotomized data for calculation purposes 
• Categorised data for visualisation purposes 
 
The power dimension of the policy networks needs to be calculated with dichotomized 
instead of accumulated interaction ratings. This is due to unusable software outputs with 
regard to closeness centrality computations. The transformation of the data sets can 
conveniently be performed by UCINET 6. All accumulated interaction ratings greater than 
3 receive a value of 1, whereas relations weighted 3 or lower are zeroed. This boundary 
makes sense because an interaction of less than 4 can be neglected, whereas a link without 
doubt exists if the frequency and intensity of an interaction reaches a value of 4 or higher. 
Definitely, the resulting dichotomized matrix shows rather coarse data, as they do not 
account for any shading in network relations. Yet, they are simple and easy to use. 
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For the visualisation of networks, neither the accumulated nor the dichotomized matrices 
provide a suitable basis. Whereas the former makes the picture too complex and unclear, 
the latter leads to an oversimplified network structure. For this reason, the accumulated 
ratings have to be categorised. Values between 10 and 6.666 are allocated the number 2, 
ratings between 6.666 and 3.333 receive a 1 and interactions weighted 3.333 or less are 
zeroed. This categorisation produces an appropriate image of interactions within the 
policy network. 
After four working steps, all required raw data is available to reconstruct the policy 
networks. The next subchapter will focus on network dimensions and their parameters in 
order to operationalise the hypotheses. 
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4.3 Determination of network dimension parameters 
 
Whereas the previous subchapters focused on the network reconstruction, this section 
determines the essential network dimension parameters. Particularly, the 
operationalisation of the hypotheses will be performed and discussed in-depth.  
Earlier in this study (see subchapter 3.3), the hypotheses have been developed on the 
bases of Rhodes and Marsh’s (1992) network dimensions. These four dimensions – 
membership, integration, resources and power - shall be picked-up again here in order to 
provide a framework for a systematic finding of methodological solutions. Table 5 is 
already well known to the reader and shall be inserted at the outset of this section as an 
overview. It has been adjusted once more by individually listing all elements and the 
corresponding applied parameters.  
For each parameter, a threshold has been defined in order to distinguish two sides on 
the policy network spectrum: the left hand side represents policy community coloured 
networks, whereas the right hand side covers issue networks and related forms. 
Subsequently, all elements, parameters and their thresholds will be explained sequentially.  
 
 
Dimension 
 
Policy community 
 
Applied parameter 
(threshold) 
 
Issue network 
 
1. Membership    
a) Number of 
participants 
Very limited number, 
some actors 
consciously excluded 
Number of involved 
network actors 
(threshold: 10) 
Large 
b) Number of interests Small range of 
interests  
Number of involved 
actor’s categories 
(threshold: 3) 
Encompasses wide 
range of affected 
interests 
c) Types of interest Executive authority 
interests dominate 
Percentage of 
involved Presidential 
actors 
(threshold: 33.333%) 
Economic and 
legislative and other 
bodies are involved 
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Dimension 
 
Policy community 
 
Applied parameter 
(threshold) 
 
Issue network 
 
2. Integration    
a) Frequency of 
interaction (information 
and resources) 
Frequent, high-quality, 
interaction of all actors 
on all matters related 
to policy issue 
Network density 
(threshold: 5.00) 
Rather low, contacts 
fluctuates in frequency 
and intensity 
b) Centralisation High Overall network 
degree centralisation 
(threshold: 50%) 
Low 
c) Executive authority’s 
position 
Central position of 
executive authority 
Degree centrality 
ranking 
(threshold: At least 
two Presidential 
actors within top 
three) 
Non-central position of 
executive authority 
3. Resources    
a) Quantity of 
information (scientific, 
legal, political or other 
knowledge) and 
resources (money, 
labour power, facilities 
and more) within 
network 
Generally high Maximum normalised 
degree centrality 
(threshold: 75%) 
Generally limited 
b) Distribution of 
information (scientific, 
legal, political or other 
knowledge) and 
resources (money, 
labour power, facilities 
and more) within 
network 
Information and 
resources among 
participants are more 
or less evenly 
distributed 
Spread between 
maximum and 
minimum normalised 
degree centrality in 
percentage of the 
highest value 
(threshold: 50%) 
Information and 
resources are unequally 
distributed 
4. Power    
a) Quantity of power 
within network 
Generally high Maximum normalised 
closeness centrality 
(threshold: 75%) 
Generally limited 
b) Distribution of 
power within network 
There is a balance of 
power between 
members, even if some 
actors may dominate 
the network. 
Spread between 
maximum and 
minimum normalised 
closeness centrality in 
percentage of the 
highest value 
(threshold: 50%) 
Unequal powers, 
reflects unequal access 
Table 5: Applied parameters for the operationalisation of hypotheses 
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1. Network membership 
• Parameter 1a: Number of participants 
The number of participants included in a policy network is the most essential 
element, because it determines the size of a decision-making structure. It is 
directly measured by the number of actors, who received an average influence 
rating of greater than 2.75. 
The threshold to differentiate between policy communities and issue networks is 
fixed at 10. This number has been chosen for the following reason: Given 128 
identified potential foreign policy actors, it is reasonable to assume that a policy 
community never involves more than 10 decision-makers. Any higher number 
would hinder efficient and tight network coordination - a major attribute of policy 
communities. Therefore, small networks including less than 10 members are 
considered to be on the policy community side, whereas more than 10 actors are 
characteristic for issue networks. 
• Parameter 1b: Number of interests 
The range of affected interests is the second important feature of the network 
membership dimension. It is measured by the number of actors’ categories (see 
Annex I) represented within the network. Of course, the assumption that an 
actor’s category represents only one homogenous, single set of interests is a 
simplification. However, the reality in Moscow often confirms that actors within 
one specific category have a wide range of interests in common, which does not 
always match with other categories. Economic actors, for instance, may have 
significant business interests in Georgia, while governmental actors by and large 
support drastic retaliation measures against Tbilisi. Presidential actors establish 
the NATO-Russia council, whereas the parliamentary chambers would have 
virtually voted against any form of cooperation with the alliance. 
Therefore, it is assumed that the number of interests increases as more actor’s 
categories are included within the decision-making structure. A network is 
considered to resemble a policy community if less than three interests are 
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represented in the network. More than three interests are rather characteristic for 
the issue network side. This threshold makes sense because a homogenous policy 
community could not afford to integrate more than two dissenting opinions. 
• Parameter 1c: Types of interest 
The third network membership parameter focuses on the types of interest. For the 
differentiation between policy communities and issue networks, the domination 
of the executive authority is decisive. For the purpose of this study, presidential 
actors will be regarded as executive authorities. Therefore, the percentage of 
involved presidential actors will be calculated. 
In order to distinguish the two policy network types, a threshold of 33.333% 
makes sense. If more than one third of all members belong to the Presidential 
category, a network is supposed to be dominated by executive authorities’ 
interests. It may then be considered as a policy community. In all other cases, the 
network rather resembles an issue network – especially if other types of interests 
are represented additionally within the structure.  
 
2. Network integration 
• Parameter 2a: Frequency of interaction 
The frequency of interaction in a policy network is measured by the network 
density. The density of a network is the total number of valued ties divided by the 
total number of possible valued ties (Borgatti, Everett, et al. 2002: 217). Hence, it 
represents the average interaction value of the network. Thereby, the calculations 
will be based on the accumulated matrices. 
As the experts assessed the interactions with ratings from 1 to 10, a value of 5.00 
shall be chosen as threshold. This definition corresponds to the dichotomization 
of the matrix values described earlier. This means that densities greater than 5.00 
may be allocated to policy communities, as frequent, high-quality interactions 
take place between actors on all matters related to the issue. In contrast, looser 
issue network-like structures are characterised by density values lower than 5.  
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• Parameter 2b: Centralisation 
Network centralisation is calculated by the overall network degree 
centralisation63. It is based on the valued, accumulated data sets and allows 
conclusions about the central or peripheral structure of a network. The parameter 
reaches a maximum of 100% when one actor is linked with all other actors, 
whereas the other players choose to interact only with this one. This is exactly the 
situation in a star graph (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 180). 0% indicates that all 
actors interact with each other with exactly the same frequency and intensity.  
Consequently, the threshold is fixed at 50%, reflecting a reasonable and average 
value. A network centralised more than 50% belongs to the policy community 
side of the spectrum, whereas lower percentages may be assigned to issue 
network types. 
• Parameter 2c: Executive authority’s position 
This parameter is important, because it measures an essential feature of policy 
networks: the executive authority’s position within the network. Similar to 
parameter 1c, Presidential actors are considered as executive authorities. It is 
assumed that they occupy a much more central position in policy communities 
than in issue networks. How can this parameter be measured? For each network 
member, a degree centrality value is calculated based on accumulated data, which 
reflects the actor’s activity in terms of his cultivated ties (Wasserman and Faust 
1994: 178). For comparative purposes, degree centrality will be normalised - 
which means expressed as percentage. Network members with higher values are 
more active and therefore central in terms of their interactions with other 
decision-makers. 
                                                 
 
63  For a given binary network with actors v1....vn and maximum degree centrality cmax, the network 
degree centralisation measure is calculated by the Σ(cmax - c(vi)) divided by the maximum value 
possible, where c(vi) is the degree centrality of actor vi Borgatti, Everett, et al. (2002: 167). 
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Hence, if at least two presidential actors belong to the top three positions, the 
network may be considered as a policy community. In all other cases, the network 
belongs to the issue network side, where the executive authority is supposed to be 
located rather peripherally. This threshold makes sense, because it pays regard to 
the main parameter requirement without ruling out a central position of a non-
executive authority. 
 
3. Network resources 
• Parameter 3a: Quantity of information and resources 
As discussed earlier, resources in a network may consist of information 
(scientific, legal, political or other knowledge) or other factors (money, labour 
power, facilities and more). These goods are supposed to be continuously 
exchanged within a network structure. The quantity of available resources within 
the network represents another indicator to differentiate policy networks. It shall 
be measured by determining the maximum normalised degree centrality value 
within the network. As pretests with different data sets have shown, the value of 
the most active member is a good indicator for the level of information and 
resources reached in a network. If the most interlinked actor is highly active, the 
common quantity of information and resources in a network turns out to be on a 
high echelon. 
75% shall be defined as the threshold. The quantity of information and resources 
within the network is generally high if the maximum value exceeds 75%. In this 
case, the network is considered as a policy community. Lower percentages are 
perceived as a sign of limited information and resources, which is typical for 
issue networks. 
• Parameter 3b: Distribution of information and resources 
The second resource-related parameter focuses on the distribution of the network 
goods. It is measured by the spread between the maximum and minimum 
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normalised degree centrality ranking64 expressed as a percentage of the maximum 
value. This index quantifies the spectrum of available goods in the network. The 
reason why it has to be related to the highest quantity is a statistical one. In order 
to compare data, parameter calculations are based on normalised values, which 
reduces the spread of lower quantities and vice versa. 
The threshold of this parameter is fixed at 50% as well. If information and 
resources are distributed over a spectrum of less than 50%, the network may be 
viewed as a policy community. In this case, variations are smaller, which 
indicates a more or less even distribution. As the spectrum exceeds 50%, 
differences between actors with regard to their available resources are larger. This 
is supposed to be a typical sign for issue networks. 
 
4. Network power 
• Parameter 4a: Quantity of power 
As already mentioned earlier, ‘power’ may not be equated with ‘resources’ or 
‘influence’. For the purpose of this present study, power is defined in terms of an 
actor’s access to other network members. An actor is central if he can quickly and 
as directly as possible interact with other network members (Wasserman and 
Faust 1994: 183). Hence, the quantity of power prevailing in a policy network 
depends on how close the actors are to each other. This shall be measured by 
determining the maximum normalised closeness centrality65. Similar to parameter 
3a, pretests have proven that the value of the most powerful actor in the network 
reflects the available power quantity. For computational purposes, the above-
explained dichotomized data sets will be used, since the access to other actors is 
supposed to be either existent (1) or non-existent (0). 
                                                 
 
64  The normalised degree centrality has already been calculated for parameter 2c. 
65  According to Borgatti, Everett, et al. (2002: 169), the normalised closeness centrality of an actor is the 
reciprocal of farness (the sum of the lengths of the geodesics to every other actor) divided by the 
minimum possible farness expressed as a percentage. 
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75% marks the threshold between the two policy network types. As the maximum 
closeness value surmounts 75%, the level of power in the network generally 
becomes higher and thus allows for easy access among network members. This is 
a major characteristic for policy communities. In contrast, an issue network 
usually shows power levels below 75%, since actors in larger networks are often 
only linked indirectly with each other. 
• Parameter 4b: Distribution of power 
Analogue parameter 3b, the distribution of power is calculated in order to 
determine the policy networks. Hence, the spread between the maximum and 
minimum normalised closeness centrality is expressed as a percentage of the 
highest value.  
Obviously, the threshold is again fixed at 50%. Thus, if power values of the 
network members vary over a spectrum smaller than 50%, the power within the 
network is considered to be, more or less, evenly distributed. This would indicate 
a policy community like network structure. However, if the spread is greater than 
50%, the network members have unequal access to each other. Some actors may 
be very powerful whereas others are quite isolated within the network. This 
situation is typical for issue networks. 
 
Obviously, a whole range of additional measures could be calculated with UCINET 6. 
However, this study shall be restricted to the most crucial and effective values, which 
allow specifying policy networks. With the help of the above-presented parameters, it will 
be possible to distinguish policy communities and its adjacent forms from issue networks 
and their relatives. 
Also, the applied measures will make it possible to compare the four policy 
networks with each other. It will be particularly interesting to draw a comparison between 
issues involving the near abroad subfields with issues addressed by the complementary 
community. Likewise, a comparison between security and economically coloured policy-
networks may lead to beneficial conclusions. 
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4.4 Visualisation of resulting decision-making procedures and structures 
 
Finally, policy networks shall be visualised. This subchapter explains the methodological 
aspects of that task. Theoretically, the decision-making structures could be visualised and 
presented in various ways. They could be reproduced based on different data sets 
(accumulated, dichotomized, categorised), layout methods or visualisation software. 
However, this study commits itself to a single graphic per case study for two reasons. 
First, comprehensive pretesting of data sets, layout tools and softwares has shown that 
there are only minor variations between different solutions. The core research findings and 
the overall significance of a specific policy network remain visible irrespective of the 
presentation method and procedure. Second, the different visualisation of one and the 
same network would be confusing. The analysis section of this study is complex enough 
given four different cases. 
The policy network visualisation is based on the UCINET 6 program and therefore 
on the integrated NetDraw software (Borgatti, Everett, et al. 2002). Data sets are created 
and adjusted in UCINET in the form of matrices before they can be transferred and 
opened on the NetDraw platform. Subsequently, the exact procedure of the visualisation 
will be determined and explained. 
 
Depiction of actors 
The actor’s – or node’s – depiction and layout vary in terms of shape, size and position 
depending on different attributes. The definitions made here will apply throughout the 
whole study. The shape of network members shall reflect the actor’s category. 
 
? Down triangles stand for Presidential actors; 
? Up triangles represent governmental actors; 
? Diamonds indicate parliamentary actors; 
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? Squares signify economic actors; 
? Circles denote other actors. 
 
The node’s size refers to the network member’s power. Hence, the diameter of a symbol 
reflects the ability of an actor to access other participants in the decision-making process. 
It is based on the normalised closeness centrality, which has been introduced in subchapter 
4.3. The average influence rating won’t be employed for visualisation purposes, because 
the expert assessments only serve as a tool to delimitate the network boundaries. 
The actor’s position within the policy network is determined according to the 
normalised degree centrality as explained in section 4.3. This definition makes sense 
because it considers network members as being central if they are active and closely 
linked in terms of their interactions. In contrast, lower degree centrality values places 
actors at the periphery of a policy network. 
 
Depiction of interactions 
As mentioned within the framework of working step 4 in section 4.2, accumulated or 
dichotomized data sets are not suitable to illustrate networks. Whereas, the former results 
are too differentiated and confuse patterns, the latter does not sufficiently reflect the 
complex nature of decision-making. Therefore, the four case study data sets are 
categorised. Ties between actors are visualised according to the following interaction 
intensity: 
 
• 0 = no or low interaction during the appropriate decision-making process 
• 1 = medium interaction during the appropriate decision-making process 
• 2 = intense interaction during the appropriate decision-making process 
 
In this study, the line size of an interaction will correspond to these categories. Intense 
relationships (2) are boldly illustrated, whereas medium links (1) are depicted as thin lines. 
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No or low interactions (0) are not inserted at all, which leads to clearer network structures. 
As this definition is easy to interpret, the attachment of labels is not necessary. 
One final remark has to be added concerning the general layout of policy networks. 
The UCINET software NetDraw arranges the decision-making structures random-like, 
provided that no special graph features are selected. This implies that every illustration has 
to be set up manually. The actor’s location, for instance, in the north or in the south of a 
picture therefore has absolutely no significance. The spatial placement of an actor rather 
fulfils graphical needs. However, it has to be kept in mind that the actor’s distance from 
the network’s midpoint highly matters due to the above-mentioned degree centrality 
values. 
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4.5 Qualitative analysis of decision-making processes 
 
In the context of Russian foreign policy-making, the analysis of pure quantitative data 
would not be very meaningful. The highly dynamic and complex surrounding of decision-
making processes in Moscow implies that instruments of SNA are supplemented by 
qualitative research. Therefore, the reconstructed policy-networks shall be viewed as 
embedded findings. They are interpreted with the help of a wide range of open source 
information. 
Most of the qualitative data has been gathered by means of face-to-face interviews. 
In addition to the 40 quantitative questionings, the author held more than 60 qualitative 
conversations in Moscow (see Appendix II). They covered both case-specific aspects and 
general facets of Russian foreign policy-making. Supplementary, media products, 
scientific documents and literature help to understand the case studies and decision-
making in Moscow. The accumulation of all these sources yielded numerous remote small 
pieces of a huge puzzle. 
As explained in subchapter 2.2, this study considers the four case studies as issues, 
not as events66. Whereas issues are conceived as specific policy problems, events may be 
understood as single happenings along the timeline. From a process-related perspective, 
they are aligned in a meaningful sequence. Of course it is technically impossible to 
reconstruct every detail of a decision-making process. However, an issue can be 
understood for the most part if the cornerstones within the appropriate time period are 
conceived. 
The four main Chapters 7 to 10 will each start with a section outlining the issue and 
its main events. These subchapters will provide a qualitative and process-related overview 
of the decision-making cases and include the following fragments: 
                                                 
 
66  Compare with Knoke, Pappi, et al. (1996: 13-17). 
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• Appearance of the issue 
• Evolution of the issue 
• Decision on the issue 
 
The qualitative analysis of the decision-making processes has two objectives. On the one 
hand, it contributes to a better understanding of the policy networks. Abstract actor 
relations per se are not really meaningful if they are not placed in a larger descriptive 
context. On the other hand, the illustration of the four processes helps to find characteristic 
features of Russian foreign policy-making. Intentionally, no hypotheses have been 
formulated for this qualitative task. The recognition of specific or general patterns of 
actor’s behaviour shall result from open, less-routed research. In combination with the 
reconstruction of policy network structures, the analysis of decision-making processes 
hopefully leads to precious insights and conclusions with regard to the genesis of Russia’s 
foreign and security policy. 
A final remark has to be added. Whereas policy networks only consider Russian 
actors, the four qualitative subchapters include international and non-Russian regional 
players. The characterisation of decision-making events simply cannot be performed 
without mentioning foreign activities. For this reason, general conclusions of this study 
may possibly include statements with reference to external causes. 
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Summary 
 
Part I provides the theoretical and methodological framework for the present study. It 
initially defines the foreign policy-making process as a ‘set of procedures and structures 
that states use to arrive at foreign policy decisions and to implement them’ (Goldstein 
1996: 176). Also, features of the foreign policy-making process are discussed and 
contrasted with characteristics of domestic policy-making. 
Subsequently, the analytical concept and its application is outlined based on 
Knoke’s and Pappi’s (1996) policy domain model and Rhode’s and Marsh’s (1992) 
typology of policy networks. It is assumed that the Russian foreign policy arena represents 
a policy domain that contains four different overlapping subfields. A geographical and a 
sectoral cleavage perpendicularly span the domain and separate actors interested in near 
abroad, far abroad, security or economic matters. With reference to the specific features of 
high and low politics, it is then argued that the far abroad and security subfields are 
relatively small and homogenous. In contrast, the near abroad and economic communities 
seem to be comparatively vast, complex and diffuse. 
Against this background, this study investigates four specific issues, each involving 
a combination of a geographically and sectorally coloured subfield: the foundation of the 
NATO-Russia Council (far abroad – security), the transformation to the Collective 
Security Treaty Organisation (near abroad – security), the establishment of the Common 
European Economic Space (far abroad – economy) and the development of the Single 
Economic Space (near abroad – economy). 
By relying on methods of social network analysis, the thesis of this present study 
advocates that policy networks tend to take the shape of small-sized and tight policy 
communities if a Russian foreign policy issue is addressed by the far abroad and security 
subfields. In comparison, large and heterogeneous issue networks tackle near abroad and 
economic policy problems. 
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Part II. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
The previous four chapters of Part I have presented the theoretical and methodological 
framework of the present study. Thereby, four particular issues have been selected and 
introduced which are considered to be instructive for Russian foreign policy-making: the 
NATO-Russia Council (NRC), the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the 
Common European Economic Space (CEES) and the Single Economic Space (SES). This 
part aims at providing the contextual background for the analysis of these four issues. 
Thereby, it addresses the following question: what kinds of political settings influence the 
form of decision-making networks?  
In particular, two political settings influence the Russian decision-making networks: 
the foreign policy contents and the foreign policy domain. With regard to the first setting, 
it is important to understand the general layout of Russian foreign policy, the most 
prominent global challenges between 2000 and 2004 as well as Moscow’s reactions. 
Therefore, Chapter 5 presents Russia’s policy contents with regard to world affairs and 
embeds the four case studies in a wider political landscape. It highlights Russia’s foreign 
policy concept 2000 and illustrates Moscow’s activities facing jeopardised influence in the 
near abroad and institutional changes in the far abroad.  
In addition to that, it is crucial to comprehend the Russian foreign policy domain 
and its actor’s constellation. Chapter 6 illuminates Moscow’s political arena more in 
depth. It outlines all presidential, governmental, parliamentary, economic and other actors, 
which have a potential impact on foreign policy-making. It highlights their roles and 
assesses their prospects to become policy network members. 
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5. Russia’s Foreign Policies Facing Global Challenges 
 
In this chapter, the focus will be turned on global developments and Russia’s 
corresponding foreign policies during Vladimir Putin’s first presidential term. Between 
March 26th, 2000 and March 14th, 2004, the Russian Federation has been challenged by a 
variety of problems, which arose geographically most notably on the southern flank and in 
the west. The following subchapters will discuss Moscow’s foreign policies with reference 
to Russia’s foreign policy concept in order to locate the four case studies within a global 
context. 
 
 
5.1 Russia’s foreign policy concept 2000 
 
On June 28, 2000, only three moths after his election, President Vladimir Putin approved a 
new foreign policy concept (Rossiiskaja-Federatsija 2000). It was designed to provide a 
guideline for Russian foreign policies in a modern, fundamentally and dynamically 
changing world. The document describes the country’s diplomacy as ‘multidirectional, 
balanced, independent and based on national interests’ (People'sDaily 2000). According to 
Foreign Minister Ivan Ivanov, the paper represents an integrated long-range foreign policy 
doctrine (Iwanov 2002: 8). For him, the biggest innovation of the concept is its realism. 
Foreign policy priorities are more closely linked than before to the long-term tasks of 
internal development. They consider Russia’s real possibilities and resources (VanBuskirk 
2000). 
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The concept’s content 
Russia’s foreign policy concept lays out the following general objectives (Rossiiskaja-
Federatsija 2000: part I): 
Ensurence of reliable security of the county; 
Influence on general world processes; 
Creation of favourable external conditions for steady development of Russia; 
Formation of a good-neighbour belt along the perimeter of Russia’s borders; 
Quest for concord and coinciding interests with foreign countries; 
Preservation of the rights and interests of Russian citizens abroad; 
Promotion of a positive perception of the Russian Federation in the world. 
 
Part II of the concept discusses transformations in international relations. It is stressed that 
Russia seeks to achieve a multi-polar system contrary to the growing trend towards a 
pronounced U.S. hegemony.67 In part III, priorities of the Russian Federation in resolving 
global problems are outlined: new world order, international security, economic relations, 
human rights and information. 
With regard to regional priorities (Rossiiskaja-Federatsija 2000: part IV), the 
concept mentions the CIS space first. The emphasis shall be made on the development of 
good-neighbourly relations and strategic partnerships with all CIS member states. 
Thereby, Russia follows a ‘two-track integration model’, which distinguishes a nucleus of 
states willing for a higher level of integration from so called ‘dragging states’ (Iwanov 
2002: 85). 
Relations with Western states and institutions are part of Russia’s traditional foreign 
policy. Whereas Russia retains a negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO, it 
seeks due respect for its interests concerning institutional evolutions of the European 
Union. For Moscow, bilateral relations with individual EU member countries and other 
states are of key importance. Certainly, relations to the U.S., China, India and Japan shall 
be constantly developed. 
                                                 
 
67  See additionally Ivanov (2002) remarks about unilateralism made at Stanford University in San 
Francisco. 
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The concept’s evaluation 
The foreign policy concept 2000 may retrospectively be assessed from different 
perspectives: favourably estimated, it may well be argued that the document heralded a 
new period in Russia’s behaviour abroad. Putin’s new pragmatism in fact stabilized 
Moscow’s position on the international stage after chaotic years under Boris Yeltsin. The 
year 2000 is to some extent comparable with 185668 as Aleksander Gorchakov declared in 
the aftermaths of the Crimean war that Russia does not pout, but gathers its forces.69 
During the reform era under Alexander II, Russia mainly focused on stabilization and on 
the domestic socio-economic development.  
Certainly, the Russian Federation of the 1990’s didn’t loose a war, it didn’t isolate 
itself or remain silent. However, the shock of the Soviet brake up and the constant political 
conflicts during Yeltsin’s presidency lead to a commonly conceived desire of smoother, 
more effective and duly formulated policies paying tribute to domestic modernization 
(Trenin 2005). To this end, the new foreign policy concept made a considerable 
contribution. 
It may also be argued that the foreign policy concept provides a useful tool to 
facilitate rational and foreseeable policy-outcomes. Even if the paper does not account to a 
‘vision thing’ (Trenin 2005), it nevertheless supports more strategic arrangements. 
Definitely, the foreign policy concept serves as a base for policy-debates. 
From a more critical point of view, one could also argue that the foreign policy 
concept 2000 has basically remained nothing more than a piece of paper. Even if Russia 
has vigorously debated its new identity and foreign policy over years (Ivanov 2001, 
Iwanov 2002), a real consensus about core national interests has not been reached up to 
date (Carnegie 2004). Quite understandably, the quest for ‘a certain idea of Russia’70 is an 
                                                 
 
68  Compare with Ivanov (2001: 8), Ivanov (2002) and Hösch (1996). 
69  “Говорят, что Россия сердится. Нет, Россия не сердится, Россия сосредоточивается”. See Senin 
(2001). 
70  This term refers to Coles (2000), who stressed the importance of a ‘a certain idea of Britain’, when it 
comes to foreign policy formulation. 
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at least ongoing – if not impossible - task for a multi-ethnic, multi-religious gigantic 
country with a turbulent history.71  
Also, the well-meant concept often enough gets overthrown as foreign policies in 
Moscow are usually forged in the last minute. In these very moments of reactive crisis 
management, it seems as if anybody remembers general policy principles and guidelines. 
It may as well be criticised that the foreign policy concept does not contain clearly 
formulated red lines (Carnegie 2005). In other words, the document leaves it open to what 
extent Russia can accept certain activities of other countries or not.72 Additionally, it could 
be advocated that there simply exists a gap between high-pitched claims of the concept 
and the available means to satisfy them (Schröder 2004). 
Finally, it might be argued that world politics in general and Russia’s position within 
the international community in particular has significantly changed within a short period 
of time. September 11th 2001 and the subsequent global war on terrorism, growing 
significance of energy resources, rapid economic growth and institutional changes have 
brought forward the expiration date of the foreign policy concept. It has never been up-
dated till this day. 
In spite of all shortcomings, the foreign policy concept may be considered as valid 
for the relevant period of the present study (2000 – 2004). Within this time frame, it has 
been applied to a remarkable extent. The next two subchapters will focus more closely on 
concrete challenges within Russia’s near and far abroad and pinpoint the four case studies 
in this context. 
                                                 
 
71  A vast amount of literature addresses Russia’s national idea and interests. Representatively, see Surkov 
(2006), Ivanov (2001), Ivanov (2002), Shevtsova (2005), Mommsen (2004). 
72  See for instance criticism concerning ABM treaty, NATO and the Kurlis by Safranchuk (2004). 
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5.2 Jeopardised Russian influence in the near abroad 
 
Within what kind of global context did the two near abroad case studies – Single 
Economic Space (SES) and Collective and Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) – 
emerge? Basically, these issues have appeared on the political agenda during Putin’s first 
term, as Russia’s influence in the near-abroad has been double challenged: economically, 
it became clear that the integration of the post-Soviet space needed new impetus in order 
to safeguard Moscow’s predominance. Geopolitically, foreign powers increasingly gained 
a foothold in Central Asia and in the Caucasus after September 11th 2001. 
 
Ineffective economic integration 
Among CIS member states, Russia’s economy plays a pivotal role. In 2004, the Russian 
Federation’s exports to CIS countries accounted to almost 30 bn US dollars. In 
comparison, the following three nations in the ranking – Ukraine (8,6 bn), Belarus (7.3 bn) 
and Kazakhstan (4,1 bn) - fall far short of this figure.73 After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, Moscow started various initiatives in order to consolidate and strengthen its key 
position as an economic regional power.74 This endeavour became gradually more urgent 
around the turn of the millennium, as foreign institutions like EU, WTO, OSCE or the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation75 (SCO) started to embrace CIS member states. 
Additionally, some newly independent states formed separate regional organisations like 
the Economic Cooperation Organisation76 (1992), GUUAM77 (1997) in order to push back 
Russian influence. 
                                                 
 
73  Source: CIS trade figures 2004, CIS Statistical committee on http://www.cisstat.com/rus/, 21.02.2007. 
74  See Alexandrova (2001). 
75  The SCO (http://www.sectsco.org/) was created in June 2001 on the base of its prototype – the 
“Shanghai-five” mechanism. 
76  This organisation has initially been founded in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. 
77  Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova formed this institution to oppose alleged neo-
imperialist activities of the Russian Federation. 
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Moscow initially intended to rely on the young institution CIS as a framework for broad 
integration. However, the economic dimension of this grouping78 has not engendered 
significant results.79 Multilateral projects mostly failed because the participating parties 
lacked of either shared interests, political will, resources or all together. 
In 1992, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation (BSEC)80 has been 
founded in order to ‘foster interaction and harmony among the Member States, as well as 
to ensure peace, stability and prosperity encouraging friendly and good-neighbourly 
relations in the Black Sea region’.81 However, this grouping has not achieved concrete 
results except the establishment of a trade and development bank in 1999 (Burakovsky 
2004: 9). 
Another initiative was taken in 1996, as Russia and Belarus started to create a Union 
State (RBU) intending mainly harmonized custom duties and a common currency. Yet, it 
seems as if both sides lack of enthusiasm to push this project beyond existing bilateral 
arrangements.82 
In 1995, the Eurasian Economic Community83 was established in order to form 
common external customs boundaries and to coordinate integration approaches into the 
world economy and the international trade system. But much to Russia’s regret, the 
second largest economy within the post-Soviet space – Ukraine – has never joined this 
organisation. For political reasons, Kiev continues to observe this Russian-dominated 
project from a distance (Zlenko 2003). 
Against this background, a separate integration project was initiated in February 
2003. The Presidents of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan decided to found the 
Single Economic Space (ЕЭП). Beside a customs union, the ЕЭП is supposed to lead to 
                                                 
 
78  See http://cis.minsk.by/main.aspx?uid=234, 25.09.2006. 
79  See “Reformirovanie organisatsii SNG: Zadachi I taktika Moskvy v ekonomike I sfere bezopasnosti”, 
Center Cur, 19.05.2002, ISI database, 18.05.2005. 
80  This regional arrangement involves Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Albania, 
Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Turkey. 
81  http://www.bsec-organisation.org, 25.09.2006. 
82  Frumkin (2004) outlines actors and their activities with regard to the formation of the Russian-
Belarussian Union. 
83  Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 
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free movement of goods, services, capital and persons (Ruzhin 2005). For Russia, the 
establishment of ЕЭП ranks high on the agenda because it integrates Ukraine and the other 
three major national economies in the region. Though, also this undertaking may end as a 
lame duck. As the numerous approaches before, SES - if it ever will be implemented at all 
- runs the risk of being highly ineffective in terms of its goals and future ambitions. 
Nevertheless, the initial decision-making process on the Russian side to establish ЕЭП 
represents a good example of near-abroad economic foreign policy-making. It will be 
traced in detail within Chapter 10 of the present study. 
 
Foreign geopolitical influence 
Russia’s traditional sphere of influence in the near-abroad was not only challenged on an 
economic level. Inextricably, Moscow’s position has also been endangered in terms of 
geopolitical authority. Russia’s foreign policy towards the near abroad during the 1990’s 
was particularly fluctuating. Moscow’s initial laissez faire attitude in 1992 was followed 
by a period of Realpolitik from 1993 until the end of the millennium (Pravda 2001: 215-
216). Within this era, Russia tried to consolidate its regional hegemony by transforming 
CIS into a full-fledged military and political grouping under Russian leadership 
(Burakovsky 2004: 6). However, these plans failed as the former Soviet Republics resisted 
to renewed Russian dominance as far as they could afford.84  
Similarly, the Collective Security Treaty founded in 1992 by nine Eurasian states,85 
did not lead to significantly closer cooperation among its signatories. On the contrary, 
Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Georgia resigned in 1999 and the agreement did not live up to 
the status of a security structure (Saat 2005: 3).  
Russia’s geostrategic leverage within the post-Soviet space further shrank as third 
powers started to gain a foothold in 1994. At that time, all Central Asian and Caucasian 
states - including Russia - acceded to the NATO’s Partnership for Peace program (PfP). 
                                                 
 
84  Most CIS member states simply cannot afford real confrontation with powerful Russia (“Alliances 
within the CIS”, Rossiiskie Vesti, 03.11.2003, ISI database, 18.05.2005). 
85  Russia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgizstan, Tadjikistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus, Kazhakhstan. 
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Obviously, this framework provided a good opportunity for former Soviet Republics to 
strengthen their independence and their position vis-à-vis Moscow. To this day, PfP-
consultations with regard to security sector reform, civil-military relations, transition to 
NATO standards, defence management, strengthening of democratic institutions play a 
positive role (Chitadze 2005: 2).  
Yet, the security-related context in Russia’s near abroad significantly changed only 
September 11th, 2001. The subsequent military interventions of coalition forces in 
Afghanistan (October 7th, 2001) and in Iraq (March 3rd, 2003) required Washington and its 
allies to install air force bases within the Eurasian region. Therefore, the U.S. received 
Uzbek permission on October 5th, 2001 to use the air base Khanabad for operations 
(GlobalSecurity 2001). Similarly, U.S., Canadian, French, Danish, Netherlands and 
Norwegian troops were allowed to move into Kyrgyzstan. In December 2001, American 
engineers arrived at Bishkek’s Manas international airport to open the airfield for 
operations.86 
In addition to the Central Asian air bases, U.S. military instructors landed in Tbilisi, 
Georgia on May 19th, 2002. Their duty was to train Georgian troops, enabling them to 
fight Chechen guerrillas believed to be operating in the countries Pankisi Gorge.  
At the top of these developments, NATO started to prepare its fifth enlargement 
round. Already in spring 2002, it became apparent that the alliance would invite seven 
eastern European countries to take up accession talks. This development loomed 
extraordinarily large on Russia’s Western horizon, even if NATO officials consequently 
reassured Moscow. 
Understandably, all these developments looked menacing from a Russian 
perspective. Nevertheless and to the surprise of political observers,87 President Putin 
adopted a mild attitude and reacted in a relaxed and even minded manner. It was not a 
coincidence that Putin was the first state leader solidly uniting with President Bush after 
                                                 
 
86  See Global Security, “Manas International Airport: Ganci Air Base, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan”, 18.09.2006 
(http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/manas-imagery.htm, 16.01.2007). 
87  Representatively, see Rumer and Sokolsky (2002). 
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the terrorist attacks. Obviously, 911 was a formidable opportunity for Putin to justify his 
new pragmatic course (Parkhalina 2005) aiming to improve ties with the West. 
Within Russia’s political arena, Putin’s new approach was barely understood. 
Especially the national defence and security establishment in Moscow was stunned and 
upset. They advocated a tougher stance and decisive reactions in order to safeguard 
Russia’s weight in world politics and to keep Moscow’s backyard clean of third party 
intrusion.88 Therefore, massive political pressure on Putin emerged along the domestic 
internal front (Kobrinskaya 2002, Rumer and Sokolsky 2002). Raising the status of the 
Collective Security Treaty to an international organisation (CSTO) may be viewed as one 
of Putin’s major responses to soothe conservative elite members. 
Upon the transformation of the Collective Security Treaty into a full-fledged 
military-political organisation, new goals were defined. According to its charter, the 
CSTO was designed to strengthen ‘peace, international and regional security and stability, 
protection - on a collective basis - of the independence and the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of the member-states’.89 The CSTO was meant to become an eastern 
counterpart of NATO90 involving the states of Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, 
Russia and Tadzhikistan. 
Officially, the CSTO was aimed at fighting common challenges like drugs, terrorism 
and terrorist groupings, illegal migration, trafficking of immigrants as well as organised 
criminal groupings in some specific industries.91 However, it goes without saying that 
through the CSTO, Moscow in fact gained new capabilities in keeping its military 
dominance in the ex-Soviet republics.92 The Russian decision-making process concerning 
the establishment of the CSTO will be reconstructed in depth within the framework of Part 
III of the present study. 
                                                 
 
88  Torbakov (2004) distinguishes three main schools of thought with regard to CIS policies: Neo-
imperialists, benevolent integrationists and the pragmatists. 
89  Chapter II, article 3 of the ОДКБ charter signed in Kishinev on October 07th, 2003. 
90  ‘CIS Collective Security Treaty Update’ in: Izvestia 19.03.2003, ISI database 18.05.2005. 
91  Nikolaj Bordjuzha, ОДКБ General Secretary, in: Krasnaya Zvezda ‘To do away with drugs mafia’, 
25.07.2003, ISI database 18.05.05. 
92  CCPR – Russia Foreign Politics ‘Foreign Politics of the Week’, 23.03.2003, ISI database 18.05.2005. 
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5.3 Institutional changes in the far abroad 
 
This subchapter will focus on the emergence of the two far abroad case studies: the 
establishment of the NATO-Russia council (NRC) and the Common European Economic 
Space (CEES). What kind of global political developments triggered these issues? In 
short, NRC and CEES appeared on the political agenda due to significant institutional 
changes within the Western hemisphere. Particularly, the two most important groupings – 
the EU and NATO – evolved at a remarkable pace at the outset of the new millennium.  
 
The EU’s eastern enlargement 
In contrast to the near abroad issues and to the NRC, the collapse of the World Trade 
Centre in New York did not play an important role for the CEES case. Obviously, the EU 
has planned its 5th round of enlargement well before these tragic events. Already in June 
1993, the European Council mentioned the potential accession of central and eastern 
European countries to the EU for the first time. 
Nine years later, on October 9th 2002, the Commission recommended to start entry 
talks with 10 states: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The historic decision to enlarge the EU has been taken at 
the Copenhagen summit on December 13th, 2002. It was followed by the official accession 
of the 10 new members on May 1st, 2003. 
Even if the Russian Federation did not fundamentally oppose the EU eastern 
enlargement project, it worried about economic disadvantages in general and about its 
enclave Kaliningrad in particular (Baranovsky 2002). Solutions had to be found within the 
framework of the bilateral Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA), signed on 
December 1st 1997. 
It is difficult to determine the ultimate trigger for the CEES-project initiation. The 
idea first and surprisingly came up on the occasion of the 7th EU-Russian summit on May 
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17th, 2001 in Moscow.93 Therefore, it maybe assumed that it has been at least informally 
discussed earlier among members of the Commission, as the eastern enlargement was 
already on the internal agenda or at least becoming apparent on the horizon. In light of this 
situation, the EU felt obliged to accommodate Moscow by enhancing the bilateral 
cooperation agenda. 
The CEES intends to create an open and integrated market between the EU and 
Russia. It shall reduce ‘barriers to trade and investment and promote reforms and 
competitiveness, based on the principles of non-discrimination, transparency and good 
governance’.94 In May 2003, the two sides agreed to complement the CEES by three other 
spaces: the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, the Common Space on 
External Security and the Common Space on Research, Education and Culture. Russia’s 
decision-making process with regard to the formation of CEES will be analysed in 
Chapter 9 of the present study. 
 
NATO enlargement and ABM treaty 
Since 1997, the relationship between Russia and NATO has been developed by the 
Permanent Joint Council (PJC). This institutional framework has been created in order to 
facilitate bilateral cooperation after decencies of cold war. Yet, latest after the World 
Trade Center attacks, it became clear that the PJC was outdated. It had to be replaced by a 
new agreement allowing farther reaching Russian involvement. 
At least three impetuses may have lead to the Rome declaration founding the NRC 
on May 28th 2002. First, the terrorist attacks on 911 significantly changed the relationship 
between the NATO headquarter in Brussels and Moscow. Putin’s immediate expression of 
solidarity towards Washington on September 12th 2001 and his subsequent pragmatic 
course engendered sympathy in the Western world (Rumer and Sokolsky 2002). In the end 
                                                 
 
93  Expert interview, Swedish Embassy in Moscow, 02.05.2005. 
94  The EU’s relation with Russia – The common economic space: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/russia/intro/index.htm#comm, 25.09.2006. 
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of 2001, both sides felt a historic opportunity to leave behind cold war thinking and to 
move on to a qualitatively different bilateral relation. 
Second, similarly to the EU, NATO was also about to plan its 5th round of 
enlargement.95 On November 22nd 2002, seven new countries were invited to begin 
accession talks. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia 
signed protocols on March 26th 2003 and formally joined the alliance one year later. It is 
not entirely clear at what time the potential enlargement appeared on Brussels agenda. 
However, it is obvious that this issue was unofficially discussed at an early stage. Hence, 
it has to be assumed that NATO anticipated the enlargement by appeasing Russia with a 
closer integration within Europe’s most powerful defence and security structure. The 
following statement of U.S. Foreign Minister Colin Powell confirms this link: ‘The Rome 
declaration and other joint initiatives between USA and the Russian Federation had 
succeeded in making the issue [NATO’s eastern enlargement] less of a problem for the 
Russians and less of an irritant in our relations’.96 Indeed, Putin’s rhetoric against the ‘big 
bang’ NATO enlargement97 softened after 911 (Gallis 2003: 5) and especially after the 
creation of the NRC in May 2002. 
Third, the establishment of the NRC is closely linked with America’s withdrawal 
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. After September 11th 2001, the U.S. 
accelerated its plans to deploy the National Missile Defence (NMD). Therefore, they 
resigned from the ABM treaty on December 13th 2001, which amazingly didn’t provoke a 
sharp reaction of President Putin.98  
Two reasons account for the soft Russian response. On the one hand, George W. 
Bush allegedly discussed the issue ‘over several meetings this year [2001]’.99 It seems as 
                                                 
 
95  See “The Road to NATO membership”, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0211-
prague/more_info/membership.htm, 19.09.2006. 
96  ‘NATO enlargement to continue despite Russian objections: Powell’, Agence France-Presse, 28.05.2002, 
ISI database, 18.04.2005. 
97  “Eastern Europe politics: A ‘big bang’ NATO enlargement?”, Economist Intelligence Unit, 05.06.2002, 
ISI database, 18.04.2005. 
98  “America withdraws from ABM treaty”, BBC news, 13.12.2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1707812.stm, 18.09.2006. 
99  Ibid. 
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if the two sides agreed in advance on a new international agreement to replace the ABM. 
On the other hand, the U.S. accommodated the Russians by announcing and ultimately 
enabling the NRC. Both issues have been linked at a later stage, on April 12th 2002. 
This interpretation is backed by statements made by John Holum (2000), President 
Clinton’s senior adviser on arms control. He considered Russia as the key to managing 
NMD diplomacy. Washington – even if it was not dependent on Moscow’s support –
nonetheless strived to address Russia’s concerns. 
The NRC was created ‘as the main forum for advancing NATO-Russia relations, in 
which the 26 Allies and Russia work together as equal partners to identify and pursue 
opportunities for joint action’.100 
In sum, this chapter has shown that the Russian Federation went through difficult 
times during Putin’s first presidential terms. Between 2000 and 2004, it faced a broad 
range of external challenges both within the near and far abroad. Whereas Moscow’s 
economic and strategic shares on the southern flank were about to shrink, it was 
confronted with institutional changes of Western organisations. 
 
                                                 
 
100  “NATO-Russia relations”, NATO topics, 15.09.2006, http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-russia/index.html, 
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6. Actors and Roles within the Russian Foreign Policy Domain 
 
Whereas the last chapter embedded the four selected case studies in a wider political 
context, this chapter will describe actors and their roles within the Russian foreign policy 
domain. The following subchapters will cover the role and significance of different 
potential foreign policy decision-makers. In sequence, presidential, governmental, 
parliamentary, economic and other actors will be discussed. However, prior to this 
discussion, three preliminary remarks about the Russian foreign policy domain shall be 
made here. 
First, it has to be reiterated that the present study focuses on organisational actors. 
In accordance with previous social network analysis (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996, Laumann, 
Heinz, et al. 1991, Laumann and Knoke 1987), the present study views the role of natural 
persons in public decision-making as less significant. This does not mean that individuals 
may be ignored. However, as stated in Chapter 2.2, public and private organised interests 
are believed to have a more effective and systematic impact on foreign policy-making. 
Second, it has to be pointed out that the Russian foreign policy domain is highly 
dynamic. In particular, actors, their roles, positions and influences rapidly change. On the 
one hand, this may be explained by the continuous elite struggle for access to the decision-
making process (Rjabov 2005: 48-51). Some actors get knocked-out, new ones appear. 
Elite and cadre affiliation in Russia is decidedly ephemeral and precarious 
(Kryshtanovskaja 2005: 99-216, Lapina 1996).  
On the other hand, the dynamic domain’s landscape stems from administrational 
reforms. The most extensive reorganisation was decreed by Putin on March 9th 2004.101 
After Prime Minister Kasjanov was replaced by Fradkov in February already, the number 
of ministries was cut from 23 to 16.102 Within the framework of a major restructuring, the 
                                                 
 
101  No. 314 'About system and structure of federal administrational organs’ (‚О системе и структуре 
федеральных органов исполнительной власти'). 
102  Politicheskii zhurnal No. 9, p. 21, 15.03.2004. 
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ministerial department heads were reduced from 250 to a hundred and a vertical top-to-
bottom organisation structure implemented.103 The actor’s presentation in this chapter 
reflects the governmental structure before the reform’s implementation. 
Third, when analysing Russian public policy-making, crime and corruption are 
factors that have to be kept in mind. The present study does not treat criminal groups as 
independent actors. Rather, criminal activities in general and corruption in particular are 
considered as embedded phenomena in decision-making. Their magnitude is hardly 
assessable. According to the INDEM foundation, paid bribes in Russia have risen from 36 
bn USD in 2001 to 319 bn USD in 2005 (Popov 2005). Yet, these figures may also be 
exaggerated (Lavelle 2005). Whatever the estimates are, crime groups have a major 
impact on foreign policy making (Orttung 2006). 
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6.1 Presidential actors 
 
President 
According to Article 80 of the Russian constitution, the head of the State represents the 
Russian Federation in international relations. He governs the foreign policy of the Russian 
Federation, holds negotiations and signs international treaties, agreements as well as 
ratification instruments of the Russian Federation.104 Further more, the President is the 
supreme commander-in-chief of the armed forces,105 the head of the Security Council and 
of his own administration.106 
In fact, the constitutional powers of the president with regard to international 
relations are far-reaching. 91% of experts view the president as the main subject in foreign 
policy-making (Korobeinikov 2005: 75). This fact may be assessed ambiguously: 
obviously, the concentration of almost all policy-making responsibilities in the hands of 
the president has its advantages. It is supposed to contribute to a more effective, efficient 
and coherent policy formulation. However, a constitutional super-president in foreign 
affairs lacks of both democratic control, long-term stability and expertise (Korobeinikov 
2005). This is the shady side of one and the same medal. 
Beyond doubt, the main constitutional provisions show that Putin de jure holds main 
authority in foreign policy-making. This may be historically explained, as Russian foreign 
affairs have always been regarded as ‘tsarskoe delo’ – important matters to be exclusively 
addressed by the Czar (Trenin and Lo 2005: 9). How does it look like de facto?  
As mentioned in the introduction of the present study, the role of president Putin in 
decision-making has been interpreted again and again with different outcomes. The whole 
range of opinions became apparent on the occasion of the expert interviews gathered in 
Moscow: on one end of the spectrum, the head of the state is considered as a puppet 
                                                 
 
104  Art. 86 Constitution of the Russian Federation. 
105  Art. 87 Constitution of the Russian Federation. 
106  Art. 83 Constitution of the Russian Federation. 
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controlled by the Federal Security Service.107 On the other end, Putin is described as an 
almighty leader, who has been trained throughout his career to take his own decisions.108 
The president mostly disregards advices from his immediate surroundings and finally 
decides himself.109 
However, recapitulating all existing opinions, the common denominator may be 
formulated as follows: Putin is neither a puppet nor a dictator. He may be conceived as a 
referee, as a balancer or mediator between different competing groups.110 Thereby, he 
continuously needs to compromise and deal with trade-offs. It has to be stressed that 
Putin’s role cannot be painted in either black or white. Rather, his position and influence 
in foreign policy-making varies. Sometimes, he takes decisions within his ‘kitchen 
cabinet’, where he depends on one or few advices.111 Sometimes, he simply decides on the 
spot and alone.112 
 
Presidential administration 
According to article 83 of the constitution, the President forms his own administration. Its 
function is to support the President to fulfil all his duties. Therefore, the presidential 
apparat plays a significant role, particularly with regard to foreign policy planning and 
implementation (Korobeinikov 2005: 75). 
The approximately 170 employees of the presidential administration113 are firmly 
directed and closely connected with the President. Its organisational structure been 
reformed in March 2004.114 From 2000 until then, it encompassed the following units 
(Grankin 2001, Maximov 2003): 
                                                 
 
107  Expert interview, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow, 01.04.2005. 
108  Expert interview, Fond “Politika”, Moscow, 01.07.2005. 
109  Expert interview, PIR-Center, Moscow: 14.04.2005. 
110  Expert interview, PIR-Center, Moscow: 22.04.2005. 
111  Expert interview, Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow: 04.07.2005. 
112  Expert interview, Swedish Embassy to Russia, Moscow: 02.05.2005. 
113  As per November 2001, confidential source of information. 
114  Mukhin (2006) and Tsepljaev (2004) both describe the presidential administration’s contemporary 
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• Direction (Chief of staff and his deputies) 
• Aides of the President 
• Advisors of the President 
• Plenipotentiary Representatives of the President 
• Presidential Services 
• Presidential Executive Divisions 
 
Putin’s closest organisational unit is the administration’s direction. Between 2000 and 
2004, the chief of staff changed once. In October 2003, Putin replaced Aleksander 
Voloshin - a former member of the Yeltsin Family - by Dmitrii Medvedev. Apparently, 
Putin and the administration’s head often discuss foreign policy issues and sometimes, 
they even decide without further consultations.115  
The chief of staff’s deputies also play a crucial role in foreign policy-making. 
Predominantly, Deputy Sergei Prikhodko - nowadays presidential aid - has been 
responsible since June 2000 for international relations. He prepares analytical information 
for the president, organises and coordinates all activities with regard to foreign policy 
formulation and implementation.116 Moreover, the two deputies Igor Sechin and Vladislav 
Surkov have a massive influence on decision-making processes, since they are close to the 
President.117 Even if they are mostly engaged in domestic polit-tekhnologia, their imprints 
on Russia’s foreign policy become visible once in a while.118 
Aids, advisors and plenipotentiary representatives of the president may as well be 
regarded as highly important to the foreign policy-making processes. Their influence is 
twofold: on the one hand, they are fulfilling a coordinating function between different 
                                                 
 
115  According to an expert (24.05.2005), Medvedev was Putin’s one and only advisor with regard to the 
Ukrainian presidential elections in November/December 2004. 
116  http://www.grankin.ru/dosye/ru_bio2.htm, 11.10.2006. 
117  Kamyshev (2004) rated Sechin as the most influential player within the Presidential Administration. 
Surkov appeared as number three on the ranking behind the chief of staff Medvedev. 
118  Expert interview, Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow: 04.07.2005. See also for instance Surkov’s 
remarks with regard to national ideology (RIANovosti, 30.08.2006). 
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ministries.119 Due to their personal closeness to the president and their polyvalent personal 
profile, they can independently interact with governmental actors. On the other hand, the 
President’s crew also plays a technical role (Carnegie 2004). It channels a lot of 
information and requests designed for the president. Lobbying activities of economic 
actors for instance mainly involve the president’s aids, advisors or representatives.120  
Presidential services and presidential executive divisions involve personal 
assistance, press service, protocol office, cadre development division and a variety of 
other bureaus. Their impact on Russian foreign policies is restricted. 
 
Security Council 
According to article 83 of the constitution, the president forms and heads the Security 
Council. This institution represents the main actor with regard to Russian national 
security. Under the terms of the corresponding law,121 the Security Council is responsible 
for the preparation of presidential decisions in the field of domestic and foreign security. 
More precisely, the Security Council and its interdepartmental commissions acquire 
information, perform strategic analysis or outlooks and control the implementation of 
decisions (Carnegie 2004). Therefore, the Security Council officially plays an important 
role with regard to foreign policy-making. 
For the purpose of the present study, the Security Council is divided in two 
organisational subunits: 
 
• Direction (Secretary, his administration and the Scientific Council) 
• Members of the Security Council 
                                                 
 
119  Expert interview, INION, Moscow: 24.05.2005. 
120  Expert interview, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Moscow: 05.05.2005. 
121  Zakon Rossiskoi Federatsi ot 5 Marta 1992 No 2446-I “O Bezopasnosti”, st.11-19. 
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The direction encompasses the Secretary, his administration and the Scientific Council. 
From March 2001 until March 2004, it has been leaded by Secretary Vladimir Rushajlo, a 
rather weak apparachik,122 who nowadays chairs the executive committee of the CIS. The 
permanent members include the key actors of the national security community: the head of 
the presidential administration, the Prime Minister, the Ministers of foreign affairs, 
defence and interior, the speakers of the two parliamentary chambers as well as the 
directors of the two intelligence services. 
In practice, the influence of the Security Council on Russia’s foreign policy-making 
processes was restricted between 2000 and 2004. This may be explained primarily by the 
fact that the above-mentioned juridical provisions are formulated in a general and abstract 
manner (Korobeinikov 2005: 76). Hence, its position and role within the system of foreign 
policy institutions has remained unclear. Additionally, the Security Council’s position has 
been considerably weakened under Putin. Its expert knowledge has less frequently been 
used for decision-making.123 The President and the siloviki are simply not interested in an 
external coordinating body. And last but not least, the role of the Security Council has 
been weakened by frequent personal changes and continuous reorganisations (Carnegie 
2004). 
Against this background, presidential actors may generally be considered as most 
influential on foreign policy-making processes. It has to be expected that they play 
prominent roles within particular policy-networks. This will be empirically verified and 
discussed in parts Part III and Part IV of the present study. The next subchapter will focus 
on governmental actors and their leverage on Russian foreign affairs. 
 
                                                 
 
122  Expert interview, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow: 04.07.2005. 
123  Expert interview, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow: 10.05.2005. 
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6.2 Governmental actors 
 
According to article 114 of the constitution, the Federal government of the Russian 
Federation shall carry out measures to secure the defence of the country, the state security, 
and the implementation of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. This provision 
basically defines the governmental role in foreign policy-making. Whereas presidential 
actors take decisions, the government ensures their implementation. 
However, this picture is much too simplistic. The Russian Federal government’s 
structure is vast and complex. Prior to the administrational reform in 2004, it encompassed 
a large amount of organisational units, different accountabilities and partly overlapping 
responsibilities. It is necessary to analyse governmental actors more closely in order to 
determine their potential influence on foreign policy-making. 
Figure 8: Ministierial structure of the Russian Federation 
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Between 2000 and 2004, the Prime Minister headed 18 Ministries, the Governmental 
Administration and numerous Agencies, Services, Committees, Commissions and other 
federal bodies. Five Federal Ministries and five Federal Services were directly 
subordinated to the President, as these ‘power agencies’124 all were (and still are) essential 
with regard to Federal interests. For the present study, they certainly could have also been 
classified as presidential actors. Yet, they are discussed within the framework of this 
subchapter, since power agencies commonly appear on governmental organisation charts. 
 
 
Figure 9: Federal Agencies, Services, Committees, Commissions and other bodies  
 
Apparently, within the framework of the present study, it is not possible to investigate 
every single actor in terms of his potential roles in foreign policy-making. Therefore, some 
organisational units have been taken together and treated as one category. However, some 
actors such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have to be analysed more carefully. In this 
                                                 
 
124  This term has sometimes been used to describe presidentially controlled organs. See for instance 
Saradzhyan and Yablokova (2004). 
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case, actors are examined on the level of administrational departments. Subsequently, the 
most important actor categories will be discussed one by one. 
 
Prime Ministry 
For the purpose of the present study, the Prime Ministry (PM) consists of the following 
two elements (Grankin 2001, Maximov 2003): 
 
• Direction (Prime Minister, his deputies and plenipotentiary representatives) 
• Governmental Administration (Departments of International Cooperation, 
Defense Complex, Finance, Economy & Property, Energetics & Natural 
Resources) 
 
From May 2000 until January 2004, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasjanov headed the 
government. Although he and his deputies regularly attended official presidential and 
governmental meetings, the influence of the Prime Ministry on foreign policies was 
weak.125 This seems to be true also for the post-Kasjanov era under Mikhail Fradkov. The 
PM plays a coordinating role between Ministries, Services, Agencies, Commissions, 
Committees and other administrational units. Its involvement in policy content 
formulation is low. 
In contrast, particular Ministries, Services or other governmental bodies and their 
sub departments may under certain conditions directly participate in foreign policy-
making. This will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
                                                 
 
125  Expert interview, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Moscow: 05.05.2005. 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is the central governmental actor with 
regard to foreign policy. Its organisational structure in effect during Putin’s first 
presidential term has been slightly adjusted for the present study (Grankin 2001, Maximov 
2003): 
• Direction (Minister and his deputies) 
• 1st European Department (Mediterranean and Western European countries) 
• 2nd European Department (Northern European countries) 
• 3rd European Department (South-Eastern European countries) 
• 4th European Department (Central European countries) 
• Northern America Department 
• Latin America Department 
• Middle East & Northern Africa Department 
• Africa Department 
• 1st Asian Department 
• 2nd Asian Department 
• 3rd Asian Department 
• 1st CIS Department (General Cooperation) 
• 2nd CIS Department (Belarus, Moldavia, Ukraine) 
• 3rd CIS Department (Central Asian countries) 
• 4th CIS Department (Caucasian countries) 
• Relations to Federal Regions Department 
• All-European Cooperation Department 
• International Organisation Department 
• Security & Disarmament Department 
• Humanitarian Cooperation & Human Rights Department 
• Culture & UNESCO Department 
• Economic Cooperation Department 
• Legal Department  
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• Personnel Department 
• Consular Service 
• Leadership issues Department 
• Financial Department 
• Legal Department 
• Abroad Financial capital and property Department 
• Ambassadors 
 
The Russian law does not exactly determine the role of the ministry in foreign policy-
making (Korobeinikov 2005: 76). The corresponding act only delegates the coordination 
of international relations to the Foreign Ministry according to the President’s directives.126 
Although, this coordinating function of the MFA is not explained in greater detail. 
Therefore, the exact tasks and functions vary and ultimately depend on the behaviour of 
the presidential actors. 
In practice, the MFA is not able to fulfil this coordinating task (Carnegie 2004). 
There are several reasons, which may explain this fact. As a peripheral actor, the Ministry 
is not in a position to effectively coordinate all the activities on different administrational 
sectors and levels. Furthermore, it simply lacks the capacities and resources to do so.127 
Against the lucrative private sector, the financially limited Ministry has difficulties 
competing for sufficient and skilled labour. However, the main reason for the MFA’s 
weakness lies in the fact that it has been taken under the special service’s wings. It seems 
as if the siloviki nowadays control structures and processes within the MFA (Carnegie 
2004). In light of these circumstances, the role of the MFA is reduced to two 
responsibilities: preparation and implementation of decisions.128 
With regard to the preparation of decisions, the influence of the MFA is significant. 
The expertise of concerned departments basically flows bottom up into the process of 
                                                 
 
126  Zakon ot 04.01.1999, N4-F3 “O Koordinatsii Mezhdunarodnykh I Vneshnepoliticheskikh Svjazei 
Subjektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii“, St. 11. 
127  Expert interview, Institute of Europe, Moscow: 01.04.2005. 
128  Expert interview, Institute of Europe, Moscow: 04.05.2005. 
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foreign policy-making. However, it is questionable whether these documents reach 
presidential circles in due time and whether they are noticed at all. As stated in Chapter 1, 
foreign policy formulation often resembles crisis management, when the need for action 
within short time frames is high. Usually, the MFA prepares the ground for decision-
making by gathering technical information and facilitating contacts129. 
The main role of the MFA is to implement decisions. Under Foreign Minister Igor 
Ivanov (09.1998 – 03.2004), the agency was relatively successful in softening, explaining, 
streamlining and packing decisions taken by presidential actors.130 However, the pure 
implementation of foreign policy decisions is a thankless role. The ministry often acts as a 
fig leaf, forced to cover odd presidential judgements.131 
 
Ministry of Defence 
The de facto role of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is comparable to the one of the MFA. 
In principle, it is reduced to prepare and implement decisions taken by presidential 
actors.132 Even if Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov (03.2001 – dato) is a close ally of 
President Putin (Makarkin 2003: 59-73), his organisation seems to have a restricted impact 
on foreign policy-making. 
For this analysis, the Ministry has been split-up in four subunits. Given the 
instrumental role in foreign policy-making, a more detailed division of the actor would 
have been inappropriate. 
• Direction (Minister and his deputies) 
• General Staff 
• Departments 
 
                                                 
 
129  Expert interview, Independent Advisor, Moscow: 29.04.2005. 
130  Expert interview, Swiss Embassy, Moscow: 31.01.2006. 
131  This role has become visible during the Ukrainian presidential elections 2004/2005, the talks with Hamas 
or the gas conflict with Ukraine in January 2006 – to name a few cases. 
132  Expert interview, Institute of Europe, Moscow: 04.05.2005. 
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The MoD’s main function is commanding the Russian army. This task includes the 
formulation of the national security concept, the military doctrine and long-term military 
planning strategies.133 The results of these activities only affect foreign policy-making 
indirectly. Nevertheless, the present study pays attention to the MoD and its subunits, 
because two of the four case studies cover security issues. 
 
Ministry of Economic Development and Trade 
The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (MEDT) is the last ministry discussed 
individually. Its general influence on foreign policy-making is low. However, as two of 
the four issues treated in the present study involve external economic relations, the 
Economic Ministry has to be analysed more in-depth. Between 2000 and 2004, the MEDT 
encompassed 58 departments and directorates (Maximov 2003). Due to this gigantic 
organisational structure, the present study will only focus on four subunits: 
• Direction (Minister and his deputies) 
• Department for External Economic Affairs 
• Department for Multilateral Cooperation with CIS Countries 
• Department for Trade Policy and Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
 
Unlike the rest of the MEDT, these four units all deal with foreign economic affairs. Their 
influence on particular foreign policy issues may be considerable, since they are the only 
state actors possessing the technical knowledge. This special role of the MEDT may also 
be due to the narrow relationship between the direction (Minister German Gref, 05.2000 – 
dato) and the Kremlin (Makarkin 2003: 59-73). 
  
Other Federal Ministries 
So far, three ministries have been discussed in detail. Whereas the MFA represents the 
official actor in Russian foreign affairs, the MoD and the MEDT are primarily affected 
                                                 
 
133  See Viktor Litovkin’s comment on RIANovosti, 23.07.2004, about a “New Chain of Command”. 
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with regard to the four case studies. Certainly, it would be interesting to discuss at least all 
five Ministries, which are directly subordinated to the President. However, it can be 
assumed that the influence of the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Justice as well as Civil 
Defence, Emergencies and Disaster Relief on foreign policy decision-making is minimal. 
Their interests and capacities are basically oriented towards other political sectors. 
Therefore, the remaining 20 ministries are collectively listed on the questionnaire 
without considering their subunits: 
• Ministry of Internal Affairs 
• Ministry of Justice 
• Ministry of Civil Defence, Emergencies and Disaster Relief 
• Ministry of Education 
• Ministry of Labour and Social Development 
• Ministry of Health Care 
• Ministry of Culture 
• Ministry of Press, Telecom and Communication 
• Ministry of Agriculture 
• Ministry of State Property 
• Ministry of Finance 
• Ministry of Tax and Duties 
• Ministry of Transport 
• Ministry of Communication 
• Ministry of Railways 
• Ministry of Natural Resources 
• Ministry of Nuclear Energy 
• Ministry of Energy 
• Ministry of Industry, Science and Technology 
• Ministry of Anti-Trust and Business Support 
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Federal Services 
Within the Russian government, there exist numerous Federal Services. Until 2004, five 
services were directly subordinate to the President, eight services were accountable to the 
PM. This organisational structure (see Figure 9) reflects the significance of these Federal 
Services with regard to presidential priorities. For this reason, the present study included 
the following categories in the questionnaire: 
• Federal Security Service (FSB) 
• Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) 
• State Courier Service 
• Federal Border Service 
• Federal Guard Service 
• Other Federal Services 
 
Expert opinions about the influence of these most important Services on foreign policy-
making vary considerably. Some observers believe that the intelligence services in general 
- and FSB in particular - fundamentally determine the Russian strategic course of 
action.134 They stress that former KGB-agent Putin bases his foreign policy judgments 
predominantly on secret services. Security-related services just manage to capture 
presidential actors more successfully than other actors.135 Apparently, this led to a general 
mistrust between razvedchiki136 and other officials within the Kremlin walls. 
The colossal size of security services in Russia confirms their high significance. 
From 2000 until 2004, FSB alone employed approximately 92’000 functionaries, whereas 
the Federal Guard Service’s staff counted around 30’000 (Mukhin 2005). Comparatively, 
                                                 
 
134  Expert interview, Institute of Europe, Moscow: 01.04.2005. 
135  Expert interview, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Moscow: 05.05.2005. 
136  Persons belonging to or affiliated with secret services. 
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2049 officials worked for the Ministry for Economic Development and Trade in 
November 2005.137  
In contrast to this point of view, some experts consider the picture of almighty 
security services as overrated. They argue that these services generally lack the technical 
expertise to effectively influence foreign policy issues.138 According to their opinion, the 
Services are more concerned with practical matters within the sphere of domestic security. 
 
Federal Agencies, Committees and Commissions 
For the present study, Federal Agencies, Committees and Commissions are merged to 
three categories: 
• Agencies (Aviation & Space, Patents & Trade Marks, etc.) 
• Committees (Fishing Industry, Statistics, etc.) 
• Commissions (Energetics, Stock Markets, etc.) 
 
Given their specialization and their predominant domestic orientation, these organisational 
units are supposed to have a negligible influence on foreign policy-making processes. As 
they are directed by the Prime Ministry, they are just too far away from the foreign policy 
epicentre in Moscow. 
 
Other Federal Bodies 
Similar to Agencies, Committees and Commissions, other Federal Bodies do have - if at 
all - a fractional impact on foreign policy issues. Nevertheless, the following actors have 
been listed on the questionnaire: 
• Bank for Foreign Trade  
• Vneshekonombank 
• Savings Bank 
                                                 
 
137  www.economy.gov.ru, 21.10.2006. 
138  Expert interview, Independent Advisor, Moscow: 29.04.2005. 
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• Central Bank 
• Federal Assets Fond 
• Audit Chamber 
• Central Elections 
 
Some of these organisations may have hardly any stakes in foreign policy, but it cannot be 
excluded beforehand that, for instance, the Central Bank or the Vneshekonombank 
(Foreign Economic Bank) have an interest in certain foreign economic issues. Due to their 
technical know-how, key decision-makers may sometimes hear their voice. 
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6.3 Parliamentary actors 
 
The Russian Federal Assembly consists of two legislative bodies: the State Duma (lower 
chamber) and the Federation Council (upper chamber). Their constitutionally granted 
codetermination rights in foreign policy-making are limited.139 According to article 106, 
laws on the following issues have to be adopted by both houses:  
- financial, currency, credit, customs regulation, and money issues; 
- ratification and denunciation of international treaties and agreements;  
- the status and protection of the state border;  
- peace and war. 
 
In practice, the influence of parliamentary actors on Russia’s foreign policies seems to be 
even weaker. The Federal Assembly seems to have almost no impact on practical 
decision-making.140 Its review of international treaties or agreements does not represent a 
major barrier for key policy-maker, but legitimises negotiation outcomes.141 Under Putin, 
a series of administrational measures have led to a monopolization of the political 
landscape within the legislative arena. The party of power ‘United Russia’ completely 
controls both chambers (Ivanchenko 2004). 
Nevertheless, the roles of parliamentary actors have to be analysed and assessed in a 
differentiated manner. Under certain conditions, some organisations may have admission 
to decision-making processes. Subsequently, the State Duma and the Federation Council 
are examined more closely. 
                                                 
 
139  Compare with U.S. library of Congress, country listing ‘Russia – The Parliament’, 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ru0166), 19.10.2006. 
140  Expert interview, Federation Council, Moscow: 14.02.2006. 
141  Expert interview, MGIMO, Moscow: 14.04.2005. 
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State Duma 
The State Duma is a complex and large organisation. Between 2000 and 2004, it included 
a council, an administration, 28 committees, 15 commissions, different fractions and 450 
representatives (Grankin 2001, Maximov 2003, Segedinenko 2004). For the purpose of the 
present study, it is not necessary to consider all subunits, as numerous of them obviously 
have little relation to foreign affairs. Therefore, the following small group of actors were 
selected based on their importance and the issues they cover: 
• Duma Council (Chair and his deputies) 
• Administration 
• Committee for Security 
• Committee for Nationality 
• Committee for CIS Cooperation 
• Committee for International Affairs 
• Committee for Defence 
• Committee for Natural Resources 
• Committee for Economic Policy 
• Committee for Energy, Transport & Communication 
• Commission for Geopolitics 
 
In certain circumstances, these actors may have a limited influence on foreign policy-
making. The Duma Council sometimes has direct access to presidential actors and a 
whispering voice in decision-making when an international treaty or agreement has to be 
ratified.142 Similarly, a particular Committee ore Commission may become involved in 
foreign policy-making processes, when expertise or a clear popular statement is required. 
However, these influences are diminutive and rare. Under President Putin, the State Duma 
                                                 
 
142  Expert interview, Independent Advisor, Moscow: 29.04.2005. 
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has lost its role as a counter-balance to the Kremlin. Its institutional impact on foreign 
policies is practically non-existent.143 
 
Federation Council 
The role of the Federation Council in foreign policy-making corresponds to the one of the 
State Duma. Actors of the Federation Council barely have an institutional influence on 
foreign policy-making processes. Nevertheless, the following subunits are selected and 
listed separately in the questionnaire: 
• Chair 
• Administration 
• Committee for Security & Defence 
• Committee for Economic Policy 
• Committee for CIS Cooperation 
• Committee for International Affairs 
 
 
                                                 
 
143  Expert interview, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Moscow: 05.05.2005. 
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6.4 Economic actors 
 
What kind of role do economic actors play in foreign policy making? This question has 
absorbed many experts since the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the 1990’s, dubious 
privatisation processes engendered a Russian business community, which gradually 
hijacked the Russian political sphere. Especially after Yeltsin’s re-election in 1996, 
oligarchs were able to selectively bend foreign policy decisions to their favour.144 Big 
industrial and financial players became more influential players as they had direct access 
to information and knowledge of the decision-making process (Kobrinskaya 2000). 
However, the real impact of business actors on Russia’s international relations remained 
limited. Since each group fought for its own particular interests, they mostly neutralized 
each other (Schröder 2001). 
Under the new President Vladimir Putin, a freshening wind reached the Russian 
political circles. Without massive tensions or struggles, Putin managed to transform the 
regime from Yeltsin’s oligarchic authoritarianism to bureaucratic authoritarianism 
(Shevtsova 2005: 322-351). At the latest, the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the 
break-up of his Western-style managed and successful corporation YUKOS made it clear 
once and for all: the President will no longer allow the business sector to interfere in 
politics. These territories belonged strictly to Putin and his crew. 
In light of these developments after the year 2000, economic actors were no longer 
able and eager to manipulate Russia’s authority (Kononenko 2005). Business-state 
relations were redefined by concluding a relatively simple deal: Under Putin, economic 
actors are left alone by civil authorities if they basically keep silent, mind their business 
and pay their taxes.145  
                                                 
 
144  Representatively for a broad range of literature, see Mommsen (2004:56-92). 
145  Numerous experts have analysed the transformation of business-state relations under Putin. 
Representatively, see Jack (2004: 174-215), Maass (2004), Zelenin (2005). 
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Yet, this re-established primacy of politics over business does not mean that economic 
actors are no longer influential in public policy-making. Since political decisions often 
have a direct impact on the economy, Russian transnational corporations continue to be 
highly interested in good relationships with state decision-makers and vice versa. 
Particularly with regard to foreign policies, Russian business is dependent on close ties to 
the Kremlin. 
Basically, business actors play an important role in foreign policy-making if their 
interests coincide with state interests. According to Robert Orttung (2006: 61), the 
understanding of this interplay ‘helps explain the role companies and crime groups play in 
promoting conflict or cooperation on Russia’s borders’. 
Common interests may be identified in two fields (Orttung 2006: 61-64). First, the 
state and corporations both desire to expand markets for Russian business abroad. To this 
end, the energy sector, in particular, and the military-industrial complex have contributed 
towards formulating Russian foreign policies. State-business cooperation are successful 
such as the acquisition of oil fields in the Caspian Region, the establishment of gas transit 
routes to EU countries or arms exports to Middle Eastern states – to name a few examples. 
A second common interest lies in developing closer ties with foreign countries. 
Here, energy companies are instrumental for the Russian state to expand its influence 
within the post-Soviet space. However, other economic actors may also have an influence 
on foreign policy decision-making. Considering the variety and intensity of Russian 
business interests within the CIS space, lobbying of Russian firms in the Kremlin is 
particularly effective.146 
Lobbying processes on the Federal level are highly complex and opaque (Orttung 
2006: 55-57). Even if only Putin initiates the involvement of an economic actor in foreign 
policy-making, he hardly meets business representatives personally. Business interests are 
usually channelled, examined and passed-on by the presidential administration. This is a 
new feature in Russian foreign policy-making, as during the 1990’s, lobbyists 
                                                 
 
146  Expert interview, Higher School of Economics, Moscow: 06.05.2005. 
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concentrated their activities on the parliament.147 The MFA barely transmits business 
interests (Carnegie 2004). 
For the purpose of the present study, economic actors are categorised based on four 
sectors: energy, finance, industry and service. Obviously, it is impossible to list all 
existing corporations. Therefore, the questionnaire only considers the five most important 
energy firms individually. There are good reasons for this proceeding. In 2004, Russia’s 
energy sector provided 44% of all export revenues.148 Putin is determined to maximise the 
role of Russia’s energy resources in foreign policy (Olcott 2004). Compared to the other 
sectors, the energy dimension plays a dominant role in Russia’s international relations 
(Carnegie 2004). Therefore, it is justified to list these five enterprises separately and cover 
the other sectors as broad categories. 
• Energy sector (Gazprom, Lukoil, RAO UES, Transneft, Yukos, other 
companies) 
• Financial sector 
• Industrial sector 
• Service sector 
 
From 2000 until 2004, five companies have dominated the energy sector. Gazprom is the 
largest company: 50.002% of its shares are controlled by the Russian Federation. 
Currently, Gazprom employs 330’000 people and contributes with its taxes more than 
25% of the Russian Federal budget (Kupchinsky 2006). As Gazprom is closely 
intertwined with the state, there is no doubt about its role in Russian foreign policy-
making. 
Lukoil is the second largest private oil Company worldwide by proven hydrocarbon 
reserves. It is mainly (62.93%) controlled by ING Bank Eurasia ZAO, but has close ties to 
state authorities. Unified Energy System (RAO UES) is the largest electricity producer 
and distributor as well as heat provider of the Russian Federation. It is a state controlled 
                                                 
 
147  Expert interview, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Moscow: 05.05.2005. 
148  Worldbank, ‘Russian Federation at a glance’, August 13th, 2006, 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/rus_aag.pdf, 22.10.2006. 
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giant that also exports power primarily to CIS countries. Therefore, it may be assumed 
that RAO UES has an impact on Russia’s near abroad policies. 
Transneft coordinates and manages oil transportation through long-distance 
pipelines to refineries in Russia and abroad. It is completely controlled by the Russian 
Federation and represents a major factor in Russia’s foreign policy formulation. Until 
2003, Yukos was Russia’s number two in oil production, but at the same time the enfant 
terrible in the eyes of the Kremlin. The privately owned and Western-style managed 
corporate group started to break apart as state authorities prosecuted the company due to 
tax fraud. 
The influence of the financial sector on foreign policy-making is unclear. Although 
Russia’s banking system for the most part belongs to the state, it is supposedly only 
indirectly instrumentalised for international affairs. The same holds true for the Russian 
service sector. The industrial sphere occasionally has a voice in decision-making 
processes. The military-industrial complex is a major factor that is taken into account by 
foreign policy-makers149. Between 2000 and 2003, arms exports accounted to more than 
17 bn. USD150. This is approximately one fourth of total exported manufactures.151  
It has to be added that the significance of business actors in foreign policy-making 
has generally augmented under Putin. As insubordinate tycoons have been repelled from 
the political sphere, obedient state-controlled economic players have had smoother access 
to decision-making. This trend has been supported by the strengthening state control over 
strategically important sectors that go far beyond oil and gas (Gavshina 2005). 
                                                 
 
149  Expert interview, MGIMO, Moscow: 05.05.2005. 
150  Source: ‘Voenno-promyshlennyi Kompleks’, Kommersant VLAST, 24.05.2004. 
151  Expert interview, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 14.02.2006. 
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6.5 Other actors 
 
So far, the most capital players of the Russian foreign policy domain have been presented 
and assessed. However, it would be wrong to consider only presidential, governmental, 
parliamentary and economic actors as potential foreign policy-makers. In fact, there exist 
more organisations, whose influence on international issues cannot a priori be excluded. 
Therefore, this subchapter focuses on four additional actor categories: regional actors, 
judiciary actors, political parties and miscellaneous actors. 
 
Regional actors 
The autonomy of regional actors with regard to Russian foreign policy issues has 
significantly changed. Under Yeltsin, some regions had a major impact on the Federal 
level. They were not only able to participate in decision-making processes, they also 
enjoyed enhanced freedom to establish and cultivate their own relations to foreign 
countries and institutions.152 
Under Putin, asymmetric and accentuated regionalism came to an end. He 
introduced a streamlined structure of seven plenipotentiary representatives, each 
controlling a federal district. After 2000, the autonomy of regional actors was drastically 
reduced (Trenin and Lo 2005: 13). As a result, regional concerns and interests hardly – or 
only indirectly - flow into the foreign policy-making process. 
Nevertheless, the questionnaire does not renounce to place regional actors at the 
disposal. 89 Federal subjects are divided in five consolidated groups: 
• Republics 
• Oblasti 
                                                 
 
152  See for instance Alexandrov (2001), who analysed the city of Moscow’s position among regions with 
regard to Russian foreign and security policy. 
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• Autonomous Okrugy & Oblasti 
• Krai 
• Cities of federal importance (Moscow, St. Petersburg) 
 
It has to be mentioned that the seven districts and their presidential envoys are not 
considered here. Since they are organisationally integrated in the presidential 
administration, they are treated as presidential actors. 
 
Judiciary actors 
According to article 118 of the Russian constitution, courts alone administer justice in the 
Russian Federation. Judges are independent and submit only to the constitution and to the 
federal law. Consequently, judiciary actors are supposed to have nothing to do with 
Russian international affairs. 
In practice however, an influence of judiciary actors in public policy-making cannot 
be totally excluded. Two arguments may be brought forward to back this point. First, as 
Russia still lacks an independent and effective judiciary system (Krasnov 2004), state 
authorities and courts are to a certain extent interlinked. It is not exaggerated to state that 
Putin’s regime - despite its constitutional provisions - by and large controls judiciary 
actors (Voswinkel 2005). 
Second, national jurisdiction has a potential impact of on bilateral international 
relations. The ‘Adamov-affair’ has impressively illustrated this. In December 2005, the 
Swiss Federal tribunal finally decided to extradite the former nuclear energy minister 
Evgenii Adamov to Russian instead of U.S. judiciary authorities. Prior to this, Moscow 
exerted massive pressure on Swiss authorities153. 
Hence, the present study considers the following Federal players as potential actors 
in Russian foreign policy (Grankin 2001): 
                                                 
 
153  See ‘Adamow wird an Russland ausgeliefert’, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 30.12.2005. 
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• Supreme Court 
• Supreme Arbitration Court 
• General Prosecutor 
• Constitutional Court 
 
Political parties 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has developed a dysfunctional and 
extremely unstable party system. According to Riggs and Schraeder (2004), this is one of 
the major impediments to real democratization. Against this background, the present study 
only considers political organisations that have received more than 5% of votes at the 
Duma elections in December 2003. Accordingly, the following parties are integrated in 
the questionnaire: 
• United Russia 
• Communist Party 
• Liberal-democratic Party 
• Motherland 
 
The Russian political party landscape can roughly be divided in two parts: the party of 
power and opposition parties. United Russia represents the party of power. At the Duma 
elections 2003, it received 38% of the votes and hence possesses the majority within the 
Russian lower chamber.154 Since Putin’s regime controls the party, its function boils down 
to legitimizing the government’s decisions through its parliamentary faction (Stanovaya 
2005). As the party is ‘polit-technologically’ constructed for the domestic political 
arena,155 international issues rarely appear on its agenda. Therefore, United Russia hardly 
plays any role with regard to foreign policy-making. 
                                                 
 
154  Data according to the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, www.cikrf.ru, 
23.10.2006. 
155  Expert statement, Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Moscow: 07.02.2006. 
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The rest of the political parties represent opposition parties. Similarly to United Russia, 
the Communist, Liberal-democratic and Motherland party primarily care about domestic 
politics. Their opinions on international issues mostly constitute propagandistic voices, 
that are scarcely relevant to realistic foreign policy-making (Trenin and Lo 2005: 13). 
 
Miscellaneous actors 
What kind of other actors have to be regarded as potential foreign policy decision-makers? 
Apparently, it is not possible to list all kinds of remaining organisations individually. 
Therefore, miscellaneous actors shall be summarized. The following categories are 
included within the questionnaire: 
• Religious actors (Orthodox, Muslim) 
• Academic actors 
• Media 
• Societal actors 
 
Religious actors have considerably gained popularity in post-Soviet Russia. The biggest 
institution constitutes the Orthodox Church, which bands together approximately 72% of 
the Russian population.156 Even if the Russian Federation is a secular state according to its 
constitution, the Orthodox Church has nonetheless become the established national church 
over the last few years (Soldatov 2004). 
The Russian Orthodox Church under its patriarch Alexi II seems to have an 
influence on the Kremlin with regard to specific domestic issues.157 However, its role in 
foreign policy-making is limited. Sometimes, the Orthodox Church may have a voice 
when issues about the relationship between Moscow and the Vatican158 are under 
                                                 
 
156  This estimate also includes believers, who do not actively practice. Source: Country studies, Library of 
US Congress, http://countrystudies.us/russia/37.htm, 24.10.2006. 
157  Expert interview, MGIMO, Moscow: 14.04.2005. 
158  Expert interview, Independent Advisor, Moscow: 29.04.2005. 
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consideration. It also has an imprint on Russian-Ukrainian relations, as Kiev constitutes 
the original centre of the Orthodox Church.159 
The Islamic community accounts to approximately 20% of the Russian society.160 It 
is institutionally far less important within the Russian foreign policy domain than the 
Orthodox Church. Nevertheless, the Muslim factor may weigh heavily on the thinking of 
Russian leaders (Trenin and Lo 2005: 14). It has to be taken into account when issues such 
as Chechnya, Iraq, Afghanistan or Iran have to be decided. 
Academic actors compose another category with potential influence on international 
affairs. Some Russian think tanks and certain trusted circles of political advisers can have 
access to decision-making processes. Their opinions are considered mostly by the 
presidential actors, even if Putin himself rarely gets involved.161 
Under Putin, the media and societal actors like NGO’s or other civil groups are 
marginalized in foreign policy-making (Trenin and Lo 2005). In fact, these actors 
construct the Russian public opinion, but their institutional influence on policy 
formulation is quasi non-existent. This situation will hardly change in future, even if Putin 
initiated the foundation of a new public chamber consisting of 126 selected personalities 
who are neither politicians nor businessmen (Bransten 2005). The new chamber will be 
created according to top-down principles and incorporate people chosen by the president 
(Petrov 2005). 
 
                                                 
 
159  Expert interview, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 29.03.2005. 
160  This estimate also includes believers, who do not actively practice. Source: Country studies, Library of 
US Congress, http://countrystudies.us/russia/40.htm, 24.10.2006. 
161  Expert interview, PIR Center, Moscow: 22.04.2005. 
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Summary 
 
Part II of the present study covered the contextual background of Russian foreign policy-
making. Thereby, it focussed initially on Russia’s behaviour with regard to various global 
challenges. Moscow’s foreign policy concept developed in 2000 has constituted a highly 
ambivalent product. On the one hand, it formulated Putin’s new and pragmatic course of 
action. As a general guideline for multi-vectored and rationalized policies, Russia strived 
for security and modernization. On the other hand, the foreign policy concept 
retrospectively turned out to be of limited use. Frequently, Russian foreign policies 
diverged and included unpredictable contents. 
The first chapter additionally analysed the political origins of the four case studies. 
The two near abroad issues - the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the 
Single Economic Space (SES) - appeared on the agenda due to the jeopardized Russian 
influence within the post-Soviet space. Institutional changes in Western Europe triggered 
the two far-abroad issues: the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and the Common European 
Economic Space (CEES). 
The second chapter presented the different actors and their roles within the Russian 
foreign policy domain. In turn, presidential, governmental, parliamentary, economic and 
other actors were analysed and discussed. Basically, presidential players dominate the 
foreign policy sphere. Putin and his administration control the access to decision-making 
processes, whereas governmental actors fulfil an advisory or implementing function. 
Particularly, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs seems to have limited influence on 
international matters. Its role is usually boiled down to packing and selling decisions taken 
by presidential actors. 
Parliamentary actors hardly have an impact on foreign policy-making. In contrast, 
business organisations keep a low profile under Putin’s authority, but possess a strong 
voice in policy-making, as soon as their interests are congruent with state interests. 
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Part III. POLICY NETWORK ANALYSIS 
 
The present study has so far introduced the theoretical and methodological framework 
(Part I) as well as the contextual background of Russian foreign policy-making (Part II). In 
this section, the following question will be addressed: what kinds of network appearances 
and qualities emerge in terms of specific Russian foreign policy issues?  
Each of the following four chapters covers a particular multilateral Russian foreign 
policy issue that has been addressed between 2000 and 2004. Chapter 7 investigates the 
establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) – a far abroad and security-related 
issue. In Chapter 8, the decision to transform the Collective Security Treaty into a full-
fledged international organisation (CSTO) will be analysed. This network involves near 
abroad and national security circles. Chapter 9 will examine the far abroad and economic-
related decision to create the Common European Economic Space (CEES) with the EU. 
Last but not least, the creation of the Single Economic Space (SES) between Russia, 
Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan will be studied in Chapter 10. This will encompass the 
near abroad and economic policy domain subfields. 
At the outset of the present study’s core section, it is necessary to recall three 
important points. First, it has to be reiterated here that this part banks fully on the 
methodological approach presented in Chapter 4 of the present study. Therefore, the data 
collection and processing won’t be explained again. Subsequent statements are restricted 
to the presentation and discussion of empirical findings. 
Second, the composition of the four following chapters is completely identical. The 
first subchapters focus on the decision-making process and provide a general chronology 
of events. The second subchapters present the raw data sets and compute the appropriate 
policy network parameters. Thereby, the findings are not immediately interpreted. The 
assessment and discussion of empirical results shall be performed only within the 
framework of the final subchapters. 
Third, it is important to reiterate that the analysis focuses on Russian policy 
networks only. Accordingly, the decision-making structures do not include any foreign 
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actors. However, the issues and its events at the outset of every chapter will be commented 
on and explained in a larger context. In so doing, international or regional players 
obviously cannot be disregarded.  
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7. NATO-Russia Council (NRC) 
 
On the 28th of May 2002, the NATO member states and Russia signed the Rome 
declaration to establish the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). It marked the end point of a 
decision-making process that started after September 11th 2001. What did this process look 
like? What kind of decision-making structure emerged in Moscow? This chapter will give 
answers to these questions by initially providing an overview of the issue and its events 
(subchapter 7.1). Subsequently, the policy network dimensions and their parameters will 
be discussed (subchapter 7.2) and at the end of this section, the decision-making structure 
will be visualised and interpreted in subchapter 7.3.  
 
 
7.1 The issue and its events 
 
After the attacks on September 11th 2001, Vladimir Putin reacted in a very prompt and 
effective manner. He was not only the first state leader calling George W. Bush in order to 
express his sympathy and solidarity. He also offered unprecedented political, military and 
intelligence support.162 Additionally, Putin instantly invited 21 Russian politicians for an 
extensive discussion about future foreign policy options. Thereby, 18 representatives 
recommended a neutral Russian position; two suggested an alignment with Western 
partners and one proposed cooperation with the Taliban regime and the Arabic world. But 
despite the clear outcome of this vote, Putin publicly announced and thereby confirmed 
his Western-oriented strategic course on September 12th 2001.163 This statement 
constituted a massive shift in world politics and immediately raised an urgent question 
                                                 
 
162  Speech by U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation Alexander Vershbow, St. Petersburg State 
University, 22.02.2002. 
163  Expert interview, Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Science, 
Moscow: 24.05.2005. 
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among European and U.S. policy-makers: how can Russia be integrated to a greater extent 
into Western institutions? 
Subsequently, the NRC decision-making process shall be divided in three different 
segments. The first paragraph describes the appearance of the issue. The second paragraph 
covers the evolution of the issue, and the final decision is portrayed in the end. 
 
Appearance of the issue 
It has to be assumed that the idea to create the NRC was generated initially within the 
sphere of a brilliant British diplomat.164 Sir David Manning was the UK’s Permanent 
Representative to the North Atlantic Council from January until September 2001. In this 
function, he was closely in touch with NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson 
and with his Special Advisor for Central and Eastern European Affairs, Christopher 
Donnaly.165 Apparently, both NATO officials immediately supported the idea to 
strengthen the NATO-Russia relationship. 
But it seems as if the brainchild then grew further within the British government, 
because Tony Blair called David Manning to London right after the terrorist attacks. With 
immediate effect, the Ambassador was appointed personal Foreign Policy Advisor to the 
British Prime Minister on September 13th 2001. Against this background, it becomes clear 
why it was Blair, who confronted Putin for the first time with the new initiative upon a 
phone call at the end of September. The pleased Russian President immediately invited his 
British counterpart to Moscow and announced on October 2nd that Russia was prepared to 
make profound changes in its relations with NATO and the European security structure.166 
The issue then appeared all of a sudden and with great intensity on all fronts. On 
October 3rd, Putin met with Robertson in Brussels and discussed the initiative “to create a 
working body that would consider the possibility of expanding, deepening and 
                                                 
 
164  Expert interview, Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Science, 
Moscow: 24.05.2005. 
165  Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006. 
166  Confict Studies Research Center, A Russian Chronology, April-June 2002, J30, p.27. 
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qualitatively changing the relations between Russia and NATO”.167 The next day, Putin 
received Blair in the Kremlin to follow-up the issue. Simultaneously, the NATO 
Ambassadors in Brussels held a brainstorming over the new cooperation framework. It 
was the Canadian delegation that took the lead and responded first to the Secretary 
General’s ideas. In sum, the initiation phase of the NRC was marked by hundreds of 
phone calls and hectic diplomatic activities.168 
 
Evolution of the issue 
So far, the development of the NRC has included only the top of Russia’s state. Putin 
himself responded to foreign inputs whereas his administration, the government or other 
actors were by and large left out. The Ministries started to get involved top down only 
around mid October, when Putin attended a MoD conference on the 17th or when 
Ambassadors of the NATO Permanent Joint Council (PJC) took stock of the positive 
efforts on the 29th. At that time, however, the leading Russian ministries were absorbed 
with ABM-treaty negotiations with Under Secretary of State John Bolton and his team169 
as well as with preparations for the Bush-Putin summit on November 13th-15th. 
Meanwhile, NATO independently created a working group in order to develop the 
new cooperation framework between the alliance and Russia. The group involved 7 
experts, who intensively coordinated the activities of Brussels and of the NATO member-
states.170 In a personal phone call, Tony Blair announced a first British-influenced NRC 
proposal to Vladimir Putin on November 17th. It was presented the next day at the NATO 
headquarter.171 
At this stage, discussions started on the Russian side. Defense Minister Sergej 
Ivanov and the Secretary General of the Security Council Vladimir Rushailo basically 
                                                 
 
167  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Press Department, 03.10.2001. 
168  Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006. 
169  Particularly, the heads of the MoD and the MFA were engaged more than 5 times with the American side 
during the first half of November 2001. 
170  Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006. 
171  Conflict Studies Research Center, A Russian Chronology, April-June 2002, J30, p.52. 
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welcomed Blair’s proposal.172 Yet, the head of the Communist Party Gennadj Zjuganov 
personally tried to convince Putin to abandon these plans. A NATO-Russian 
parliamentary assembly (Joint Monitoring Group) was convened in Moscow on November 
22nd in order to discuss the initiative.173 
Simultaneously, an intense debate started among NATO-members. It was caused by 
additional proposals filed by Canada, the U.S. and Italy.174 In essence, some delegations 
disagreed on the level of joint decision-making, whereas the Russians asked for more 
political influence in Brussels. The U.S. pentagon, in particular, demanded to keep some 
‘fire-walls’ in place.175 Nevertheless, the PJC Foreign Ministers decided on December 7th 
2001 to establish the new format ‘full-fledged 20’ latest at their next meeting in Reykjavik 
in May 2002. This ambitious goal implied a tight schedule. 
Nevertheless, from January to March 2002, the peak of diplomatic activity was not 
yet reached. Whereas NATO administration was already completely involved, the Russian 
were still acting mostly on a ministerial level. In particular, Sergej and Igor Ivanov often 
met Western policy-makers during this period to discuss the concept of ‘retrievability’.176 
Whereas Moscow favored a council made up of 20 individual nations with separate 
decision-making mechanisms, NATO wanted to keep the option to retrieve issues back at 
19. Due to this dissent, the negotiations stalled and broke down on March 4th 2002.  
Until that date, the Russians did not substantially contribute to the issue. Moscow 
either accepted or rejected Western proposals.177 There may be several reasons for this 
Russian apathy. Perhaps the political and administrational spheres in Moscow had a 
general suspicion for Western ideas and for NATO initiatives in particular. But it is also 
possible that the Russian bureaucracy lacked the will and capacities to coordinate and 
                                                 
 
172  Confict Studies Research Center, A Russian Chronology, April-June 2002, J30, p.55. 
173  A Summary of the Meeting of the NATO-PA-Russian Federal Parliament Joint Monitoring Group. 
http://www.nato-pa.int (08.09.2005). 
174  NATO Press Conference 23.11.01, www.nato.int (16.08.2005). 
175  Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006. 
176  ‘NATO, Russia move to joint council’, 27.02.2002, www.content.mail.ru (16.08.2005). 
177  Expert interview, Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Science, 
Moscow: 24.05.2005. 
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draft their own proposals. And finally, one could also imagine that NATO did not dedicate 
enough efforts to integrate the Russian side during the phase of concept development. 
 
Decision on the issue 
However, this situation remarkably changed for the rest of the NRC decision-making 
process. As the May deadline was approaching, NATO and Russian experts had daily 
discussions and fights at the headquarter in Brussels, whereby they learnt to deal with each 
other.178 At the same time, Russian high-level representatives started bilateral negotiations 
in European capitals and in Washington. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov extensively 
travelled from Italy (04.03.02) over Great Britain (19.03.02) to Germany (21.03.02) in 
order to agree with national delegations.  
Only at this stage, the Russian government was also involved, but at a lower, 
technical level. Several bilateral meetings between Deputy Foreign Minister Evgenni 
Gusarov and Deputy NATO Secretary General Günther Altenburg confirm this fact.179 
Three internal working groups (MoD, MFA & Security Council) were created in order to 
find possible solutions. Representatives of these working groups met day by day.180 
A breakthrough only became possible at the end of March 2002, as Russia dealt 
directly with its main opponent - Washington. In a personal phone call on the 27th March, 
Putin and Bush talked about the issue in connection with strategic stability.181 The two 
sides primarily discussed a potential new agreement on strategic nuclear weapons. Over 
10 years, the present level had to be cut from 6000 to 5000 and from 2200 to 1700 
warheads. However, the Presidents also addressed the NATO-Russia relationship and it 
seems as if they interlinked these two subjects. In return for a Russian concession on the 
                                                 
 
178  Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006. 
179  Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, 22.03.02. 
180  Expert interview, Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Science, 
Moscow: 24.05.2005. 
181  Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, 28.03.02. 
NATO-Russia Council  139 
 
bilateral nuclear dossier, the U.S. gave the green light for the multilateral NRC.182 
Seemingly, this Presidential intervention paved the way for a solution officially found 
during a meeting in Madrid on April 11th between the Foreign Ministers Igor Ivanov and 
Colin Powell. As this deal was never made public, it seemed as if Russia compromised its 
national interests. Accordingly, Sergej Ivanov dismissed these accusations in the aftermath 
of the meeting.183 
This interpretation is plausible, since the next day was marked by hectic telephone 
diplomacy at the highest level. After conversations between Putin, Bush, Blair and 
Berlusconi, the White House spokesman Ari Fleischer announced on April 12th that a 
NATO-Russia summit in Italy will be convened in May 2002. After weeks of difficult 
negotiations and numerous polemic statements, Igor Ivanov said on April 15th in Brussels: 
“Documents are basically prepared. Experts will now take care of the remaining details. 
Reykjavik is a realistic goal”.184 
The 19 NATO Foreign Ministers met in Reykjavik on May 14th 2002 and approved 
a document, that provided a basis for Heads of State and governments to decide on the 
creation of the NATO-Russia Council.185 And only ten days later, Bush and Putin signed 
the new treaty on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. The happy end was marked 
by the opening of a NATO-Russia Military Liaison Mission in Moscow on May 27th and 
finally by signing the Rome Declaration on May 28th in Pratica di Mare. Whereas the state 
leaders hailed the historic and ground braking new body, Russian domestic forces 
criticised the content and the pace of the new agreement. In their view, the ‘carrot for 
                                                 
 
182  The Russian side initially insisted on an official treaty. Yet, the agreement finally encompassed not more 
than three pages including a long preamble. It did not involve any definitions, timetables, verification 
procedures or other limitations (The Moscow Times, 16.05.2002). The NATO and nuclear deals were 
interlinked also from a pure Russian perspective (‘Rossija – NATO. Polnochlennoe vkhozhdenie? Putin i 
Bush sazhtopajut “dyrki”’, Argumenty i Fakty No. 20, 15.05.2002). 
183  ‘Russia’s Ivanov Defends US Arms Deal’, A. Charlton, Associated Press, 15.05.2002.  
184  Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, 16.04.02. 
185  ‘NATO and Russia ‘bury Cold War’’, BBC news, 14.05.2002. 
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Putin’ reflected the ‘Alliance's hopes to neutralize Russia's negative reaction to the big-
bang enlargement of NATO planned for the summit in Prague’.186 
 
 
                                                 
 
186  D. Rogozin ‘Russia and NATO at 20: Should the new arrangement be rushed?’, 19th International 
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NATO-Russia Council  141 
 
 
7.2 Policy network parameters 
 
The last subchapter outlined the whole process of decision-making in a qualitative 
manner. It particularly revealed the role of Moscow’s policy-makers and their 
administrational units. Contrastingly, this section presents the empirical findings with 
regard to the NRC decision-making structure. It fully concentrates on the Russian side and 
neglects all international actors. 
Policy network parameters are specified pursuant to the methodological approach 
(see Chapter 4). Accordingly, they are sequentially determined within the four policy 
network dimensions: membership, integration, resources and power. It is important to 
mention that the values won’t be interpreted immediately in the context of the policy 
network type debate. The question whether a policy network represents a policy 
community or an issue network can only be answered by assessing all parameters at once. 
For that reason, the empirical findings are aggregated at the end of this subpart. They are 
then compared to the parameter’s thresholds and commented in terms of the policy 
network typology. 
 
1. Network membership 
The expert’s assessments of all potential Russian foreign policy actors with regard to the 
NRC decision have lead to the following result. Only eight actors achieved an average 
rating lying at or above the value 2.75. This means that only eight Russian organisational 
actors are considered as really influential concerning the above-described decision to 
found the NRC (parameter 1a).  
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Position Actors 
Average 
influence 
ratings 
1 Presidential actor President  4 
2 Presidential actor Presidential Administration Direction 3.25 
3 Governmental 
actor 
Ministry of Defence (MoD) Departments 3.08333 
4 Governmental 
actor 
Ministry of Defence (MoD) General Staff 3.08333 
5 Presidential actor Presidential Administration Aides of the President 3 
6 Governmental 
actor 
Мinistry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) 
Direction 3 
7 Governmental 
actor 
Federal Services Federal Security Service 
(FSB) 
2.85 
8 Governmental 
actor 
Federal Services Foreign Intelligence Service 
(SVR) 
2.85 
Table 6: NRC network members (parameter 1a-c) 
 
Second to none, the President was assessed as highly influential with a rating of 4. This is 
no surprise given the personal preferences and efforts of Vladimir Putin, which have been 
highlighted in the previous section. In fact, the President personally controlled the NRC 
decision-making process.187 The second most influential actor was the Direction of the 
Presidential Administration. The chief of staff and his deputies received an average rating 
of 3.25. This confirms their position as a hinge in decision-making. The Aides of the 
President (3) are located at a lower position. But nevertheless, they allegedly accompanied 
Putin side-by-side throughout the whole decision-making process.188 
Two governmental actors follow the core presidential actors: The Departments 
(Department of International Treaties) and the General Staff of the Ministry of Defence. 
                                                 
 
187  Expert interview, Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Science, 
Moscow: 24.05.2005. 
188  Expert interview, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow: 09.02.2006. 
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Their considerable influence (3.0833) is no surprise given their expertise.189 The two 
actors were linked through a common working group led by General Bushinski190 and 
jointly addressed the numerous and extensive military-technical cooperation sectors 
covered by the NRC agreement191. 
As the qualitative analysis showed, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (3) was a core 
decision-maker on the Russian side. The Direction was supported by an internal working 
group chaired by Ambassador Aleksejev. Allegedly, the MFA and MoD working groups 
coordinated their activities independently and in an effective manner.192 
On the seventh and eighth position, the Federal Security Service and the Foreign 
Intelligence Service were rated 2.85. Although the two services were never mentioned 
publicly, they played an essential role in checking all involved institutions.193 
Evidently, only two interests were included as Russia decided about the NRC: 
(parameter 1b). Executive authority’s interests are highly involved, as 37.5% of the policy 
network members belong to the Presidential category (parameter 1c). The remaining 
actors are part of the governmental apparatus. Beside the presidential and governmental 
sphere, no other categories were involved. Neither parliamentary, nor economic or other 
actors were rated influential enough to be integrated in the NRC policy network. The first 
non-presidential, non-governmental actors are listed at positions 19 and 20: the Duma 
Committee for Defence (1.7) and academic actors (1.7). Allegedly, the defence industry 
was not involved at all with regard to the NRC issue.194 
Which actors had some influence without being member of the policy network? 
Table 7 displays the next ten positions of the average influence ranking.  
 
                                                 
 
189  Expert interview, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow: 04.05.2005. 
190  Expert interview, Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Science, 
Moscow: 24.05.2005. 
191  See the Rome Declaration: NATO (2002). Cooperative efforts encompass areas like non-proliferation, 
arms control, search and rescue at sea, military-to-military cooperation and defence reform. 
192  Expert interview, Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Science, 
Moscow: 24.05.2005. 
193  Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006. 
194  Expert statement, Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Moscow: 07.02.2006. 
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Position Actors 
Average 
influence 
ratings 
9 Governmental actor Мinistry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) 
All-European Cooperation 
Department 
2.65 
10 Presidential actor Presidential Administration Advisors of the President 2.4 
11 Presidential actor Security Council Direction 2.33333 
12 Presidential actor Presidential Administration Presidential Services 2.2 
13 Presidential actor Presidential Administration Presidential Executive Divisions 2.2 
14 Governmental actor Мinistry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) 
Security & Disarmament 
Department 
2.2 
15 Presidential actor Presidential Administration Plenipotentiary Representatives 
of the President 
2 
16 Governmental actor Prime Ministry  Direction 2 
17 Governmental actor Other Federal Ministries Ministry of Internal Affairs 1.8 
18 Governmental actor Мinistry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) 
Northern America Department 1.75 
Table 7: NRC additional actors 
 
The additional actor’s list does not comprise any surprises. However, it is amazing 
that even technical divisions of the Presidential Administration are considered as more 
influential than for instance the Prime Ministry. Kasjanov and his crew follow on rank 16 
with an influence rating of 2. It also stands out that the Security Council didn’t belong to 
the policy network, which after all decided over a relatively important security issue. 
Despite a special working group dealing with the NRC issue, the General Secretary 
Rushajlo and his officials remained fairly weak as an institution.195 
Certainly, all these additional actors played a role with regard to the NRC case. 
However, according to the methodological procedures, only the eight most influential 
                                                 
 
195  Expert interview, Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Science, 
Moscow: 24.05.2005. 
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players can be regarded as policy network members. This group will subsequently be 
analysed in more detail. 
 
2. Network integration 
How did the experts assess the interactions between these eight actors? The following 
table shows the accumulated ratings with regard to NRC-related links. The data set reveals 
that no interaction received the highest value (10) or the lowest (0). 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
                                 P P D G A M F S 
                                 - - - - - - - - 
  1                   President                  
  2 Presidential Administration  9               
  3             MoD Departments  8 5             
  4           MoD General Staff  8 6 8           
  5      Aides of the President  9 8 6 5         
  6                         MFA  9 9 7 5 9       
  7                         FSB  5 4 3 3 5 3     
  8                         SVR  8 5 3 3 7 6 5   
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  12 Jan 07 17:13:10 
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies 
Table 8: NRC matrix accumulated 
 
The fact that no relation received the maximum or minimum rating does not only 
reflect the Gaussian distribution of expert ratings. It primarily tells that all actors within 
the policy network were somehow linked with each other concerning NRC. A total 
absence of a relationship between two organisations hardly exists. This, however, reveals 
the fact that a relationship of maximum intensity cannot be found either. This means that 
the issue was not predominantly decided by two or three very closely linked actors. The 
decision was ultimately taken by interplay of these eight key organisations. 
Even if these empirical findings are highly interesting as such, they shall be 
discussed and interpreted in-depth only within the context of the visualised network (see 
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7.3). This section focuses on data sets and the parameter computation. The next table 
illustrates the dichotomized data set. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
                                 P P D G A M F S 
                                 - - - - - - - - 
  1                   President                  
  2 Presidential Administration  1               
  3             MoD Departments  1 1             
  4           MoD General Staff  1 1 1           
  5      Aides of the President  1 1 1 1         
  6                         MFA  1 1 1 1 1       
  7                         FSB  1 1 0 0 1 0     
  8                         SVR  1 1 0 0 1 1 1   
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  12 Jan 07 17:20:56 
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies 
Table 9: NRC matrix dichotomized 
 
This binary matrix distinguishes only between the categories “interaction” (1) or “no 
interaction” (0). It is particularly suitable for closeness centrality calculations. These will 
be performed later in this subchapter. Finally, the categorised matrix is displayed below. It 
differentiates three sorts of interactions: “intense” (2), “medium” (1) and “low or none” 
(0). This data set will be used later to illustrate the NRC matrix (see 7.3). 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
                                 P P D G A M F S 
                                 - - - - - - - - 
  1                   President                  
  2 Presidential Administration  2               
  3             MoD Departments  2 1             
  4           MoD General Staff  2 1 2           
  5      Aides of the President  2 2 1 1         
  6                         MFA  2 2 2 1 2       
  7                         FSB  1 1 0 0 1 0     
  8                         SVR  2 1 0 0 2 1 1   
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  12 Jan 07 17:25:24 
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies 
Table 10: NRC matrix categorised– 
 
Based on these data, parameter 2a can be calculated. The table below shows the 
NRC policy network density, which represents the frequency of interaction, or in other 
words, the average interaction value among all policy network members. With zero being 
the lowest and 10 the highest number, 6.1071 indicates a considerably high level of 
activity within the network. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          1 
     ------ 
  1  6.1071 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  12 Jan 07 17:32:31 
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies 
Table 11: NRC density (parameter 2a) 
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The next value to be calculated is the network degree centralisation (parameter 2b). 
Indeed, 25.238% does not indicate a highly centralised network, as the maximum value - 
which stands for a star formation - would be 100%. But nevertheless, it tells that the 
network is to a certain extent centralised around one specific actor. This parameter will 
become more interesting in a comparative context. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Network Centralisation = 25.238% 
Heterogeneity = 12.96%.  Normalised = 0.52 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  12 Jan 07 17:39:14 
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies 
Table 12: NRC network degree centralisation (parameter 2b) 
 
The third parameter (2c) of this section reveals the actor’s position within the 
network according to their degree centrality. A high number of intense links places an 
actor in the core of a network and therefore high on the ranking. Table 13 shows this 
ranking of the eight actors based on their Freeman degree centrality. It is striking that the 
hierarchy looks significantly different than the one set up according to the influence expert 
ratings. On the one hand, particularly the Presidential aides and the MFA are more central 
in terms of their interactions with other network members. On the other hand, the direction 
of the Presidential Administration as well as the MoD actors seem to be interlinked to a 
lesser degree. Nevertheless, Presidential actors are clearly on top of the list, occupying 
ranks one, two and four. The executive authority may therefore be regarded as centrally 
positioned within the NRC decision-making structure.  
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                            1            2            3 
                                       Degree    NrmDegree        Share 
                                 ------------ ------------ ------------ 
  1                   President        56.000      80.0000        0.164 
  5      Aides of the President        49.000      70.0000        0.143 
  6                         MFA        48.000      68.5714        0.140 
  2 Presidential Administration        46.000      65.7143        0.135 
  3             MoD Departments        40.000      57.1429        0.117 
  4           MoD General Staff        38.000      54.2857        0.111 
  8                         SVR        37.000      52.8571        0.108 
  7                         FSB        28.000      40.0000        0.082 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  12 Jan 07 18:03:17 
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies 
Table 13: Executive authority’s position within NRC network (parameter 2c) 
 
3. Network resources 
This dimension covers two important aspects of the network: the quantity and the 
distribution of resources. The quantity of available information and resources within the 
network is reflected by the maximum normalised degree centrality. This value can be 
extracted both from the degree centrality ranking (Table 13) and from the descriptive 
statistics part shown in Table 14. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                         1            2            3 
                    Degree    NrmDegree        Share 
              ------------ ------------ ------------ 
  1     Mean        42.750      61.0714        0.000 
  2  Std Dev         8.166      11.6661        0.000 
  3      Sum       342.000     488.5714        0.000 
  4 Variance        66.688    1360.9695        0.000 
  5      SSQ     15154.000  309265.3000        0.000 
  6    MCSSQ       533.500   10887.7563        0.000 
  7 Euc Norm       123.102     175.8594        0.000 
  8  Minimum        28.000      40.0000        0.000 
  9  Maximum        56.000      80.0000        0.000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  12 Jan 07 18:03:17 
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies 
Table 14: Quantity & distribution of resources within NRC network (parameter 3a+b) 
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The maximum normalised degree centrality within the NRC network accounts to 80.00% 
and is achieved only by the President (parameter 3a). This may be regarded as a high 
value which stands for the elevated quantity of information available within the network. 
But how are resources distributed within the NRC network? Whereas Putin reaches 
a degree centrality of 80%, the FSB has obviously a lesser amount of resources available 
(40%). This spread between the maximum and minimum normalised degree centrality 
values expressed in terms of the maximum value accounts to 50% (parameter 3b). This 
indicates that the spectrum of resource allocation is relatively medium-sized. The 
explanatory power of this value will certainly increase in a comparative perspective (see 
Part IV). 
 
4. Network power 
The last policy network dimension covers the power facet of the NRC network. On the 
one hand, the quantity of available power is decisive. It is reflected by the maximum 
normalised closeness centrality showed in Table 15. Putin attains 100%, which implies 
direct access to all other network members (parameter 4a). Obviously, the President was 
powerful with regard to the establishment of the NRC. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                            1            2 
                                      Farness   nCloseness 
                                 ------------ ------------ 
  1                   President         7.000      100.000 
  2 Presidential Administration         7.000      100.000 
  5      Aides of the President         7.000      100.000 
  6                         MFA         8.000       87.500 
  3             MoD Departments         9.000       77.778 
  4           MoD General Staff         9.000       77.778 
  8                         SVR         9.000       77.778 
  7                         FSB        10.000       70.000 
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Statistics 
 
                         1            2 
                   Farness   nCloseness 
              ------------ ------------ 
  1     Mean         8.250       86.354 
  2  Std Dev         1.090       11.446 
  3      Sum        66.000      690.833 
  4 Variance         1.188      131.008 
  5      SSQ       554.000    60704.398 
  6    MCSSQ         9.500     1048.061 
  7 Euc Norm        23.537      246.383 
  8  Minimum         7.000       70.000 
  9  Maximum        10.000      100.000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  15 Jan 07 11:00:10 
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies 
Table 15: Quantity & distribution of power within NRC network (parameter 4a+b) 
 
 
On the other hand, the dispersion of power within the NRC network has to be detected. At 
the lower end of the spectrum, FSB’s interconnectedness is computed at 70%. Hence, the 
spread relative to the highest value makes up 30% (parameter 4b). This number shows the 
comparatively small range of power distribution within the NRC network. 
 
Network type assessment 
The previous four paragraphs presented the empirical data and calculations of the NRC 
network. At this stage, all values shall be aggregated and reproduced in Table 16. 
 
Dimension 
 
Parameter 
 
Value 
 
Threshold 
 
1. Membership    
a) Number of 
participants 
Number of involved 
network actors 
8 10 
b) Number of interests Number of involved 
actor’s categories 
2 3 
c) Types of interest Percentage of involved 
Presidential actors 
37.50% 33.33% 
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Dimension 
 
Parameter 
 
Value 
 
Threshold 
 
2. Integration    
a) Frequency of 
interaction (information 
and resources) 
Network density 
 
6.1071 5 
b) Centralisation Overall network 
degree centralisation 
25.24% 50.00% 
c) Executive authority’s 
position 
Degree centrality 
ranking 
Ranks 1, 2 and 4 At least two 
Presidential actors 
within top three 
3. Resources    
a) Quantity of 
information and 
resources within 
network 
Maximum normalised 
degree centrality 
80.00% 75.00% 
b) Distribution of 
information and 
resources within 
network 
Spread between max 
and min normalised 
degree centrality in 
percentage of the 
highest value 
50.00% 50.00% 
4. Power    
a) Quantity of power 
within network 
Maximum normalised 
closeness centrality 
100.00% 75.00% 
b) Distribution of 
power within network 
Spread between 
maximum and 
minimum normalised 
closeness centrality in 
percentage of the 
highest value 
30.00% 50.00% 
Table 16: Aggregated NRC parameters 
 
With regard to the membership dimension, all NRC parameters are clearly located 
on the policy community side of the thresholds. The network is small and restricted as it 
consists of only eight members representing not more than two interest categories. Since 
37.5% of all members belong to the Presidential sphere, the executive authority has a 
remarkable share in decision-making. 
Two of the three integration dimension parameters are characteristic of a policy 
community. The network is fairly dense (6.1071) and largely controlled by centrally 
located Presidential actors. However, the centralisation of the NRC network only amounts 
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to 25.24%, which lies clearly below the defined threshold of 50%. This parameter would 
be typical for issue networks. 
With regard to resources and power, three of four parameters confirm the policy 
community nature of the NRC network. With 80% and 100%, the quantity of resources 
and power within the structure lies above the threshold. Also, the distribution spectrum of 
power amounts to 30%, which lies clearly below the dividing line. This indicates a 
balance of power between members of the NRC network. The only ambiguous parameter 
is 3b. The distribution of information, knowledge, money and other factors reaches a value 
of 50%, which equals the threshold value. 
In sum, eight of the ten calculated parameters are situated on the policy community 
side. Obviously, the NRC decision was marked by a comparatively small-sized, tight, 
resource rich, powerful and balanced network primarily controlled by the executive 
authority. This finding basically corresponds with sub hypothesis A formulated in 
subchapter 3.3, as the NRC issue was addressed by far abroad and security subfields. 
However, the testing of the hypothesis shall not be anticipated here. This matter will be 
addressed only in Chapter 11, which reviews all four policy networks in a comparative 
perspective. 
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7.3 Resulting decision-making procedures and structures 
 
The previous two subchapters have recorded the decision-making process and determined 
the NRC policy network dimensions. In doing so, it has become clear that the NRC web 
amounts to a policy community according to the theoretical definition presented in 2.2. 
Based on this solid basis, the resulting decision-making network shall now be visualised 
and examined. 
The following graphic has been created with the help of the UCINET NetDraw 
software. Since it is based on the categorised matrix, frequent and intense interactions are 
illustrated by bold lines, whereas moderate links are shown with fine lines. Few or no 
relations are not displayed at all. It also has to be reiterated that the actor’s size reflect his 
power while his position is determined by the centrality rating. 
 
Figure 10: NATO-Russia Council (NRC) resulting policy network 
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The resulting NRC policy community is indeed small in size and dense with regard to its 
degrees. Rightly, President Putin is located in the very centre with bold ties to almost all 
actors. The only exception is the Federal Security Service (FSB), which was linked only 
moderately to the state leader. Doubtlessly, the President was the main actor, who 
personally controlled the decision-making process. He seized the chance to unfreeze 
Russian relations with the West and NATO after a longer period of isolation caused by the 
Kosovo and Chechen war.196 
Obviously, the Presidential Administration and the Aides were Putin’s closest 
partners within the network. They are both powerful and had links to all other network 
members. Yet, the Aides of the President were even more central due to their higher 
degree. Particularly and in contrast to the Administration’s Direction, the assistants had a 
strong link to the Foreign Intelligence Service. 
The third central player in the network is the MFA Direction. It was interlinked with 
all others except with the FSB. In a sense, the role of the MFA within the policy network 
does not correspond to the hyperactivity of Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. In fact, this 
actor was pushed forward to the public front. Behind the scenery, the MFA had little 
influence and received instructions.197  
The two MoD actors were positioned more peripheral within the network. 
Definitely, the Departments and the General Staff contributed the technical expertise in 
the field of military cooperation with NATO. Nevertheless, they only had minimal 
influence on the decision itself. Remarkably, both MoD actors had no or only insignificant 
contacts with the two intelligence services. This is surprising since the collaboration 
among siloviki actors would be commonly assumed. 
Last but not least, the FSB and SVR are located at the outer rim of the network. 
Without possessing any significant power, they only participated in small-scale 
interactions with other actors. Nevertheless, FSB allegedly checked and consulted the 
                                                 
 
196  Expert interview, Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Science, 
Moscow: 24.05.2005. 
197  Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006. 
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major Russian players,198 while SVR most probably delivered additional information for 
decision-making. 
 
                                                 
 
198  Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006. 
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8. Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) 
 
The decision to transform the Collective Security Treaty (CST) into a full-fledged 
international organisation represents the second case study. Policy-making regarding this 
issue started right after September 11th, 2001 and finished on September 18th, 2003. At 
that date, the CSTO-charter entered into force after ratification by all six member states – 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, Kirgizia and Tadzhikistan. What kind of Russian 
actors, interactions and events marked the establishment of this security-related Eurasian 
alliance? 
The form of this chapter pursues the same route of analysis as the previous NRC 
section. The first subchapter 8.1 discusses events of the issue along the time line. This 
process-related perspective allows an understanding of the main occurrences of the case. 
Subsequently, the policy network dimension parameters are determined and discussed in 
subchapter 8.2. It ends with the classification of the CSTO decision-making structure 
based on the policy network typology. Finally, subchapter 8.3 draws attention to network 
visualisation. The resulting patterns of actors and interactions shall be analysed and 
explained. 
 
 
8.1 The issue and its events 
 
The transformation of the CST into a regional organisation according to the UN charter 
extended two years all in all. Compared to the nine months it required to create the NRC, 
this is a remarkably long period. However, it has to be kept in mind that the CSTO was 
subject to ratification, whereas the NRC entered in force immediately after the signing of 
the Rome declaration. In fact, the heads of the six treaty member states approved the 
charter and the legal status of the CSTO by October 7th 2002. However, for the analysis of 
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decision-making structures and processes, it would be wrong to disregard the 
parliamentary phase. This would possibly tamper the resulting policy networks. 
Similarly to the NRC case, the CSTO process can be divided into three different 
phases. The following paragraphs in turn present the appearance, the evolution and the 
decision of the issue. 
 
Appearance of the issue 
According to the first General Secretary of the CSTO, Ambassador Velerii Nikolaenko, 
the idea to bestow the security treaty with the status of an organisation traces back to 
1999. 199 At that time, the CST should have been adapted to the geopolitical situation and 
to a new level of effectiveness. However, the signatory states confined themselves to the 
prolongation of the CST for another five years. Apparently, the project failed due to a 
general lack of political will. 
The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington significantly changed the 
dynamics in international relations and hence particularly in geopolitics within the post-
Soviet space. From September 11th 2001 until May 14th 2002, it became clear on various 
occasions that more coordinated security efforts were indispensable. The Russian 
Federation, in particular, took the lead to reinforce security related institutions within its 
Eurasian and Caucasian backyard. 
On October 7th 2001, U.S. and British troops started operations in Afghanistan and 
simultaneously established the two air force bases in Manas (Kirgizia) and Khanabad 
(Uzbekistan). These activities were officially tolerated by Moscow, but had to be counter-
balanced. Therefore, intense communication initially started between Russia and Kirgizia 
as well as Tadzhikistan. On October 4th, Duma chairman Seleznev visited Bishkek.200 On 
October 5th, Putin called Tadzhik President Emomali Rakhmonov and at the same day, an 
                                                 
 
199  See Nikolaenko (2004: 89). 
200  Confict Studies Research Center, A Russian Chronology, April-June 2002, J30, p.28. 
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interparliamentary commission called for the set-up of a Russian air base in Southern 
Tadzhikistan in line with the CST. 201 
On short notice, the CST signatory states staged command and staff exercises from 
October 8th until October 13th.202 These activities were combined with a meeting of the six 
CST Security Council Secretaries in Dushanbe. Thereby, Vladimir Rushailo and his 
colleges discussed various questions with regard to the role of the CST and further 
potential steps with regard to security-related integration.203 
During the following period, numerous bustling activities took place. Russian 
Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov supported an initiative taken by senators to establish a 
single air defence system for all CIS member states.204 Putin convened an important MoD 
Conference on October 17th.205 The Duma Defence Committee chairman Andrej Nikolajev 
and his entourage verified plans to physically fortify the Russian southern border.206 Also, 
the Russian Border Guard Service signed a cooperation protocol with the Kazakh counter-
part and the CIS military cooperation headquarters announced Russian military equipment 
for CST members at discount prices.207 Additionally, the 201st Motor Rifle Division at the 
Russian military base in Kant (Kirgizia) was reinforced to enable the operation of a 
collective rapid reaction force in Central Asia within the CST framework.208  
Meanwhile in Moscow, on October 23rd 2001 and on January 29th 2002, the 
plenipotentiary CST representatives leaded by Nikolaenko examined the legal basis of 
further CST integration in security matters.209 Gradually, it became clear that all initiatives 
                                                 
 
201  Confict Studies Research Center, A Russian Chronology, April-June 2002, J30, p.28. 
202  These exercises involved three phases and included personnel in Moscow as well as troops in Kirgizia. 
(Confict Studies Research Center, A Russian Chronology, April-June 2002, J30, p.28). 
203  Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, ‘O Konsultatsijakh 
Polnomochnykh Predstavitelei Gosudarstv-Uchastnikov DKB’, 24.10.2002. 
204  Confict Studies Research Center, A Russian Chronology, April-June 2002, J30, p.31. 
205  Confict Studies Research Center, A Russian Chronology, April-June 2002, J30, p.35. 
206  Confict Studies Research Center, A Russian Chronology, April-June 2002, J30, p.37. 
207  Confict Studies Research Center, A Russian Chronology, April-June 2002, J30, p.52. 
208  Statements of force commander Maj-Gen Sergey Chernomyrdin, Confict Studies Research Center, A 
Russian Chronology, April-June 2002, J30, p.25. 
209  Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, ‘O Konsultatsijakh 
Polnomochnykh Predstavitelei Gosudarstv-Uchastnikov DKB’, 24.10.2002 & ‘Ob Ocherednykh 
Konsultatsijakh Polnomochnykh Predstavitelei Gosudarstv-Uchastnikov DKB’, 30.01.2002. 
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had to be institutionally combined in a bundle. However, the CSTO issue was discussed in 
earnest only in spring 2002. On April 9th, the CST deputy Foreign and Defence Ministers 
met to further develop options with regard to a single regional collective security 
organisation.210 On April 12th, the CST Security Council Secretaries held a meeting in 
Alma-Ata211 and Putin personally prepared the issue with Nikolaenko on May 6th.212 
The issue to transform the military-political CST into a full-fledged political-
military organisation213 finally appeared officially and prominently on the agenda on May 
14th, 2002. On this date, the CST council session celebrated the treaty’s 10th year jubilee in 
Moscow. The Presidents of the six states determined the future of the pact behind closed 
doors without any participation of ministers, advisors or bureaucrats.214 As they stepped 
out of the Kremlin’s Aleksandrovsky Hall, they instructed their governments to form a 
working-group at the level of deputy ministers of foreign affairs and defence by July 1st 
2002. The objective of this group was to prepare draft agreements to regulate the activities 
of the Organisation and its elements by November 1st 2002.215  
It is striking that the 14th of May 2002 cornerstone took place exactly 14 days prior 
to the NRC final meeting in Rome., This date was deliberately chosen for two reasons. 
First, nationalist forces within the Russian elite were upset due to the U.S. presence in 
Central Asia and the rapprochement of NATO and Russia.216 Therefore, Putin and his 
more liberal surroundings had to accommodate these dissatisfied circles by anticipating 
                                                 
 
210  Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, ‘O Konsultatsijakh 
zamestitelei Ministrov Inostrannykh del i oborony gosudarstv-uchastnikov dogovora o kollektivnoi 
bezopasnosti’, 05.04.2002. 
211  Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, ‘K itogam 
zasedanija Komiteta sekretarei Sovetov Bezopasnosti gosudarstv-uchastnikov Dogovora o kollektivnoi 
bezopasnosti (DKB) v Alma-Ate’, 17.04.2002. 
212  Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, ‘O vstrche 
Presidenta RF V.V. Putina s Generalnym sekretarem Soveta kollektivnoi Bezopasnosti’, 08.05.2002. 
213  Alekseyeva N.: ‘An examiner charter’ Izvestia, 19.12.2002 (ISI database, 18.05.2005). 
214  ‘Na jubileinoi sessii liderov gosudarstv-chlenov dogovora o kollektivnoi bezopasnosti v Moskve’, 
Telekanal RTR – Vesti, 14.05.2002 (ISI database, 18.05.2005). 
215  Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, ‘Zajavlenie glav 
gosudarstv-uchastnikov Dogovora o kollektivnoi bezopasnost po sluchaju 10-letnja pdpisanija dogovora 
o kollektivnoi bezopasnosti & Blagov, S.: ‘Russia pushes for deeper post-Soviet integration’, Asia 
Times, 15.05.2002. 
216  K. Knox, ‘Russia: CIS Military-Alliance Upgrade Plan Faces Numerous Obstacles’, JRL No.6246, 
16.05.2002. 
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the Rome summit with an initiative to create something analogous to NATO within the 
eastern hemisphere.217 On the other hand, the Russian administration seemed to be 
inspired by Brussels. It took advantage of the momentum by reproducing the NRC 
drafting process. 
Over all, it is not clear who initially came up with the CSTO idea. According to the 
official version, the general secretariat CST gave the initial impulse.218 Yet, given 
Moscow’s strong interest to restore its influence on the southern flank, a Russian actor is 
more likely responsible. Moreover, Nikolaenko and his entourage were generally 
conceived as insignificant as well as inexperienced in military matters219 and therefore 
incapable of fighting for an idea. In fact, two experts are almost certain that the CSTO 
idea emerged from the Russian MFA.220 Igor Ivanov and his deputies were probably 
farsighted and close enough to the Kremlin to think out and pass on the idea.  
 
Evolution of the issue 
After the jubilee session, the issue gained momentum. Putin personally emphasized that 
the creation of the CSTO should not involve additional bureaucratic units.221 On May 21st 
2002, a consultation meeting was convened in Moscow. Thereby, the plenipotentiary CST 
representatives created an intergovernmental working group and a group of General Staff 
coordinators.222 The high level group was chaired by the Russian deputy Foreign Minister 
                                                 
 
217  ‘CIS collective security treaty update’, WPS Russian Political Monitor, 19.03.2003. 
218  Expert interview, General Secretariat CSTO, Moscow: 22.02.2006. 
219  S. Saradzhyan, ‘Russia to shoulder burden in CSTO’, The St. Petersburg Times, 29.04.2003 (ISI 
database, 18.05.2005). 
220  Expert interviews, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 21.02.2006 & Institute of World Economy and 
International Relations, Moscow 30.01.2006. 
221  Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, ‘Zajavlenie 
Presidenta Rossii V.V. Putina po okonchanii sessii Soveta Kollektivnoi Bezopasnosti 14 Maja 2002 
goda, Moskva’, 16.05.2002. 
222  Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, ‘Ob ocherednykh 
konsultatsijakh polnomochnykh predstavitelei gosudarstv-uchastnikov dogovora o kollektivnoi 
bezopasnosti pri generalnom sekretare SKB I voennykh predstavitelei v shtabe po koordinatsii voennovo 
sotrudnichestva’, 22.05.2002. 
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Vjacheslav Trubnikov and consisted of the deputy Foreign, Defense and Finance 
Ministers as well as of Security Council representatives of all six countries.223  
Subsequently, the CSTO high level group met twice in Moscow to discuss structures 
and mechanisms of the new Eurasian alliance. On August 2nd 2002, it mandated an expert 
group to draft the charter and the legal status of the future organisation.224 One month 
later, on September 3rd 2002, it convened again to consider the expert’s work.225 
Allegedly, these activities have not caused major friction or disagreement among the 
participating policy-makers. Separately, Putin personally met the CST Secretary General 
Nikolaenko on a regular basis.226 
Another cornerstone of the CSTO decision-making process was October 10th 2002. 
On this date, the six Presidents met again in Kishinev (Moldavia) in order to sign the 
charter and the legal status of the future organisation. Thereby, they also decided to 
forward these documents to the national parliaments for ratification.227 This is the reason 
why the decision-making process could not yet be considered as complete. 
Meanwhile, activities on the military-operational level fully evolved. The Russian 
airfield in Kant was inspected and tested.228 while other subjects like capacity building, 
quick intervention forces, General Staff headquarter and arms trade were further 
developed. Within the same time period, debates about the judicial, financial and 
organisational aspects of the regional security framework dragged on. On February 5th and 
6th 2003, the experts met again to prepare and revise legal documents for the high level 
                                                 
 
223  Expert interview, General Secretariat CSTO, Moscow: 22.02.2006. 
224  Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, ‘O pervom 
zasedanii Rabochei gruppy predstavitelei gosudarstv-uchastnikov dogovora o kollektivnoi bezopasnosti 
(DKB)’, 05.08.2002. 
225  Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, ‘O vtorom 
zasedanii rabochei gruppy vysokovo urovenja predstavitelei gosudarstv-uchastnikov dogovora o 
kollektivnoi bezopasnosti (DKB)’, 04.09.2002. 
226  Expert interview, General Secretariat CSTO, Moscow: 22.02.2006. 
227  Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, ‘O podpisanii 
ustava organizatsii dogovora o kollektivnoi bezopasnosti I soglashenija o pravovom statuse ODKB’, 
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228  D. Glumskov, I. Safronov, ‘Russian Air force will put pressure on NATO in Kyrgyzstan’, Kommersant, 
02.12.2002 (ISI database, 18.05.2005). 
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group meeting four days later.229 Further talks took place at a ministerial level and among 
CST plenipotentiary representatives and Security Council members.  
The establishment of the CSTO involved numerous sub agreements and financial 
aspects, which had to be coordinated. In principal, contentious points centred around one 
major question: how much will Moscow pay for the loyal integration of the former Soviet 
republics? Or inversely, how many internal votes shall the ‘deptor’ states receive in return 
for cut-rated arms sales, officer’s training and other benefits?230 
 
Decision on the issue 
On March 20th and 21st 2003, the Security Council Secretaries made the final adjustments 
of the prepared CSTO documents. At the end of the meeting, Putin personally addressed 
the Committee. He took advantage of the occasion to comment on the U.S. led war in Iraq, 
which had started only a couple of hours earlier. It was also the perfect point of time to 
emphasize the importance of the CSTO as a tool to protect and stabilize the southern 
region.231  
The final decision to bring the CSTO into being was taken on April 28th 2003 in 
Dushanbe (Tadzhikistan).232 The six Presidents confirmed and signed the definite 
documents including the charter, the legal status and 15 additional agreements.233 
Additionally, they appointed Nikolaj Bordjuzha – former KGB officer and head of 
Yeltsin’s Administration in 1998 - CSTO Secretary General. Yet, despite ceremonious 
speeches and optimistic press statements, the official CSTO founding event held a slightly 
                                                 
 
229  Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, ‘O predstojashikh 
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231  Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, ‘Bystuplenie 
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vapid taste. On television, the six leaders were shown with gloomy faces, which gave rise 
to speculations about the unanimity and the political will of the CSTO-members.234  
The ratification process went off without a hitch. After the Russian Government 
approved the papers and transformed them into two separate law projects, 235 the Federal 
Assembly ratified them in May2003.236 The other parliaments followed during the 
summer, however, Armenia needed some more time.237 Nevertheless, the CSTO came into 
effect on September 18th 2003.238 
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8.2 Policy network parameters 
 
So far, the decision-making process has been traced and reconstructed. In this subchapter, 
the CSTO network parameters shall be determined and explained. Similar to the NRC 
case, the calculations are sequenced according to the four network dimensions. Initially, 
the attention shall be drawn to network members and their reputation. Subsequently, the 
policy network is integrated by focussing on interactions. In the end, the amount and 
allocation of resources and power within the network will be analysed. 
 
1. Network membership 
All in all nine actors have received an average rating greater than 2.75 (parameter 1a). 
They are therefore considered as network members. Obviously, the President stands again 
at the top of the ranking (3.75). In fact - and as the last subchapter clearly revealed - Putin 
remarkably and personally influenced the establishment of the CSTO. He is followed by 
two governmental units, the Federal Border Service (3.5) and the Federal Security Service 
(3.05). These positions are not surprising given the amount of sensitive aspects like drugs 
and arms trade, military technical cooperation or safeguard of state boundaries that had to 
be addressed. Assumedly, the two Services possess more expertise in these subjects as the 
two MoD actors. Nevertheless, the Departments (3) and the General Staff (3) were both 
rated as considerably influential. The competent MoD Departments and particularly the 
General Staff’s main operational directorate perform the bulk of strategic planning on 
different theatres of actions, including Central Asia and Caucasus.239 They are supported 
additionally by governmental agencies like the defunct Control Systems Agency (3). 
 
                                                 
 
239  Expert interview, The Moscow Times, Moscow: 10.05.2005. 
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Position Actors 
Average 
influence 
ratings 
1 Presidential actor President  3.75 
2 Governmental actor Federal Services Federal Border Service 3.5 
3 Governmental actor Federal Services Federal Security Service (FSB) 3.05 
4 Governmental actor Ministry of Defence (MoD) Departments 3 
5 Governmental actor Ministry of Defence (MoD) General Staff 3 
6 Governmental actor Federal Agencies, Committees 
and Commissions 
Agencies 3 
7 Economic actor Energy Sector RAO UES 3 
8 Presidential actor Presidential Administration Direction 2.8 
9 Presidential actor Security Council Direction 2.8 
Table 17: CSTO network members (parameter 1a-c) 
 
The seventh actor in the ranking is striking. The experts rated RAO UES as influential (3) 
with regard to the CSTO decision-making process. What is the reason for the involvement 
of the energy sector? UES constitutes a power holding that owns 96.1% of the high-
voltage grids in Russia. Its export activity is mainly directed towards former Soviet 
Republics. Its efforts are aimed at expanding into new consumer markets and at acquiring 
attractive energy assets within the near abroad.240 Against this background, it is likely that 
the electricity monopolist had a considerable amount of influence on Russian strategic 
activities within Central Asia and the Caucasus.241 
At the end of the ranking, the directions of the Presidential Administration and of 
the Security Council follow with an influence rating of 2.8. These two players may have 
been expected to be included in the policy network. 
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Whereas the NRC network took two interests into account, the CSTO structure 
encompassed three categories (parameter 1b). In addition to Presidential and governmental 
interests, the economic sphere was included. However, parliamentary and other actors 
remained strictly excluded from decision-making. The percentage of the executive 
authority amounts to 33.33%, which may be perceived as a relatively high value 
(parameter 1c). 
When comparing the influential network members in Table 17 with the less 
influential non-members in Table 18, three points catch the reader’s eyes. 
 
Position Actors 
Average 
influence 
ratings 
10 Presidential actor Security Council Members 2.6 
11 Governmental actor Federal Services Foreign Intelligence Service 
(SVR) 
2.6 
12 Governmental actor Мinistry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) 
Ambassadors 
(Kaz/Bel/Kirg/Tadj/Armen) 
2.5 
13 Economic actor Industrial sector  2.5 
14 Governmental actor Prime Ministry Direction 2.45 
15 Presidential actor Presidential Administration Aides of the President 2.4 
16 Other actors Political parties United Russia 2.33333 
17 Presidential actor Presidential Administration Presidential Services 2.3125 
18 Governmental actor Governmental Administration Dep of Defence Complex 2.25 
19 Governmental actor Мinistry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) 
Direction 2.2 
Table 18: CSTO additional actors 
 
First, it is astonishing that the Prime Ministry was not involved in the policy network. It 
only appears on rank 14 with an influence rating of 2.45. Why is it that the head of the 
government has only a weak voice with regard to an important state issue? This question 
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will be picked-up again later upon the review and comparison of the case studies. Second, 
it is even more surprising that actors of the Foreign Ministry did not apply more weight to 
the decision. Apparently, they played a rather peripheral role, despite the fact that the 
whole transformation process from CST to CSTO was officially headed by Nikolaenko, an 
experienced ambassador with close ties to the Russian diplomatic sphere. MFA actors 
occupy positions 12, 19 and – beyond the displayed ranking - 20 as well as 21.  
Thirdly, it is noteworthy that two non-Presidential, non-governmental actors had 
quite some influence, although they were not part of the policy network. Apparently, the 
industrial sector was mildly important (2.5) with regard to the establishment of the CSTO. 
There is evidence that particularly the Russian parkettnyi generaly - the parquet generals 
of the war-industrial complex – were very interested in the security alliance.242 Even they 
agreed to export arms at considerable discount to CSTO members, their lobbying was 
effective. Additionally, the industrial sector is highly interested in the Central Asian 
region (2.5). RusAl for instance invested millions of dollars in Tadjikistan over the last 
few years243. Last but not least, the political party ‘United Russia’ seemingly had some 
influence (2.333) on the creation of the CSTO. Yet, the motives of its involvement are not 
clear. 
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2. Network integration 
This section and the following will focus exclusively on the policy network. How are the 
nine actors linked with each other? What kind of interactions brought the CSTO into 
being? The following table shows the matrix with accumulated expert ratings.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                            1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
                            P F F M M A R P S 
                            - - - - - - - - - 
  1              President                    
  2 Federal Border Service  5                 
  3                    FSB  7 7               
  4        MoD Departments  5 4 5             
  5      MoD General Staff  5 5 5 6           
  6               Agencies  3 1 2 5 3         
  7                RAO UES  3 1 2 1 1 2       
  8     Presidential Admin  9 5 7 6 5 6 4     
  9       Security Council  7 5 5 4 6 2 0 6   
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  23 Nov 06 15:25:19 
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies 
Table 19: CSTO matrix accumulated 
 
It stands out that no interaction reached the maximum value of 10. The most frequent and 
intense liaison (9) was kept between the President and the direction of his administration. 
On the lower end of the scale, one relationship was unanimously appreciated with the 
lowest value 0. The Security Council had seemingly no ties with RAO UES. 
The dichotomization of this matrix is performed by allocating the value 1 for all 
interactions greater than 3 and by zeroing the rest. This simplified matrix is illustrated in 
Table 20. 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                            1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
                            P F F M M A R P S 
                            - - - - - - - - - 
  1              President                    
  2 Federal Border Service  1                 
  3                    FSB  1 1               
  4        MoD Departments  1 1 1             
  5      MoD General Staff  1 1 1 1           
  6               Agencies  0 0 0 1 0         
  7                RAO UES  0 0 0 0 0 0       
  8     Presidential Admin  1 1 1 1 1 1 1     
  9       Security Council  1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1   
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  17 Jan 07 10:41:43 
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies 
Table 20: CSTO matrix dichotomized 
 
The dichotomized matrix will be used for power calculations later in this subchapter. 
However, neither the dichotomized, nor the accumulated matrix will be suitable for the 
visualisation of the CSTO network. Therefore, the accumulated data set is additionally 
categorised as shown in Table 21.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                            1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
                            P F F M M A R P S 
                            - - - - - - - - - 
  1              President                    
  2 Federal Border Service  1                 
  3                    FSB  2 2               
  4        MoD Departments  1 1 1             
  5      MoD General Staff  1 1 1 1           
  6               Agencies  0 0 0 1 0         
  7                RAO UES  0 0 0 0 0 0       
  8     Presidential Admin  2 1 2 1 1 1 1     
  9       Security Council  2 1 1 1 1 0 0 1   
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  23 Nov 06 15:26:06 
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies 
Table 21: CSTO matrix categorised 
 
At this stage, the CSTO data set is complete and ready to use for UCINET calculations. 
The first computation determines the network density (parameter 2a).  
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------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          1 
     ------ 
  1  4.3056 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  16 Jan 07 11:16:54 
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies 
Table 22: CSTO density (parameter 2a) 
 
The value 4.3056 is meaningful, because it represents the average level of interaction 
within the network. Given the range of 0 to 10, the CSTO density lies more or less in the 
middle of the spectrum. Thus, the interaction frequency and intensity can be considered 
neither as high nor low. 
The next parameter 2b describes the centralisation of the CSTO network. It is shown 
in Table 23. 21.786% may be perceived as a rather low value. Apparently, the relationship 
patterns are not straightened out to one single point in the network.  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Network Centralisation = 21.786% 
Heterogeneity = 11.99%.  Normalised = 0.98 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  16 Jan 07 11:23:43 
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies 
Table 23: CSTO network degree centralisation (parameter 2b) 
 
Nevertheless, the CSTO network is somewhat centralised, as parameter 2b does not lie 
close to zero either. Therefore, it may be assumed that some actors are located more 
centrally than others. Table 24 displays the centralisation ranking in terms of actor’s 
degrees. It is striking that the positions in the ranking significantly changed compared to 
the average influence ranking (see Table 17). This means that some actors are central 
within the network due to their activity while others become quasi-outsiders. 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                       1            2            3 
                                  Degree    NrmDegree        Share 
                            ------------ ------------ ------------ 
  8     Presidential Admin        48.000      60.0000        0.155 
  1              President        44.000      55.0000        0.142 
  3                    FSB        40.000      50.0000        0.129 
  4        MoD Departments        36.000      45.0000        0.116 
  5      MoD General Staff        36.000      45.0000        0.116 
  9       Security Council        35.000      43.7500        0.113 
  2 Federal Border Service        33.000      41.2500        0.106 
  6               Agencies        24.000      30.0000        0.077 
  7                RAO UES        14.000      17.5000        0.045 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  16 Jan 07 11:23:43 
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies 
Table 24: Executive authority’s position within CSTO network (parameter 2c) 
 
The Presidential Administration obviously ascended to the top position with an absolute 
degree centralisation of 48. Conversely, the Federal Border Service lost some positions 
and became more peripheral (33). Against this background, it is interesting to locate the 
executive authority in the network (parameter 2c). Presidential actors occupy positions 1, 
2 and 6 of the centrality ranking. Hence, two of them are placed within the top or central 
three. This result will be discussed in more detail in the context of the network type debate 
at the end of this subchapter. 
 
3. Network resources 
How does the CSTO network appear in terms of resources? The maximum normalised 
degree centrality attained equals 60% (parameter 3a). This signifies that the potential for 
possessing information, knowledge, financial means and other resources has not been fully 
exploited given a maximum value of 100%. Therefore, the quantity of resources within the 
network may be considered as limited. 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                         1            2            3 
                    Degree    NrmDegree        Share 
              ------------ ------------ ------------ 
  1     Mean        34.444      43.0556        0.000 
  2  Std Dev         9.662      12.0777        0.000 
  3      Sum       310.000     387.5000        0.000 
  4 Variance        93.358    1458.7191        0.000 
  5      SSQ     11518.000  179968.7500        0.000 
  6    MCSSQ       840.222   13128.4719        0.000 
  7 Euc Norm       107.322     134.1524        0.000 
  8  Minimum        14.000      17.5000        0.000 
  9  Maximum        48.000      60.0000        0.000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  16 Jan 07 11:23:43 
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies 
Table 25: Quantity & distribution of resources within CSTO network (parameter 3a+b) 
 
On the other end of the spectrum, the minimum normalised centrality value of 17.5% was 
achieved by RAO UES. This implies a relative spread of 70.83% (parameter 3b). An 
assessment of this result is fairly easy. The distribution of resources within the CSTO 
network ranges over 70.83% of the spectrum, which reflects remarkable attributive 
differences between network members. 
 
4. Network power 
After having analysed the membership, integration and resource dimension, his paragraph 
focuses on the level and distribution of power within the CSTO policy network. Table 26 
presents the normalised closeness values and ranks the nine actors accordingly. Compared 
to the centrality ranking, the positioning of the MoD Departments catches the eye. 
Apparently, this actor has numerous access channels to other key players, which adds 
weight to his role in decision-making. 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                       1            2 
                                 Farness   nCloseness 
                            ------------ ------------ 
  8     Presidential Admin         8.000      100.000 
  4        MoD Departments         9.000       88.889 
  1              President        10.000       80.000 
  3                    FSB        10.000       80.000 
  5      MoD General Staff        10.000       80.000 
  2 Federal Border Service        10.000       80.000 
  9       Security Council        10.000       80.000 
  6               Agencies        14.000       57.143 
  7                RAO UES        15.000       53.333 
 
Statistics 
 
                         1            2 
                   Farness   nCloseness 
              ------------ ------------ 
  1     Mean        10.667       77.707 
  2  Std Dev         2.160       13.603 
  3      Sum        96.000      699.365 
  4 Variance         4.667      185.029 
  5      SSQ      1066.000    56010.984 
  6    MCSSQ        42.000     1665.261 
  7 Euc Norm        32.650      236.666 
  8  Minimum         8.000       53.333 
  9  Maximum        15.000      100.000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  15 Jan 07 19:12:34 
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies 
Table 26: Quantity & distribution of power within CSTO network (parameter 4a+b) 
 
As the maximum normalised closeness value corresponds to 100%, the amount of power 
within the network is on a maximum level (parameter 4a). It also appears as if this power 
is not unevenly distributed: the comparative power allocation spectrum equals 46.67%.  
 
Network type assessment 
After the computation of all parameters, they shall be aggregated and interpreted in this 
section. The review of all values in terms of the network types shows a very complex 
picture. Some parameters are characteristic for policy communities while some are typical 
of issue networks. 
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Dimension 
 
Parameter 
 
Value 
 
Threshold 
 
1. Membership    
a) Number of 
participants 
Number of involved 
network actors 
9 10 
b) Number of interests Number of involved 
actor’s categories 
3 3 
c) Types of interest Percentage of involved 
Presidential actors 
33.33% 33.33% 
2. Integration    
a) Frequency of 
interaction (information 
and resources) 
Network density 
 
4.3056 5 
b) Centralisation Overall network 
degree centralisation 
21.79% 50.00% 
c) Executive authority’s 
position 
Degree centrality 
ranking 
Ranks 1, 2 and 6 At least two 
Presidential actors 
within top three 
3. Resources    
a) Quantity of 
information and 
resources within 
network 
Maximum normalised 
degree centrality 
60.00% 75.00% 
b) Distribution of 
information and 
resources within 
network 
Spread between max 
and min normalised 
degree centrality in 
percentage of the 
highest value 
70.83% 50.00% 
4. Power    
a) Quantity of power 
within network 
Maximum normalised 
closeness centrality 
100.00% 75.00% 
b) Distribution of 
power within network 
Spread between 
maximum and 
minimum normalised 
closeness centrality in 
percentage of the 
highest value 
46.67% 50.00% 
Table 27: Aggregated CSTO parameters 
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Concerning the membership dimension, the number of actors is small and hence policy 
community-like. However, the two other parameters are located exactly on the thresholds 
between the two network types. The integration dimension shows a similar situation: 
Whereas the executive authority’s position within the network reflects a policy 
community, the moderate density and the weak centralisation value are classic attributes 
of an issue network. 
Both resource parameters are clearly located on the issue network side of the 
spectrum. A generally moderate level of resources is combined with an unequal 
distribution of goods. With regard to power, the opposite appears true. The maximum 
level of closeness centrality as well as the more or less balanced power among network 
actors corresponds to the policy community side. 
In conclusion, the CSTO policy network parameters are highly contradictory. Four 
values correspond to policy community characteristics while the other four reflect issue 
network qualities. These results principally stand in line with sub hypothesis C formulated 
in section 3.3 of the present study. The CSTO decision-making structure may be 
considered as a hybrid form of policy network. Yet, the testing of hypotheses will be 
performed at a later stage (Chapter 11). 
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8.3 Resulting decision-making procedures and structures 
 
The last two subchapters have so far highlighted the decision-making process and the 
policy network dimensions. In this section, these two aspects are merged and interpreted 
with the help of the visualised policy network illustrated below. 
 
 
Figure 11: Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) resulting policy network 
 
When examining the CSTO network structure at first glance, two findings from the 
previous subchapter can be confirmed. The network is relatively small, but not very tight 
nor centralised in terms of interactions. This perfectly reflects the hybrid nature of the 
CSTO policy network. The fact that the Presidential Administration is placed in the very 
centre of the network is comprehensible. Aleksander Voloshin and his entourage did not 
only coordinate decision-making: they rigorously controlled the network on behalf of the 
President, whenever the head of the state was not available for the issue. This view stands 
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in line with statements of the CSTO General Secretariat, according to which the 
Presidential Administration was its main point of contact on the Russian side.244 
Nonetheless, the President certainly played a dominant role with regard to the 
establishment of the Eurasian Security alliance.245  
The third player of the innermost troika is the FSB, who was constantly involved in 
decision-making.246 It is centrally located due to the manifold links to other actors in and 
outside of the policy network. Beside close ties to the Presidential actors, FSB had an 
intense exchange with the Federal Border Service, which was highly active due to the 
sensitive Russian southern frontiers to the former Soviet republics and – farther away at 
the outer circumference – Afghanistan and Iraq. 
As stated in the last subchapter, the two MoD actors played an important role in 
CSTO decision-making. They owe their position to their military-technical knowledge and 
to their numerous relationships within the policy network. Even if all MoD links were not 
particularly frequent or intense, the Departments and the General Staff cooperated with a 
broad range of actors including the CSTO Secretariat.247  
In contrast to other network members, it is not clear what role the Security Council 
played with regard to the CSTO issue. Seemingly, it was closely attached to the President 
and kept company with the bulk of the other key decision-makers. It is possible that the 
Security Council provided a useful arena to form an opinion about this near abroad 
security issue. 
Two actors with few or no interactions are placed at the outer rim of the policy 
network. Governmental agencies were linked to the Presidential Administration and to the 
MoD departments. This player reflects the channel towards the defence industry, which 
played an essential role with regard to the CSTO issue.248 The second actor at the 
periphery was RAO UES. The electricity monopolist entertained moderate interactions 
                                                 
 
244  Expert interview, CSTO General Secretariat, Moscow: 22.02.2006. 
245  Expert interview, Fonda Politika, Moscow: 01.07.2005. 
246  Expert interviews, Vremja Novostej, Moscow: 13.02.2006. 
247  Expert interview, CSTO General Secretariat, Moscow: 22.02.2006. 
248  Expert interview, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow 30.01.2006 & The 
Moscow Times, Moscow: 10.05.2005. 
Collective Security Treaty Organisation  179 
 
with the Presidential Administration only. This is not astonishing, because the heads of the 
two institutions - Aleksander Voloshin and Anatoly Chubais – are well known to be close 
allies.249 Further more, RAO UES was interested in influencing the CSTO decision-
making process due to its vast infrastructure located particularly in Armenia and 
Tadzhikistan. In contrast, Gazprom, for example, is more focussed on Ukraine and 
Turkmenistan, two non-CSTO members.250 
 
                                                 
 
249  Expert interview, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow 30.01.2006. 
250  Expert interview, The Moscow Times, Moscow: 03.02.2006. 
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9. Common European Economic Space (CEES) 
 
After having examined the NRC and CSTO cases, this chapter analysis the third Russian 
foreign policy issue: the Common European Economic Space (CEES). This initiative was 
brought forward in spring 2001 as Western state leaders were calling for an institutionally 
integrated, democratic and modern Russia. The main purpose of the CEES was – and still 
is - to improve conditions of free traffic of commodities, services, capital and people 
between the EU and the Russian Federation. The development of this common framework 
was a lengthy process, which came to an intermediate end in November 2003. At this 
stage, the CEES concept was adopted at the 12th EU-Russian summit in Rome. 
Which major events marked the decision-making process to establish the CEES? 
What kinds of actors were involved on the Russian side and how were they interlinked 
with each other? Which type of policy network resulted in Moscow? 
These questions shall be addressed within this chapter. The first section (9.1) 
describes the genesis of the EU-Russian economic project along the time line. It thereby 
provides a useful overview for the reader. Subsequently, the Russian policy network is 
reconstructed and analysed in subchapter 9.2. In particular, the network parameters are 
determined and assessed in the context of the policy network typology. The last 
subchapter (9.3) summarizes all findings by visualizing and interpreting the CEES 
network structure. 
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9.1 The issue and its events 
 
The Russian decision-making process with regard to the CEES somewhat differs from the 
previous two case studies. Namely, the issue appeared suddenly, whereas the NRC and 
CSTO cases became apparent weeks ahead. Also, CEES policy-making did not end with a 
clear-cut decision, but arrived at an intermediate stage in November 2003, dragged on and 
encroached upon a new framework of cooperation. Today, the CEES is one of four 
common spaces between the EU and Russia: the Common Economic Space, the Common 
Space on Freedom, Security and Justice, the Common Space on External Security and the 
Common Space on Research, Education and Culture.251 
Consecutively, the decision-making process shall again be divided in three 
segments. At first, the emergence of the issue is traced and presented. After that, it is 
explained how actors further developed the CEES concept and finally, the third segment 
reproduces the intermediate decision. 
 
Appearance of the issue 
The principle notion to form a common European economic space including Russia had 
been in the air since 1999 and therefore difficult to trace. It has been adopted under the 
German EU Council Presidency,252 picked-up by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov in 
Berlin253 and mentioned again later by French President Jacques Chirac at the European 
Council meeting in Stockholm.254 However, it was never an official issue and never 
appeared on any agenda until the 7th EU-Russian summit in Moscow on May 17th, 2001. 
                                                 
 
251  The European Commission’s Delegation to Russia, http://www.delrus.cec.eu.int, 30.01.2007. 
252  Expert interview, Swedish Embassy, Moscow: 02.05.2005. 
253  ‘Russian foreign minister says Europe needs single economic space’, ITAR-TASS/BBC Monitoring, 
25.11.2000 (ISI database, 20.05.2005). 
254  ‘France’s Chirac greets Russia’s Putin as strategic partner’, AFP/BBC Monitoring, 23.03.2001 (ISI 
database, 12.04.2005). 
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The day before the summit, a part of the EU delegation under Swedish council presidency 
met with the Russian deputy Foreign Minister Evgeni Gusarov. At this preparatory 
meeting, the CEES was not a topic of discussion. Later in the evening, the EU delegation 
was shortly briefed by Commission President Romano Prodi who informed that he will 
propose a new project to Putin. Until this very moment, the idea was obviously discussed 
only informally within the Commission and was not mentioned in Prodi’s briefing 
papers.255 Literally over night, Swedish diplomatic staff had to change the agenda items 
for the following day.256 
In light of this prehistory, the summit included a surprising element. When Prodi 
submitted the proposal to Putin, the Russian President immediately got into the act. It 
seems as if both leaders acted on the spur of the moment without being completely aware 
of the political implications. Subsequently, a short amendment to the drafted text was 
adopted at the end of the session, which raised no specific questions at the following press 
conference. However, later in the evening, a reporter from the Financial Times called the 
Swedish diplomats. Yet, at this stage, nobody was able to answer any questions regarding 
the CEES.257 
Subsequently, it took six month to set up a CEES High Level Group since the 
group’s composition only gradually became apparent. Allegedly, the Russian side retarded 
this phase, because, for some unaccountable reasons, it was unable to nominate a 
delegation.258 The body was lead by EU Commissioner for External Relations Chris 
Patten and also by Russian deputy Prime Minister Viktor Khristenko. It involved the 
following Russian actors including their deputies: Pochinok Aleksander (Minister of 
Labour and Social Dev), Lesin Mikhail (Minister of Press and Means of Mass 
Communication), Gordeev Aleksej (Minister of Agriculture), Gref German (Minister of 
Eco Dev and Trade), Kudrin Aleksej (Minister of Finance), Bukaev Gennadi (Minister of 
                                                 
 
255  Expert interview, The European Commission’s Delegation to Russia, Political Section, Moscow: 
27.01.2006. 
256  Expert interview, Swedish Embassy, Moscow: 02.05.2005. 
257  Expert interview, Swedish Embassy, Moscow: 02.05.2005. 
258  Expert interview, The European Commission’s Delegation to Russia, Political Section, Moscow: 
27.01.2006. 
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Tax and Duties), Frank Sergej (Minister of Transport), Morosov Vadim (Minister of 
Communication), Artjukhov Vitali (Minister of Natural Resources), Jusufov Igor 
(Minister of Entergetic), Nazdratenko Evgenii (Head of Governmental Committee for 
Fisheries) and Koptev Juri (Head of Governmental Agency for Aviation and Space 
Matters).259 
 
Evolution of the issue 
During the following two years, the CEES concept was discussed and developed within 
not less than eight different fora across all levels and various sectors. From a distance, the 
process appeared well structured, institutionalized and concerted with concrete mandates, 
schedules and cooperation mechanisms. At a closer look, however, policy-making was 
marked by many conflicts and misunderstandings.260 Whereas Brussels intended to 
involve Moscow in a larger dialogue, to help with reforms and smooth the EU 
enlargement, the Russian Federation expected to deal with an equal partner, who provides 
benefits on all fronts. Whereas the EU considered the CEES as a purely economic venture, 
Moscow regarded it as a political project.261 
Within the decision-making period, five EU-Russian summits took place. At these 
meetings, the Russian side was usually represented by Putin with his advisors and 
assistants, Foreign Minister Ivanov with his deputies, Ambassador to the EU Vassili 
Lykhachov, Dmitri Rogozin as main negotiator for Kaliningrad as well as, on occasions, 
Prime Minister Kasjanov, Trade Minister Gref with his deputies and Finance Minister 
Kudrin.262 Additionally, the Foreign Ministers met within the framework of the EU-
Russian Cooperation Council meetings. 
                                                 
 
259  Expert interview, Independent Analyst, Moscow: 29.04.2005. 
260  Expert interview, The European Commission’s Delegation to Russia, Political Section, Moscow: 
27.01.2006. 
261  Expert interview, Swedish Embassy, Moscow: 02.05.2005. 
262  Expert interview, Independent Analyst, Moscow: 29.04.2005. 
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On October 3rd, 2001, the 8th EU-Russian summit defined a mandate for the High Level 
Group, which restricted its work to maximum two years.263 Within this limited time frame, 
the CEES High Level Group met four times. On December 5th, 2001, it set up a working 
schedule and designated an informal group of experts to forward technical work. On 
March 26th, 2002, it agreed to a list of key sectors264 and defined concrete working stages. 
Finally, on October 17th, 2002, it concentrated on defined priorities. Patten and 
Khristenko’s group reported twice to the EU-Russian summit and presented their final 
results on November 6th, 2003. 
The details of the CEES concept were elaborated by High Level Group support 
teams and by PCA subcommittees. These experts – on the Russian side mainly scientists 
from leading institutes of the Russian Academy of Science (Vinokurov 2004: 13) - often 
met and worked out the sectoral specifications. Basically, the EU-Russian collaboration 
was successful. Yet, major difficulties namely arose with regard to air traffic charges for 
EU airlines over flying Siberia, agricultural questions, WTO terms of accession such as 
energy prices, antidumping regulations and trade disputes.265 Technical question were 
additionally addressed on other occasions. The high level economic dialogues, the EU-
Russian Industrialists Roundtables and specific bilateral talks all contributed economic 
expertise and viewpoints. 
Internally, the Russian Administration created its own working group. A 
governmental commission led by Viktor Khristenko coordinated all activities between the 
involved Ministries, Services and Agencies. It united a total of 23 administrational units266 
and, allegedly, the interministerial activities were well prepared and tuned.267 
                                                 
 
263  Appendix 2 of the Joint Statement, EU-Russia Summit, Brussels, 03.10.2001. 
264  Standardisation, technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures; customs regulation; public 
procurement; competition policy; financial services; auditing and accounting services; 
telecommunications; space launching services; transport; metallurgy, car industry, civil aviation industry 
and agriculture. 
265  Expert interview, The European Commission’s Delegation to Russia, Economics and Trade Section, 
Moscow: 17.05.2005. 
266  Expert Interview, Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, Department for External 
Economic Affairs, Moscow: 16.02.2006. 
267  Expert interview, The European Commission’s Delegation to Russia, Economics and Trade Section, 
Moscow: 17.05.2005. 
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As the CEES concept evolved, three major characteristics about decision-making 
became apparent. First, on a technical level, most expertise papers were created or 
commissioned by the EU. In contrast, the Russian Administration delivered rather few and 
modest assessments.268 Also, the Russian side revealed a general drafting apathy.269 
However, these diagnostic findings may perhaps be explained by a shortage of qualified 
experts on the Russian side, by the language barrier or by a lack of interest. 
Understandably, Moscow didn’t appreciate the EU’s attempts to implement parts of its 
‘acquis communautaire’ on a third state. In fact, Brussels intended to make the Russian 
laws compatible to EU regulations270 and often felt an open Russian reluctance to change 
legislation.271 
Second, it became clear that opposite interests, frictions, resistances and other 
conflicts only appeared at the lower level of administration. It is unnecessary to explain 
that coming to a concrete agreement on technical questions is a more difficult task than the 
formulation of abstract and open objectives. Sometimes, the different views become 
insurmountable.272 
Third, the development of the CEES manifested that Western and Russian 
organisational-administrational cultures diverge. Whereas the EU technocrats were fully 
authorized to negotiate and conclude deals on lower levels, Russian bureaucrats are 
completely dependent on and controlled by the highest authority. This difference often led 
to troublesome situations and ineffective collaboration.273 
                                                 
 
268  Expert interview, Swedish Embassy, Moscow: 02.05.2005 & Chris Patten, personal statement, Zurich: 
29.06.2006. 
269  Expert interview, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Science, 01.04.2005. 
270  See Chris Patten’s remarks in: ‘The EU and Russia: close, but how close?’, The St. Petersburg Times, 
31.05.2002. 
271  Expert interview, Swedish Embassy, Moscow: 02.05.2005. 
272  Expert interview, Swedish Embassy, Moscow: 02.05.2005. 
273  Expert interview, The European Commission’s Delegation to Russia, Political Section, Moscow: 
27.01.2006. 
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Decision on the issue 
On May 22nd, 2003, Khristenko travelled to Brussels in order to bilaterally prepare with 
Prodi the forthcoming 11th EU-Russian summit in St. Petersburg. Thereby, the CEES was 
their main issue.274 Much to the Commission’s regret, the High Level Group was not yet 
ready to present its final concept at the historic St. Petersburg summit. Therefore, the joint 
statement adopted within the framework of the St. Petersburg tricentennial celebrations 
contained only a reference to the next EU-Russian summit in Rome.275 Yet, it was decided 
to complement the CEES with three additional cooperation pillars: freedom, security and 
justice, external security, as well as research, education and culture. 
On October 28th, 2003, the High Level Group met for the last time in order to 
finalise and come to an agreement on the CEES. After a hectic finish, the concept paper 
and the final report were attached as appendicies to the Joint Statement of the Rome 
summit, that took place on November 6th, 2003. For both sides, the CEES concept 
represented at that time an important project, although it seemed as if its content was 
secondary. Whereas the Commission managed to integrate Moscow in the face of the 
upcoming EU enlargement, Russia ascended one step closer to WTO accession.  
 
 
                                                 
 
274  ‘Russian deputy premier, EC president discuss economic, energy cooperation’, RIAnovosti/BBC 
Monitoring, 22.05.2003 (ISI database, 12.04.2005). 
275  Joint Statement adopted at the EU-Russian Summit, St. Petersburg, 31.05.2003. 
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9.2 Policy network parameters 
 
Whereas the last section covered events and their consequences over time, this subchapter 
focuses on decision-making structures in Moscow. It potentially confirms the main actors, 
who were mentioned previously. Based on the methodological approach (Chapter 4) and 
analogous to the previous chapters, the network parameters are determined and assessed. 
Whereas paragraphs 1 to 4 cover the specific network dimensions and their characteristics, 
the last section aggregates and discusses all parameters in terms of the two extreme 
network types. 
 
1. Network membership 
Based on expert opinions, ten actors can be considered as network members (parameter 
1a). As Table 28 shows, they all received an average influence rating of greater than 2.75. 
At the top of the list, the President ranks with a maximum value of 4. After a quite a large 
gap of 0.5, he is followed by the direction of his Administration (3.5). On the third rank, 
the Prime Ministry Direction received a rating of 3.4. Seemingly, this actor may be very 
influential depending on the issue. In this case, it certainly owes its position to Deputy 
Prime Minister Khristenko, who played a pivotal role.276 He was technically supported by 
the Department for Trade Policy and Multilateral Trade Negotiations of the Ministry of 
Economic Development and Trade (3.3). This important position of a subordinate unit is 
interesting, but it certainly underlines the influence of technical expertise with regard to 
complex issues. 
                                                 
 
276  Expert Interview, European Commission, Bilateral trade relations with the Russian Federation, Brussels: 
30.10.2006. 
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Position Actors 
Average 
influence 
ratings 
1 Presidential actor President  4 
2 Presidential actor Presidential Administration Direction 3.5 
3 Governmental actor Prime Ministry Direction 3.4 
4 Governmental actor Ministry of Economic Dev & 
Trade (MEDT) 
Department for Trade Policy 
and Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations 
3.3 
5 Presidential actor Presidential Administration Aides of the President 3 
6 Governmental actor Other Federal Ministries Ministry of Energy 3 
7 Governmental actor Ministry of Economic Dev & 
Trade (MEDT) 
Direction 2.9 
8 Presidential actor Presidential Administration Advisors of the President 2.75 
9 Governmental actor Мinistry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) 
All-European Cooperation 
Department 
2.75 
10 Governmental actor Мinistry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) 
Ambassadors (EU) 2.75 
Table 28: CEES network members (parameter 1a-c) 
 
Two additional Presidential actors have gained access to the CEES policy network: the 
Aides (3) and the Advisors (2.75) of the President. The Ministry of Energy received a 
ranking of 3, which is remarkable. So far, it is the only Federal Ministry apart the MoD, 
MFA and MEDT included in decision-making. The MEDT direction at rank seven (2.9) is 
no surprise, as this ministry coordinated the bulk of the issue’s technical aspects.277 
Finally, the two MFA actors – the all-European Cooperation Department and the EU 
Ambassador (both 2.75) - are considered as network members.  
                                                 
 
277  Expert Interview, Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, Department for External 
Economic Affairs, Moscow: 16.02.2006. 
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The CEES policy network involves two interest categories only (parameter 1b). 
Thereby, executive interests seem to be predominate, as 40% of the decision-makers 
belong to the Presidential sphere (parameter 1c). It is astonishing that economic actors 
remained outside of the policy network. Most economic players participated rather 
passively in decision-making by restricting themselves to the EU-Russian Industrialists 
Roundtable. This may be explained by two factors: first, it is possible that the Russian 
business sector was simply not interested as long as the CEES concept was a piece of 
paper without concrete implications.278 Second, as the previous subchapter outlined, the 
development of the CEES concept was by and large an internal governmental affair.279 
Therefore, most economic actors were insufficiently informed. At best, the biggest 
enterprises were informally updated by the deputy Prime Ministry or by the Presidential 
Administration.280 
Table 29 presents the list of 10 additional influential actors, who were not admitted 
to the innermost circle. Nevertheless, they attained remarkable average influence ratings. 
 
Position Actors 
Average 
influence 
ratings 
11 Governmental actor Мinistry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) 
Direction 2.7 
12 Economic actor Energy Sector Gazprom 2.625 
13 Governmental actor Prime Ministry Governmental Administration 
(Int Coop) 
2.5 
14 Governmental actor Prime Ministry Governmental Administration 
(Energy & Natural Resources) 
2.5 
15 Governmental actor Мinistry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) 
Relations to Federal Regions 
Department 
2.5 
16 Economic actor Energy Sector RAO UES 2.5 
                                                 
 
278  Expert interview, The European Commission’s Delegation to Russia, Political Section, Moscow: 
27.01.2006. 
279  See also Vinokurov (2004). 
280  Expert Interview, Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, Department for External 
Economic Affairs, Moscow: 22.06.2005. 
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Position Actors 
Average 
influence 
ratings 
17 Economic actor Financial Sector  2.5 
18 Economic actor Industrial sector (RusAl) 2.5 
19 Economic actor Service Sector  2.5 
20 Governmental actor Other Federal Ministries Minitry of Transport 2.4 
Table 29: CEES additional actors 
 
Upon reviewing and comparing the CEES network members and non-members, at least 
three points stand out. First, the CEES case involves four ‘other’ Federal Ministries. 
Beside the MEDT and MFA, the Ministries of Energy, Transport and – no longer shown 
on the list – the Ministries of Finance (rank 23) as well as Communication (position 24) 
had some influence on the development of the economic space. This fact certainly reflects 
the complex nature of the CEES. Numerous aspects of diverse state sectors have been 
addressed by the EU-Russian concept. 
Second, the two tables presented above illustrate again that sometimes a specific 
ministerial department may be more influential than its superior direction. This is the case 
for the MEDT and for the MFA. This circumstance can be explained by the fact that 
technical knowledge of apparatchiki is in certain cases more important than the 
coordinating role of Ministers. 
And finally, it is noteworthy that Services such as FSB, SVR or others were 
apparently not important at all. As these actors by and large lack profound economic 
expertise, they are less present in decision-making of non-security-related issues.281 
                                                 
 
281  Expert interview, Independent Analyst, Moscow: 29.04.2005. 
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2. Network integration 
The previous paragraph delimitated the CEES policy network in terms of its membership. 
In this section, it is determined, how and to what extent these ten decision-makers 
interacted. Table 30 presents the accumulated expert scores. Thereby, it is obvious that no 
relationship achieved the maximum (10) or the minimum rating (0). 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                                          1 
                                        1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 
                                        P P P M P M M P M M 
                                        - - - - - - - - - - 
  1                          President                      
  2                      PA, Direction  9                   
  3          Prime Ministry, Direction  8 8                 
  4       MEDT, Dep Trade Policy&Negot  4 5 3               
  5         PA, Aides of the President  7 9 5 4             
  6                 Ministry of Energy  3 5 6 2 3           
  7                    MEDT, Direction  7 5 8 9 6 3         
  8      PA, Advisors of the President  8 9 4 3 8 3 4       
  9         MFA, All-European Coop Dep  1 4 3 3 3 1 3 2     
 10                 MFA, EU Ambassador  2 3 3 1 2 1 3 2 7   
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  17 Jan 07 16:29:17 
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies 
Table 30: CEES matrix accumulated 
 
In Table 31, the dichotomized interaction values are shown. As this matrix is 
relatively easy to read, it is already conceivable that the two MFA actors are hardly linked 
to the rest of the network. This fact will become even more visible in the network graphic 
(see 9.3). 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                                          1 
                                        1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 
                                        P P P M P M M P M M 
                                        - - - - - - - - - - 
  1                          President                      
  2                      PA, Direction  1                   
  3          Prime Ministry, Direction  1 1                 
  4       MEDT, Dep Trade Policy&Negot  1 1 0               
  5         PA, Aides of the President  1 1 1 1             
  6                 Ministry of Energy  0 1 1 0 0           
  7                    MEDT, Direction  1 1 1 1 1 0         
  8      PA, Advisors of the President  1 1 1 0 1 0 1       
  9         MFA, All-European Coop Dep  0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0     
 10                 MFA, EU Ambassador  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1   
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  17 Jan 07 16:38:16 
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies 
Table 31: CEES matrix dichotomized 
 
The last CEES data set encompassed the categorised interaction values (Table 32). It will 
be used for visualisation purposes in subchapter 9.3.  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                                          1 
                                        1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 
                                        P P P M P M M P M M 
                                        - - - - - - - - - - 
  1                          President                      
  2                      PA, Direction  2                   
  3          Prime Ministry, Direction  2 2                 
  4       MEDT, Dep Trade Policy&Negot  1 1 0               
  5         PA, Aides of the President  2 2 1 1             
  6                 Ministry of Energy  0 1 1 0 0           
  7                    MEDT, Direction  2 1 2 2 1 0         
  8      PA, Advisors of the President  2 2 1 0 2 0 1       
  9         MFA, All-European Coop Dep  0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0     
 10                 MFA, EU Ambassador  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2   
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  17 Jan 07 16:45:53 
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies 
Table 32: CEES matrix categorised 
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What is the average activity of the CEES network members? As Table 33 illustrates the 
density amounts to 4.4889 (parameter 2a). This represents a medium level of interactivity 
given the possible range from 1 to 10.  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          1 
     ------ 
  1  4.4889 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  17 Jan 07 16:55:41 
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies 
Table 33: CEES density (parameter 2a) 
 
Similar to the density, the network degree centralisation does not show an extreme result. 
23.056% represents a rather low value (parameter 2b).  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Network Centralisation = 23.056% 
Heterogeneity = 10.73%.  Normalised = 0.81 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  17 Jan 07 16:58:32 
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies 
Table 34: CEES network degree centralisation (parameter 2b) 
 
What is the executive authority’s position within the CEES network? Table 35 displays 
the degree centrality ranking of the ten decision-makers. Obviously, the President and his 
head of Administration are situated at the top of the ranking and the Presidential Aides and 
Advisors follow on positions five and six (parameter 2c). 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                             1            2            3 
                                        Degree    NrmDegree        Share 
                                  ------------ ------------ ------------ 
  2                 PA, Direction       57.000      63.3333        0.141 
  1                     President       49.000      54.4444        0.121 
  3     Prime Ministry, Direction       48.000      53.3333        0.119 
  7               MEDT, Direction       48.000      53.3333        0.119 
  5    PA, Aides of the President       47.000      52.2222        0.116 
  8 PA, Advisors of the President       43.000      47.7778        0.106 
  4  MEDT, Dep Trade Policy&Negot       34.000      37.7778        0.084 
  6            Ministry of Energy       27.000      30.0000        0.067 
  9    MFA, All-European Coop Dep       27.000      30.0000        0.067 
 10            MFA, EU Ambassador       24.000      26.6667        0.059 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  17 Jan 07 17:04:34 
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies 
Table 35: Executive authority’s position within CEES network (parameter 2c) 
 
When studying Table 35, it can be noted that the two MEDT actors changed positions 
with regard to their influence ranking. Whereas the direction climbs from rank 7 to rank 4, 
the department for external economic affairs moves in the opposite way. Otherwise, the 
positions within the network can be considered as pretty stable. 
 
3. Network resources 
The resource dimension includes two parameters. The first one covers the quantity of 
information and other resources available within the network. It equals 63.33% (parameter 
3a) according to the maximum normalised degree centrality shown in Table 36. This 
represents a relatively weak value. Yet, it was reached only by the direction of the 
Presidential Administration. 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                         1            2            3 
                    Degree    NrmDegree        Share 
              ------------ ------------ ------------ 
  1     Mean        40.400      44.8889        0.000 
  2  Std Dev        10.883      12.0922        0.000 
  3      Sum       404.000     448.8889        0.000 
  4 Variance       118.440    1462.2222        0.000 
  5      SSQ     17506.000  216123.4500        0.000 
  6    MCSSQ      1184.400   14622.2219        0.000 
  7 Euc Norm       132.310     147.0114        0.000 
  8  Minimum        24.000      26.6667        0.000 
  9  Maximum        57.000      63.3333        0.000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  17 Jan 07 17:04:34 
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies 
Table 36: Quantity & distribution of resources within CEES network (parameter 3a+b) 
 
The second parameter is an indicator for the resource distribution within the policy 
network. It is calculated by expressing the spread between the minimum and maximum 
degree centralisation as a percentage of the maximum value. The Russian EU Ambassador 
evidently represents the bottom line with 26.6667%, thus the relative spectrum amounts to 
57.89% (parameter 3c). This signifies a considerable gap between the highest and lowest 
amount of resources within the policy network. 
 
4. Network power 
The last network dimension addresses the amount and allocation of power within the 
network. According to the methodological definition, these two aspects are measured by 
the actor’s closeness centrality values. Table 37 indicates the closeness ranking as well as 
its statistics. The highest number - 90% - is again attained by the direction of the 
Presidential Administration with (parameter 4a). 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                                   1            2 
                                             Farness   nCloseness 
                                        ------------ ------------ 
  2                      PA, Direction        10.000       90.000 
  1                          President        13.000       69.231 
  3          Prime Ministry, Direction        13.000       69.231 
  5         PA, Aides of the President        13.000       69.231 
  7                    MEDT, Direction        13.000       69.231 
  8      PA, Advisors of the President        14.000       64.286 
  4       MEDT, Dep Trade Policy&Negot        15.000       60.000 
  9         MFA, All-European Coop Dep        16.000       56.250 
  6                 Ministry of Energy        17.000       52.941 
 10                 MFA, EU Ambassador        24.000       37.500 
 
Statistics 
 
                         1            2 
                   Farness   nCloseness 
              ------------ ------------ 
  1     Mean        14.800       63.790 
  2  Std Dev         3.572       12.983 
  3      Sum       148.000      637.900 
  4 Variance        12.760      168.569 
  5      SSQ      2318.000    42377.328 
  6    MCSSQ       127.600     1685.694 
  7 Euc Norm        48.146      205.858 
  8  Minimum        10.000       37.500 
  9  Maximum        24.000       90.000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  17 Jan 07 17:12:56 
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies 
Table 37: Quantity & distribution of power within CEES network (parameter 4a+b) 
 
Equal to the resource dimension, the MFA Ambassador is located at the bottom of the list. 
His quantity of power 37.5% reflects his isolated position within the network. Between the 
maximum and the minimum amount of power, a relative spectrum of 58.33% can be 
calculated (parameter 4b). This value implies that the CEES network is not balanced in 
terms of power. Some actors have direct links to many other players while others are by 
and large separated. 
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Network type assessment 
Now as all CEES parameters have been determined and presented one-by-one, they shall 
be summarized. Table 38 recapitulates all the dimensions, parameters, values and their 
respective thresholds. How can these numbers be interpreted with reference to the 
theoretical network types? 
 
Dimension 
 
Parameter 
 
Value 
 
Threshold 
 
1. Membership    
a) Number of 
participants 
Number of involved 
network actors 
10 10 
b) Number of interests Number of involved 
actor’s categories 
2 3 
c) Types of interest Percentage of involved 
Presidential actors 
40.00% 33.33% 
2. Integration    
a) Frequency of 
interaction (information 
and resources) 
Network density 
 
4.4889 5 
b) Centralisation Overall network 
degree centralisation 
23.06% 50.00% 
c) Executive authority’s 
position 
Degree centrality 
ranking 
Ranks 1, 2, 5 and 6 At least two 
Presidential actors 
within top three 
3. Resources    
a) Quantity of 
information and 
resources within 
network 
Maximum normalised 
degree centrality 
63.33% 75.00% 
b) Distribution of 
information and 
resources within 
network 
Spread between max 
and min normalised 
degree centrality in 
percentage of the 
highest value 
57.89% 50.00% 
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Dimension 
 
Parameter 
 
Value 
 
Threshold 
 
4. Power    
a) Quantity of power 
within network 
Maximum normalised 
closeness centrality 
90% 75.00% 
b) Distribution of 
power within network 
Spread between 
maximum and 
minimum normalised 
closeness centrality in 
percentage of the 
highest value 
58.33% 50.00% 
Table 38: Aggregated CEES parameters 
 
Concerning membership, the CEES network appears at first glance rather like a policy 
community. A limited number of interests are controlled to a certain extent by Presidential 
actors. However, the number of actors lies exactly on the threshold between the two 
network types. A clear statement is therefore not possible. 
The same impression may be achieved by analysing the integration dimension. 
Whereas the density and centralisation values are located on the issue network side, the 
executive authority’s central position is characteristic of policy communities. 
Resources are scarce and unevenly distributed relative to the thresholds. This would 
situate the CEES network on the issue network side of the spectrum. However, the power 
facet again displays contradictory results. A comparatively high amount of available 
power is allocated quite unevenly. Hence, it is not possible to compare the CEES decision-
making structure with one of the pure network types. 
In conclusion, four out of ten parameters reflect a policy community-like structure, 
whereas five values are more typical for issue networks. Thus, the CEES pattern 
constitutes a hybrid form of policy network and has to be placed somewhere in between 
the two far ends of the spectrum. In fact, this finding is reminiscent to sub hypotheses C, 
that was formulated in subchapter 3.3. If a Russian foreign policy issue is addressed by the 
far abroad and economic subfields, a classic policy community or issue network according 
to theoretical assumptions cannot be expected. However, these suppositions have to be 
verified later on, when all four cases are contrasted in Chapter 11. 
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9.3 Resulting decision-making procedures and structures 
 
So far, it has been revealed how the CEES concept appeared, evolved and reached an 
intermediate stadium in the end of 2003. The policy network dimensions were also 
highlighted and determined. All these findings are considered together here. In this 
subchapter, the CEES policy network is visualised and interpreted. 
 
 
Figure 12: Common European Economic Space (CEES) resulting policy network 
 
The above-displayed resulting CEES decision-making structure illustrates basically a core, 
some attached actors and three single mavericks. At the very centre, the powerful 
Direction of the Presidential Administration acts as a hinge. It interacts with all actors 
apart from the MFA Ambassadors. The role of the Presidential Administration in this case 
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is generally underestimated. Even if it was not involved in the development of the CEES 
content on a technical level,282 it may have influenced decision-making by reviewing and 
adjusting briefing papers and other basic documents.283 Vladimir Putin is located right 
beside his Administration. He basically interacted with all other network members apart 
from the two MFA actors. In fact, the President himself was not immediately involved in 
creating the CEES on lower levels. However, he initiated the process, determined the 
strategic course and marked the cornerstones. 
The third most important actor in the policy network was the Prime Ministry 
Direction. This central position can only be explained with the central role of Deputy 
Viktor Khristenko and his crew. They did not only manage the interface between Moscow 
and the EU. They also coordinated all activities within the Russian government.284 
Thereby, it is noteworthy that the Prime Ministry didn’t interact directly with the 
appropriate MEDT department. A majority of the information and other resources were 
apparently vertically processed via the MEDT Direction. Over all, the deputy’s role may 
not be overrated. According to EU Commissioner Chris Patten, Viktor Khristenko is a 
‘nice guy, but he is completely dependent on Putin’.285  
The Direction of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade lies a bit further 
away from the network centre. German Gref and his deputies as well as their 
administration played an active role as mediators between the strategic and technical 
level.286 Also, the MEDT Direction is important due to the active role of Deputy Minister 
Maksim Medvedkov, who was responsible for WTO accession negotiations. Directly 
subordinate to the Direction is the highly important Department for Trade Policy and 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations. This actor actually delivered most of the expertise, 
negotiated sectoral agreements and submitted documents for the attention of the High 
                                                 
 
282  Expert interview, The European Commission’s Delegation to Russia, Political Section, Moscow: 
27.01.2006. 
283  Expert Interview, Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, Department for External 
Economic Affairs, Moscow: 16.02.2006. 
284  Expert Interview, Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, Department for External 
Economic Affairs, Moscow: 16.02.2006. 
285  Personal statement, Zurich: 29.06.2006. 
286  Expert Interview, Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, Department for External 
Economic Affairs, Moscow: 16.02.2006. 
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Level Group.287 The department was led by Elena Danilova, who had a strong impact on 
the CEES concept paper.288 
Obviously, the Presidential Aides and Advisors had leverage on the issue due to 
their direct link to Putin. In particular, Andrej Illarionov (economic matters), Viktor 
Ivanov (national projects)289 and during the end phase Igor Shuvalov (EU matters)290 both 
were influential. In contrast, it is not entirely clear to what extent the Ministry of Energy 
influenced the CEES decision. It can only be speculated that Minister Igor Jusufov and his 
apparat negotiated hard within the framework of the EU-Russian energy dialogue, which 
inter alia influenced the CEES concept. Brussels has for several reasons a strong interest 
in Russian energy market reforms, whereas Moscow is unwilling to implement major 
changes.291 
At the network’s periphery, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is represented by two 
not very powerful actors. Even if the MFA was basically included in all discussions, it 
only had a limited share in CEES decision-making. Whereas the All-European 
Cooperation Department technically followed the issue, the permanent mission of Russia 
to the EU in Brussels under Ambassador Vasili Likhachev acted as a local facilitator.292 
 
                                                 
 
287  Expert interview, Independent Analyst, Moscow: 29.04.2005. 
288  Expert interview, The European Commission’s Delegation to Russia, Economics and Trade Section, 
Moscow: 17.05.2005. 
289  Expert interview, The European Commission’s Delegation to Russia, Political Section, Moscow: 
27.01.2006. 
290  Expert interview, Independent Analyst, Moscow: 29.04.2005. 
291  See Grant and Barysch (2003). 
292  Expert Interview, European Commission, Bilateral trade relations with the Russian Federation, Brussels: 
30.10.2006. 
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10. Single Economic Space (SES) 
 
The fourth and last case study covers the development of the Single Economic Space 
(SES) between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. This project was initiated at the 
beginning of 2003 and aimed at further integrating the four economies according to the 
EU model. Basically, the four CIS members decided to form a free trade area, to 
harmonize regulatory standards and to liberalize the movement of production factors. The 
decision-making process ended in May 2004, when the framework agreements entered 
into force. 
This chapter is arranged in the same format as the previous three sections. At the 
outset, the issue and its events are presented as a general synopsis (subchapter 10.1). This 
process-oriented examination uncovers the cornerstones of a delicate decision. In 
subchapter 10.2, the SES policy network dimensions and their parameters will be 
presented. Based on these results, it shall be determined whether the decision-making 
structure reflects a policy community, an issue network or a mixed form. Finally, 
subchapter 10.3 visualises and discusses the policy network. The complex relationship 
patterns shall be interpreted and explained. 
 
 
10.1 The issue and its events 
 
In contrast to the previous three cases, the creation of the SES is marked by a more blurred 
decision-making process. Particularly, the initiation phase as well as the end point are not 
completely intelligible. This may be explained by two factors: firstly, Russian decision-
making with regard to near abroad issues lacks transparency. In addition to the general 
secrecy of foreign policy-formulation, events by and large take place backstage. Secondly, 
the establishment of the single integrated economic block gradually became a politicised 
venture. Instead of adopting a pure economic-related orientation, the four founding states 
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ended up once again in a highly emotional debate over national, strategic interests. This 
fact contributed to an additional obliteration and confusion of the decision-making 
process. 
Nevertheless, the main cornerstones of the process were visible enough to provide 
an idea about the genesis of the project. The following three paragraphs shall trace the 
appearance, the evolution and the decision of the issue. 
 
Appearance of the issue 
The initial idea of the SES can be backtracked to an informal CIS summit in Kiev in late 
January 2003. On that occasion, the head of states discussed several options to revitalize 
the Commonwealth by focussing on economic approaches. Yet, the SES as such was not 
mentioned at all.293 It took another month until the Presidents of the Russian Federation, 
Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus met in Moscow. On February 23rd, they signed a short 
declaration, that stipulated the creation of a single economic space between the four 
biggest Eurasian economies. As a new stage of integration among CIS-members, they set 
the target to ultimately form a new regional organisation. Simultaneously, they decided to 
consign a High Level Group to work out the framework agreements.294 
The declaration of the four Presidents constituted a highly unexpected 
announcement. Policy-makers as well as experts in the field were completely surprised by 
the initiative, which literally came out of the blue. Even the acting Ukrainian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs Boris Tarasyuk came to know about the project from mass media.295 
Apparently, the idea had been born within Putin’s closed Presidential circle without any 
expert analysis or public discussion.296 
                                                 
 
293  T. Kuzio ‘Ukrainian President revamps CIS, obtains Russia’s backing for 2004 elections’, Radio Free 
Europe / Radio Liberty, 27.02.2003. 
294  Zajavlenie Prezidentov Respubliki Belarus, Respubliki Kazakhstan, Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Ukrainy, 
23.02.2003. 
295  Zerkalo Nedeli, No. 15, Kiev: 23.04-06.05.2005. 
296  See Glinkina and Kosikova (2006: 7). 
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In fact, it is unclear who came up with the initiative first. According to one version, it was 
the Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, who was personally interested in SES.297 In the 
run-up to the Presidential elections, his position on the domestic front by and large 
depended by and large on Russia’s support. His own political survival could only be 
assured with the help of a closer alliance with Putin.298 Additionally, it may be assumed 
that large Ukrainian business sectors could profit from a SES.299  
The second version tells a different story. It assumes that the idea was brought up by 
Putin and his administration.300 Actually, several reasons may be identified to back up this 
account. First and foremost, the Russian President made many efforts to bring the SES 
into being. He continuously and personally pushed the initiative.301 But also, Russia 
intended to make a symmetric Eurasian response to the EU eastern enlargement, which 
was decided in April 2003. Apparently, the CEES initiative of the EU Commission did not 
fully compensate for the isolation felt by Moscow. Further more, the SES project reflected 
another Russian attempt to involve Ukraine in Eurasian integration processes.302 The fact 
that Kiev continuously rejected to join EurAsEC never evoked sympathy in Moscow. 
After all, Ukraine made up 35.1% of the trade relations with Russia within the CIS space. 
Last but not least, Moscow had good economic reasons to establish a ‘union of the big 
four’.303 
 
Evolution of the issue 
Two weeks after the Presidential meeting in Moscow, the Russian and Ukrainian Prime 
Ministers Kasjanov and Yanukovich held bilateral talks in Kiev. Thereby, they addressed 
various questions about the SES. In particular, the composition of the High Level Group 
                                                 
 
297  Expert interview, Institute CIS countries, Moscow: 15.02.2006. 
298  L. Kosikova ‘EEP: Byt ili ne byt’, Nezavisimaja Gazeta Dipkurer, 27.02.2006. 
299  See Glinkina and Kosikova (2006: 19). 
300  Expert interview, Committee Russia in the United Europe, Moscow, 17.02.2006. 
301  Expert interview, Fonda Politika, Moscow: 01.07.2005. 
302  See Glinkina and Kosikova (2006: 5-6). 
303  Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Departament Informatsii i pechati, ‘Torgovo-
ekonomicheskie otnoshenija RF so stranami-uchastnikami SNG’, 28.01.2003. 
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was an urgent task given the Presidential deadline to present the basic documents in 
September.304 In this group, the Russian side was represented by Deputy Prime Minister 
Viktor Khristenko, two deputy Ministers for Economic Development and Trade Dmitri 
Sukhoparov and Maksim Medvedkov as well as other officials from various Ministries 
and authorities. 
The first session of the High Level Group took place in Kiev on March 5th 2003. The 
representatives thereby addressed organisational and procedural questions and set up a 
working plan. It was envisaged to draft a blueprint of the SES concept at the end of 
March.305 Henceforth, the High Level Group gathered another seven times by September 
2003. Its work was supported by technical expertise that was provided by seven different 
working groups. 
Officially these working groups were subordinate to the quadripartite High Level 
Group.306 Yet, it is obvious that Moscow provided most of the experts. It goes without 
saying that the Russian Government profited from the foregoing conceptualization of the 
CEES. Thanks to this cooperation project with the EU, Moscow had accumulated 
considerable know how and experience with regard to common economic zones according 
to WTO regulations.307 Hence, except the participation of the four Foreign Ministries, the 
working groups by and large included specialists from the Russian governmental and 
scientific spheres. They were coordinated and organised by MEDT head Gref and his 
deputy Sukhoparov and addressed the following seven sectors: customs, subsidies and 
competition, technical questions, finance, banks, taxes and capital, services, investments 
and labour.308 
                                                 
 
304  ‘PM says Russia-Ukraine economic space to boost integration’, Prime-TASS, 07.03.2003 (ISI database, 
20.05.2005). 
305  ‘Ukrainian premier meets top-level delegation on CIS free trade zone’, UNIAN / BBC Monitoring, 
06.03.2003 (ISI database, 20.05.2005). 
306  ‘Spravochnyi material po Edinomu ekonomicheskomu prostranstvu Respubliki Belorussija, Respubliki 
Kazakhstan, RF I Ukrainy’, MERT, 27.06.2005. 
307  Expert interview, Independent analyst, Moscow: 29.04.2005. 
308  Expert interview, MEDT Department for external economic policy, Moscow: 27.06.2005. 
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On August 11th 2003, the experts endorsed the three basic documents –the agreement, the 
concept and the implementation plan of the SES.309 Only four days later, they were 
approved by the High Level Group in Almaty. According to the MEDT, the pace of the 
process at that stage reflected the successful coordination among different Ministries. 
Allegedly, the technical workings were additionally supported by the Russian Union of 
Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and by the Russian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry.310 
 
Decision on the issue 
During the first part of September 2003, the four Presidents interacted with each other 
mainly on a personal and bilateral basis. Seemingly, these contacts at the highest level 
were necessary in order to sort out the last differences on the common concept. Only the 
day before the CIS meeting in Jalta had a consensus been reached.311 On September 19th, 
2003, Putin, Kuchma, Nazarbaev and Lukashenko ceremonially signed the agreement on 
the SES that also contained the other two main documents. 
As the SES agreement was subject to ratification, it had to be passed on to the 
national parliaments. On January 15th, 2004, the Russian Government approved the 
integration project and handed the issue over to the Federal Assembly. The Duma and the 
Federation Council then ratified the agreement on April 20th and 21st, 2004. Finally on 
May 20th, the SES officially entered into force.312 However, the integration project had so 
far been a more of a theoretic construct. It now had to be implemented by creating a 
package of not less than 90 international treaties, which were supposed to contain concrete 
regulations and measures. 
                                                 
 
309  ‘Eksperty Ukrainy, RF, Kazakhstana I Belorussii utverdjat rjad dokumentov dlja sozdanija edinovo 
ekonomicheskovo prostranstva’, RIA Novosti, 11.08.2003. 
310  Expert interview, MEDT Department for external economic policy, Moscow: 27.06.2005. 
311  ‘Russia’s Foreign Policy’, RIA Oreanda, 20.09.2003 (ISI database, 18.05.2005). 
312  ‘Spravochnyi material po Edinomu ekonomicheskomu prostranstvu Respubliki Belorussija, Respubliki 
Kazakhstan, RF I Ukrainy’, MERT, 27.06.2005. 
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10.2 Policy network parameters 
 
The last section viewed the decision-making events in a process-related perspective. In 
contrast, this subchapter draws attention to structural aspects. According to the 
methodological procedures, the SES policy network shall be reconstructed and 
quantitatively analysed. All four network dimensions are determined by calculating the 
appropriate parameters. At the end of this subchapter, all parameters are aggregated and 
assessed in the context of the theoretical policy network typology. 
 
1. Network membership 
Which domain actors are part of the SES policy network? According to the average expert 
assessments shown in Table 39, 19 players achieved an influence rating greater than 2.75 
(parameter 1a). They are considered as SES network members and therefore need to be 
examined more closely.  
 
Position Actors 
Average 
influence 
ratings 
1 Presidential actor President  4 
2 Governmental actor Prime Ministry Direction 3.8 
3 Governmental actor Ministry of Economic 
Development & Trade 
(MEDT) 
Direction 3.7 
4 Governmental actor Prime Ministry Governmental Administration 
(Dep Int Coop) 
3.6875 
5 Economic actor Energy Sector Gazprom 3.6 
6 Presidential actor Presidential Administration Direction 3.5 
7 Governmental actor Ministry of Economic 
Development & Trade 
(MEDT) 
Department for Multilateral 
Cooperation with CIS 
Countries 
3.5 
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8 Economic actor Energy Sector RAO UES 3.5 
9 Parliamentary actor State Duma Duma Council 3.33333 
10 Presidential actor Presidential Administration Aides of the President 3.25 
11 Governmental actor Prime Ministry Governmental Administration 
(Direction) 
3.25 
12 Governmental actor Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) 
1st CIS Department (General 
Cooperation) 
3.25 
13 Parliamentary actor State Duma Committee for CIS 
Cooperation 
3.25 
14 Governmental actor Prime Ministry Governmental Administration 
(Dep Finance) 
3.125 
15 Economic actor Energy Sector Lukoil 3.125 
16 Governmental actor Мinstry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) 
Ambassadors (Kaz/Bel/Ukr) 3 
17 Parliamentary actor Federal Council Chair 3 
18 Governmental actor Other Federal Ministries Ministry of Finance 2.875 
19 Parliamentary actor State Duma Committee for International 
Affairs 
2.75 
Table 39: SES network members (parameter 1a-c) 
 
The first position of the President (4) is not astonishing given the above-described regular 
and personal interventions. It is curious that only 15.79% of the SES policy network is 
presidentially coloured (parameter 1c). Accordingly, the top of the ranking is dominated 
by governmental actors. The Prime Ministry direction (3.8) is closely followed by the 
Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (3.7) and the Governmental Administration 
(3.6875). Seemingly, these actors played a coordinating role with regard to the SES 
establishment. 
At position five, Gazprom ranks as the first non-Presidential, non-Governmental 
decision-maker. It is not surprising that the energy giant is assessed as highly influential 
(3.6), because it has massive stakes in these three former Soviet Republics. Gazprom is 
not the only network member representing the economic sphere. The creation of the 
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common economic space involved additionally RAO UES (rank 8, 3.5) and Lukoil (rank 
15, 3.125). 
Another feature of the average influence ranking catches the eye. Compared to 
previous cases, the SES policy network involves four parliamentary actors. The Duma 
Council (position 9), the Duma Committee for CIS Cooperation (rank 13), the Federation 
Council Chair (position 17) and the Duma Committee for International Affairs (rank 19). 
Obviously, the ranking accurately reflects the fact that the constituting documents of the 
SES had to be ratified by the Federal Assembly. Therefore, the SES policy network 
involves four interest categories (parameter 1b). 
The last remark concerns the Prime Ministry. Seemingly, the subordinated 
Governmental Administration was influential given the fact that it is listed not less than 
three times. The involvement of the Direction (rank 11), the Department of International 
Cooperation (position 4) and the Department of Finance (position 14) probably reflect the 
important coordination role of the Prime Ministry and particularly of vice-Prime Minister 
Khristenko. 
Table 40 displays the next ten positions encompassing influential non-network 
members. When considering this list, two facts stand out.  
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Position Actors 
Average 
influence 
ratings 
20 Presidential actor Security Council Direction 2.66667 
21 Parliamentary actor State Duma Administration 2.66667 
22 Economic actor Energy Sector Yukos 2.66667 
23 Governmental actor Мinstry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) 
Direction 2.625 
24 Governmental actor Other Federal Ministries Ministry of Industry, 
Science & Technology 
2.625 
25 Governmental actor Мinstry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) 
2nd CIS Dep (Bel, Mol, 
Ukr) 
2.5 
26 Governmental actor Мinstry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) 
3rd CIS Dep (Central Asia) 2.5 
27 Governmental actor Other Federal Ministries Ministry of Justice 2.5 
28 Governmental actor Ministry of Economic 
Development & Trade 
(MEDT) 
Department for Trade 
Policy and Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations 
2.5 
29 Economic actor Industrial sector (Steel)  2.5 
Table 40: SES additional actors 
 
First, it is noteworthy that Yukos obviously had some weight in SES decision-making. 
However, it has to be assumed that this influence suddenly shrank at an early stage of the 
process, since the energy corporation started to fall apart after Khodorkovsky’s arrest on 
October 25th 2003. Second, the MFA Direction is listed only at position 23. This is 
astonishing, because this actor would be expected to find access to the enlarged policy 
network of 19 members. 
After the identification of the network population, the focus shall be turned towards 
the relationships among decision-makers. The next paragraph presents the interaction 
matrices and transforms them for various purposes. 
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2. Network integration 
The first data set is presented in Table 41. It opposes the 19 network members and 
displays the accumulated expert ratings, which indicate the frequency and intensity of the 
interactions. This matrix will be used for parameter calculations. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                                   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
                                 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
                                 P P M G G P M R D P G M D G L M F M D 
                                 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
  1                   President                                        
  2   Prime Ministry, Direction  9                                     
  3             MEDT, Direction  6 7                                   
  4     Gov Admin, Dep Int Coop  3 7 4                                 
  5                     Gazprom  6 5 5 3                               
  6               PA, Direction  8 9 5 5 4                             
  7 MEDT, Dep Mulitlat CIS Coop  1 6 9 7 3 3                           
  8                     RAO UES  3 4 3 2 6 7 3                         
  9               Duma, Council  4 4 2 2 5 5 3 4                       
 10  PA, Aides of the President  8 9 5 5 5 7 4 5 2                     
 11        Gov Admin, Direction  5 8 3 6 5 4 7 3 4 3                   
 12            MFA, 1st CIS Dep  6 4 7 6 3 3 8 2 4 6 6                 
 13        Duma, Cttee CIS Coop  1 1 2 2 1 1 5 1 4 2 4 6               
 14      Gov Admin, Dep Finance  2 2 4 4 2 3 6 2 3 3 5 6 2             
 15                      Lukoil  3 5 3 3 5 5 3 4 3 4 3 3 1 1           
 16            MFA, Ambassadors  2 3 4 2 3 3 4 1 2 1 2 9 3 1 3         
 17   Federation Council, Chair  3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 2 2 2 3 1 2 1       
 18         Ministry of Finance  4 5 8 4 4 4 6 3 2 3 4 4 2 4 3 2 2     
 19     Duma, Cttee Int Affairs  2 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 3 0 0 3 5 0 1 0 2 0   
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Running time:  00:00:01 
Output generated:  19 Jan 07 10:33:10 
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies 
Table 41: SES matrix accumulated 
 
Based on the accumulated matrix, the next data set (Table 42) shows the dichotomized 
values. It is easily readable because interactions are either existent (1) or not (0). This 
matrix will especially be used for closeness centrality computations. 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                                   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
                                 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
                                 P P M G G P M R D P G M D G L M F M D 
                                 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
  1                   President                                        
  2   Prime Ministry, Direction  1                                     
  3             MEDT, Direction  1 1                                   
  4     Gov Admin, Dep Int Coop  0 1 1                                 
  5                     Gazprom  1 1 1 0                               
  6               PA, Direction  1 1 1 1 1                             
  7 MEDT, Dep Mulitlat CIS Coop  0 1 1 1 0 0                           
  8                     RAO UES  0 1 0 0 1 1 0                         
  9               Duma, Council  1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1                       
 10  PA, Aides of the President  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0                     
 11        Gov Admin, Direction  1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0                   
 12            MFA, 1st CIS Dep  1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1                 
 13        Duma, Cttee CIS Coop  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1               
 14      Gov Admin, Dep Finance  0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0             
 15                      Lukoil  0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0           
 16            MFA, Ambassadors  0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0         
 17   Federation Council, Chair  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0       
 18         Ministry of Finance  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0     
 19     Duma, Cttee Int Affairs  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0   
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Table 42: SES matrix dichotomized 
 
Last but not least, Table 43 provides the categorised data that will be required for the 
depiction of the network graphs. Similar to the previous case studies, the content of these 
data sets will only be discussed in subchapter 10.3. 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                                   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
                                 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
                                 P P M G G P M R D P G M D G L M F M D 
                                 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
  1                   President                                        
  2   Prime Ministry, Direction  2                                     
  3             MEDT, Direction  1 2                                   
  4     Gov Admin, Dep Int Coop  0 2 1                                 
  5                     Gazprom  1 1 1 0                               
  6               PA, Direction  2 2 1 1 1                             
  7 MEDT, Dep Mulitlat CIS Coop  0 1 2 2 0 0                           
  8                     RAO UES  0 1 0 0 1 2 0                         
  9               Duma, Council  1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1                       
 10  PA, Aides of the President  2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 0                     
 11        Gov Admin, Direction  1 2 0 1 1 1 2 0 1 0                   
 12            MFA, 1st CIS Dep  1 1 2 1 0 0 2 0 1 1 1                 
 13        Duma, Cttee CIS Coop  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1               
 14      Gov Admin, Dep Finance  0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0             
 15                      Lukoil  0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0           
 16            MFA, Ambassadors  0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0         
 17   Federation Council, Chair  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0       
 18         Ministry of Finance  1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0     
 19     Duma, Cttee Int Affairs  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0   
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Table 43: SES matrix categorised 
 
At this stage, all matrices are ready to use for parameter computations. The first UCINET 
operation calculates the SES network density based on the accumulated data (Table 44). 
The value 3.5614 is rather weak (parameter 2a). It implies that the level of interaction 
within the network was generally low relative to the maximum of 10 and the minimum of 
0. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          1 
     ------ 
  1  3.5614 
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Table 44: SES density (parameter 2a) 
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Also, the network degree centralisation of 16.699% is very moderate (parameter 2b). It 
signifies that the network spreads out without having a clearly conceivable epicentre. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Network Centralisation = 16.699% 
Heterogeneity = 5.66%.  Normalised = 0.42 
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Table 45: SES network degree centralisation (parameter 2b) 
 
Accordingly, the determination of the executive authority’s position within the network 
looses significance. Nevertheless, UCINET software is able to calculate and present a 
hierarchy based on the degree centrality values (Table 46). Thereby, Presidential actors are 
located on ranks 5, 6 and 8 (parameter 2c). 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                            1            2            3 
                                       Degree    NrmDegree        Share 
                                 ------------ ------------ ------------ 
  2   Prime Ministry, Direction        91.000      50.5556        0.075 
 12            MFA, 1st CIS Dep        88.000      48.8889        0.072 
  7 MEDT, Dep Mulitlat CIS Coop        83.000      46.1111        0.068 
  3             MEDT, Direction        80.000      44.4444        0.066 
  6               PA, Direction        78.000      43.3333        0.064 
  1                   President        76.000      42.2222        0.062 
 11        Gov Admin, Direction        74.000      41.1111        0.061 
 10  PA, Aides of the President        74.000      41.1111        0.061 
  4     Gov Admin, Dep Int Coop        68.000      37.7778        0.056 
  5                     Gazprom        67.000      37.2222        0.055 
 18         Ministry of Finance        64.000      35.5556        0.053 
  9               Duma, Council        60.000      33.3333        0.049 
  8                     RAO UES        56.000      31.1111        0.046 
 15                      Lukoil        55.000      30.5556        0.045 
 14      Gov Admin, Dep Finance        51.000      28.3333        0.042 
 13        Duma, Cttee CIS Coop        46.000      25.5556        0.038 
 16            MFA, Ambassadors        46.000      25.5556        0.038 
 17   Federation Council, Chair        40.000      22.2222        0.033 
 19     Duma, Cttee Int Affairs        21.000      11.6667        0.017 
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Table 46: Executive authority’s position within SES network (parameter 2c) 
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Concerning Table 46, two surprising appearances have to be mentioned. It is striking that 
the President obviously was not very central in terms of his interactions. Compared to the 
influence ranking, he lost six positions. On the contrary, it is amazing that two technical 
Departments are situated at the top of the list. Apparently, the CIS Departments of the 
MFA and MEDT had a significant influence on the development of the SES concept. 
 
3. Network resources 
Whereas the last section focused specifically on relationships between actors, this 
paragraph analyses the amount and distribution of resources within the network in terms 
of social capital. As shown in Table 47, the maximum achieved level of resources 
amounts to 50.55% (parameter 3a). Indeed, this value may be considered as modest in 
light of the maximum of 100%. It demonstrates a relative low quantity of available 
information and other resources. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                         1            2            3 
                    Degree    NrmDegree        Share 
              ------------ ------------ ------------ 
  1     Mean        64.105      35.6140        0.000 
  2  Std Dev        17.607       9.7814        0.000 
  3      Sum      1218.000     676.6667        0.000 
  4 Variance       309.989     956.7560        0.000 
  5      SSQ     83970.000  259166.6750        0.000 
  6    MCSSQ      5889.790   18178.3625        0.000 
  7 Euc Norm       289.776     160.9865        0.000 
  8  Minimum        21.000      11.6667        0.000 
  9  Maximum        91.000      50.5556        0.000 
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Table 47: Quantity & distribution of resources within SES network (parameter 3a+b) 
 
Additionally, it seems that resources are unequally distributed within the SES policy 
network. The relative spectrum spans over 76.92%, which represents a high value. The 
next paragraph will perform the same kinds of calculations in terms of the power 
dimension.
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4. Network power 
This network dimension is measured and assessed by the closeness centrality numbers. 
They are calculated for every actor and hierarchically arranged in Table 48. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                            1            2 
                                      Farness   nCloseness 
                                 ------------ ------------ 
 12            MFA, 1st CIS Dep        24.000       75.000 
  2   Prime Ministry, Direction        24.000       75.000 
 11        Gov Admin, Direction        25.000       72.000 
  6               PA, Direction        26.000       69.231 
  5                     Gazprom        27.000       66.667 
  3             MEDT, Direction        27.000       66.667 
  9               Duma, Council        27.000       66.667 
  7 MEDT, Dep Mulitlat CIS Coop        27.000       66.667 
 10  PA, Aides of the President        28.000       64.286 
 18         Ministry of Finance        28.000       64.286 
  1                   President        28.000       64.286 
  4     Gov Admin, Dep Int Coop        29.000       62.069 
 13        Duma, Cttee CIS Coop        32.000       56.250 
  8                     RAO UES        33.000       54.545 
 14      Gov Admin, Dep Finance        34.000       52.941 
 15                      Lukoil        37.000       48.649 
 16            MFA, Ambassadors        37.000       48.649 
 17   Federation Council, Chair        44.000       40.909 
 19     Duma, Cttee Int Affairs        49.000       36.735 
 
 
Statistics 
 
                         1            2 
                   Farness   nCloseness 
              ------------ ------------ 
  1     Mean        30.842       60.605 
  2  Std Dev         6.619       10.678 
  3      Sum       586.000     1151.501 
  4 Variance        43.817      114.026 
  5      SSQ     18906.000    71953.602 
  6    MCSSQ       832.526     2166.490 
  7 Euc Norm       137.499      268.242 
  8  Minimum        24.000       36.735 
  9  Maximum        49.000       75.000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table 48: Quantity & distribution of power within SES network (parameter 4a+b) 
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The level of power within the SES network is relatively high, as the normalised closeness 
centrality of the MFA’s CIS Department equals 75% (parameter 4a). It is quite surprising 
that this administrational unit seemingly possesses the most direct channels to other 
network members. Yet, this result may reflect the far-reaching technical nature of the 
issue. 
With regard to the power distribution, the result is not very telling. The relative 
power variation spectrum amounts to 51.02% (parameter 4b). This indicates that power 
within the SES network can neither be perceived as balanced, nor as un-balanced. 
 
Network type assessment 
In the last paragraph of this subchapter, the results shall be summarized. After all, the 
determination of parameters would not make any sense without a judgment in the context 
of network types. Table 49 aggregates all ten parameters and confronts them with their 
appropriate thresholds. 
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Dimension 
 
Parameter 
 
Value 
 
Threshold 
 
1. Membership    
a) Number of 
participants 
Number of involved 
network actors 
19 10 
b) Number of interests Number of involved 
actor’s categories 
4 3 
c) Types of interest Percentage of involved 
Presidential actors 
15.79% 33.33% 
2. Integration    
a) Frequency of 
interaction (information 
and resources) 
Network density 
 
3.5614 5 
b) Centralisation Overall network 
degree centralisation 
16.69% 50.00% 
c) Executive authority’s 
position 
Degree centrality 
ranking 
Ranks 5, 6 and 8 At least two 
Presidential actors 
within top three 
3. Resources    
a) Quantity of 
information and 
resources within 
network 
Maximum normalised 
degree centrality 
50.56% 75.00% 
b) Distribution of 
information and 
resources within 
network 
Spread between max 
and min normalised 
degree centrality in 
percentage of the 
highest value 
76.92% 50.00% 
4. Power    
a) Quantity of power 
within network 
Maximum normalised 
closeness centrality 
75.00% 75.00% 
b) Distribution of 
power within network 
Spread between 
maximum and 
minimum normalised 
closeness centrality in 
percentage of the 
highest value 
51.02% 50.00% 
Table 49: Aggregated SES parameters 
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Concerning the membership dimension, all three parameters are located on the issue 
network side. The comparatively high number of actors and interests reflect this network 
type as well as the low involvement of Presidential actors. 
Similarly, the integration dimension is shaped as an issue network. Compared to the 
according thresholds, the SES decision-making structure has relatively low density and 
centralisation values. Also, the executive authority is not at all represented within the top 
three on the centrality ranking. 
The resource dimension of the SES network shows the typical features of an issue 
network as well. Resources are limited and unevenly distributed. However, the power 
facet cannot be clearly determined with reference to the network archetypes. Whereas the 
quantity of power lies exactly on the defined threshold, the distribution parameter shows 
only a minor trend towards the issue network side. 
In sum, nine of ten parameters cause the SES decision-making pattern to appear as 
an issue network. Even if the power dimension delivers ambiguous results, a general trend 
is clearly identifiable. Therefore, it may be assumed that the creation process of the 
economic space between Moscow, Minsk, Astana and Kiev was shaped on the Russian 
side mainly by an issue network. It is characterised by a large number of decentralised and 
weakly interlinked actors, who deal with a high number of interests with limited and 
unevenly distributed resources and powers. Actually, this finding stands in line with the 
hypotheses formulated in Chapter 3 of the present study. If an issue is addressed primarily 
by the near abroad and economic subfields, the policy network is likely to take the shape 
of an issue network. Yet, this postulation has to be examined more in-depth. The testing of 
the hypotheses will be carried out only in Chapter 11. 
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10.3 Resulting decision-making procedures and structures 
 
The preceding two subchapters have traced the SES decision-making process and 
determined the policy network dimensions. They both gave an idea about the network of 
actors, which initiated and advanced the issue. These quantitative findings are interpreted 
in this section. 
When examining the resulting decision-making structure as displayed in the graphic 
below, two features immediately catch the eyes: the SES policy network is large in size 
and has numerous peripheral actors. This characterises issue networks consisting of near 
abroad and economic subfields. 
 
 
Figure 13: Single Economic Space (SES) resulting policy network 
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The Direction of the Prime Ministry is placed in the core of the policy network. This 
makes sense as the deputy Prime Minister Viktor Khristenko and his entourage 
coordinated the SES decision-making process. Coherently, this actor interacted most 
frequently and intensively with other network members. The central position of its 
immediate network neighbour, the first CIS Department of the MFA, is perhaps surprising 
at first glance. However, the important role of this actor can be explained by its strong 
presence within all working groups.313 The locations of the two MEDT actors within the 
network are fully comprehensible. The technical development of the SES agreement, the 
concept and the implementation plan has been lead-managed by the MEDT Direction and 
the subordinate Department for Multilateral Cooperation with CIS countries.314 
Despite Putin’s personal commitment, the Presidential actors have been rated and 
placed slightly outside of the network centre. This finding may be contended, but it also 
reveals an essential point of decision-making. The Presidential impact is less perceived if 
the issue is addressed for a relatively long period of time on lower administrational levels. 
The more technical knowledge an issue requires, the more important is the role of 
governmental actors. Against this background, it is not astonishing that the President, his 
Administration Direction and his aides aren’t located in the very centre of the decision-
making structure. 
Obviously, the Governmental Administration was also considerably involved in 
policy-making. In particular, it seems as if the Department of International Cooperation 
under Tatjana Volovaja played an important coordinating role due to strong ties to the 
Prime Ministry Direction and to the MEDT Department.315  
The three economic actors are all located at the periphery of the network. 
Nevertheless, they had an impact on the establishment of the SES.316 On the one hand, 
they acted as strong lobbyists. On the other hand, Gazprom and RAO UES, in particular, 
contributed technical expertise for the composition of specific documents. The 
                                                 
 
313  Expert interview, MEDT Department for external economic policy, Moscow: 27.06.2005. 
314  Expert interview, MEDT Department for external economic policy, Moscow: 27.06.2005. 
315  Expert interview, Ukrainian Government, Kiev: 21.02.2006. 
316  Expert interview, Russia’s Institute for Strategic Studies, Moscow: 20.02.2006. 
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involvement of Russian business actors is not surprising, given the remarkable stakes of 
Russian firms in the Ukraine.317 They all had a particular interest in market liberalization 
within the framework of the SES. It is striking that Gazprom is highly interlinked within 
the policy network, which makes the energy giant very powerful. Of course, other 
business actors like the industrial sector have been interested in the SES, but they didn’t 
have access to decision-making.318 
With regard to the MFA Ambassadors, it turned out that the Russian Ambassador in 
Kiev, former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin played an essential role. Even with only few 
ties to other network members, he managed to defend the SES idea on the spot in Kiev 
and pass on information to Moscow.319 The impact of the Ministry of Finance is less clear. 
Yet, considering the expert ratings and statements of a well informed source, Minister 
Kudrin and his crew were also involved in SES decision-making.320 
Last but not least, the graphic shows the parliamentary actors on the outer edge of 
the policy network. As the SES documents had to be ratified, the Federal Assembly was 
highly interested in the issue.321 Moreover, numerous representatives and senators also 
have at least emotional bindings to Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus.  
 
                                                 
 
317  Expert interview, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow: 19.05.2005. 
318  Expert interview, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Moscow: 05.05.2005. 
319  Expert interview, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 29.03.2005. 
320  Expert interview, Ministry of Energy, Department for International Cooperation, Moscow: 22.02.2006. 
321  Expert interview, Committee Russia in the United Europe, Moscow, 17.02.2006. 
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Summary 
 
This part constitutes the core of the present study. It analyses the four case studies with 
regard to procedural and structural aspects of foreign policy-making. Thereby, all four 
issues are examined and evaluated in the same way. The initial subchapters track the 
decision-making processes and explain events and actors’ behaviours in a chronological 
order. Thereafter, the four policy network dimensions - membership, integration, 
resources and power - are determined. The computations of the ten specific parameters 
ultimately allow classifying the policy networks according to Rhodes and Marsh’s (1992) 
typology. The final subchapters present the resulting visualised policy networks and 
interpret the empirical findings. 
With regard to the creation of the NRC, Moscow acted passively for a long time 
until the issue became concrete prior to a bilateral U.S.-Russian deal. On the Russian side, 
the decision was made by a relatively small, tight, resource rich, centralised and powerful 
network of actors that was by and large controlled by the executive authority. Hence, the 
NRC network clearly represented a policy community.  
In contrast to the NRC case, the CSTO and the CEES issues have engendered rather 
contradictory results. A restricted number of powerful actors obviously did not interact 
frequently and intensively with each other. Therefore, these cases reflect hybrid policy 
network types. Process-wise, the CEES case was clearly EU driven, whereas the impetus 
to establish the CSTO was provided predominantly by Moscow. 
Finally, the analysis of the SES decision again yielded clear empirical results. A 
large number of relatively weak actors from diverse spheres interacted rather sporadically. 
These findings perfectly match with the issue network characteristics defined by Rhodes 
and Marsh. The SES issue was by and large propelled by Russian foreign policy-makers. 
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Part IV. RESULTING INSIGHTS 
 
So far, the present study has developed a theoretical and methodological framework (Part 
I) and determined the contextual background (Part II) in order to analyse four different 
cases of Russian foreign policy-making (Part III). Moscow’s decisions concerning the 
NATO-Russia Council, the Common European Economic Space, the Collective Security 
Treaty Organisation and the Single Economic Space have been examined in terms of 
structures and processes. The last part of the present study closes the research cycle by 
raising the following question: to what extent do decision-making networks vary and fit 
into a greater structural and procedural setting of Russian foreign policy-making? The 
subsequent chapters aggregate and texture empirical findings in order to derive resulting 
insights. In so doing, they do not only string together outcomes of the previous sections, 
but attach particular importance to policy-relevant consequences. 
The present part consists of three chapters, which draw the present study to a close. 
In Chapter 11, the four policy networks analysed in Part III will be contrasted. Procedural 
and structural aspects will be highlighted in a comparative perspective, taking into account 
the geopolitical and sectoral divides running across the Russian foreign policy domain. 
Essentially, the network comparison will ultimately allow either a confirmation or the 
discarding of the hypotheses formulated in subchapter 3.3. Subsequently, Chapter 12 will 
aggregate and explain the major characteristics of Russian foreign policy-making. Based 
on findings of the case analysis, general structural and procedural attributes of decision-
making will be laid out and discussed. Finally, the closing Chapter 13 will focus on 
consequences for internal and external players. Given previous findings and conclusions, 
it will reflect most notably two crucial points. Firstly, potential provisions to improve 
decision-making shall be revealed for the benefit of domestic actors. And secondly, the 
chapter outlines some basic principles for international players on how to deal with the 
Russian foreign policy domain. Questions regarding current trends and potential future 
developments affecting Russian foreign policy-making will only be addressed in the 
present study’s conclusion. 
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11. Policy Networks in Comparison 
 
In Part III, the four policy networks have been determined and discussed individually. It 
was revealed that the NRC and the SES networks were clearly located on the policy 
community, respectively on the issue network side. Previous chapters also showed that the 
CSTO and CEES networks corresponded to hybrid rather than to extreme forms. Now, 
these intermediate findings shall be examined within a larger context and assessed with 
reference to the hypotheses. This chapter essentially compares all four networks including 
the different decision-making processes. Initially, subchapter 11.1 contrasts the four policy 
networks by comparing their different dimensions and parameters. Then, the hypotheses 
are evaluated in subchapter 11.2 and finally, section 11.3 compares the qualitative findings 
with regard to the foreign policy-making processes. 
 
 
11.1 Policy network parameter variations 
 
This subchapter compares the four policy networks in terms of their dimensions and 
parameters. The following table displays the ten values of all four cases including their 
appropriate thresholds. Whereas parameters lying on the policy community side are 
slightly shaded, issue network-like numbers are coloured dark grey. Parameters that are 
equal to the threshold, cannot be allocated to either side and hence appear without any 
shading. With the help of these graphic features, the table becomes fairly easy to interpret. 
Subsequently, the four policy network dimensions will be discussed successively. 
Policy Networks in Comparison  227 
 
 
Dimension 
 
Parameter 
 
NRC 
 
CSTO 
 
CEES 
 
SES 
 
Threshold 
 
1. Membership       
a) Number of 
participants 
Number of involved 
network actors 
8 9 10 19 10 
b) Number of 
interests 
Number of involved 
actor’s categories 
2 3 2 4 3 
c) Types of interest Percentage of 
involved Presidential 
actors 
37.50% 33.33% 40.00% 15.79% 33.33% 
2. Integration       
a) Frequency of 
interaction 
(information and 
resources) 
Network density 
 
6.1071 4.3056 4.4889 3.5614 5 
b) Centralisation Overall network 
degree centralisation 
25.24% 21.79% 23.06% 16.69% 50.00% 
c) Executive 
authority’s position 
Degree centrality 
ranking 
Ranks 1, 
2 and 4 
Ranks 1, 
2 and 6 
Ranks 
1, 2, 5 
and 6 
Ranks 
5, 6 and 
8 
At least two 
Presidential 
actors within top 
three 
3. Resources       
a) Quantity of 
information and 
resources within 
network 
Maximum 
normalised degree 
centrality 
80.00% 60.00% 63.33% 50.56% 75.00% 
b) Distribution of 
information and 
resources within 
network 
Spread between max 
and min normalised 
degree centrality in 
percentage of the 
highest value 
50.00% 70.83% 57.89% 76.92% 50.00% 
4. Power       
a) Quantity of power 
within network 
Maximum 
normalised closeness 
centrality 
100.00% 100.00% 90% 75.00% 75.00% 
b) Distribution of 
power within 
network 
Spread between max 
and min normalised 
closeness centrality 
in percentage of the 
highest value 
30.00% 46.67% 58.33% 51.02% 50.00% 
Table 50: Network parameters in comparison 
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Membership 
Concerning the membership dimension, one point is particularly poignant. Apparently, the 
SES policy network involves approximately twice as much participants and interests 
(1a+b) than the other three cases. Which factors may provide an explanation for these 
findings? Primarily, one can argue that for Putin’s circles, economic issues are just not as 
important as security issues. Therefore, they accept the participation of additional actors 
and interests. Yet, with this reasoning, the question remains open, why did the other 
economic issue (CEES) involve merely ten actors and two interests. Another explanation 
may sustain that near abroad issues simply attract more actors and interests, because post-
Soviet matters usually have more direct repercussions on the Russian Federation than far 
abroad issues.322 In fact, near abroad policy-making is complicated by the broader range 
of actors and interests, which have to be taken into account.323 However, this 
interpretation would not take into account the closed decision-making circle of the second 
near abroad issue (CSTO). In conclusion, neither of the two reasons does satisfactorily 
explained the relative high number of actors and interests within the SES network. 
However, it is most likely that both factors simultaneously contribute to the enlarged SES 
membership dimension. In this way, the large SES issue network becomes 
comprehensible. 
Yet, there exists an alternative argumentation. It is not excluded that the ‘Ukraine-
factor’ played a certain role. In fact, the interdependence between Moscow and Kiev quasi 
automatically leads to a broader range of interested Russian foreign policy actors.324 
However, this aspect should not be overrated as Russia’s bilateral relations with Belarus 
or with Kazakhstan for instance, may just as well be labelled as ‘special’, tight and 
particularly marked by common culture and history. 
                                                 
 
322  Expert interview, PIR-Center, Moscow: 22.04.2005. 
323  Expert interview, The Moscow Times, Moscow: 29.04.2005. 
324  Expert interview, JSC ‘SOGLASYIE’, Moscow: 16.02.2006. 
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In addition to the number of participants and interests, the comparison of the interest 
types (1c) raises questions. Once again, it is the SES parameter that stands out. Whereas 
only 15.79% of all SES network members belong to the Presidential sphere, the executive 
fraction amounts to at least one third of the network in all of the other three cases. 
Presumably, this discrepancy has to do with the length of the SES decision-making 
process and with the technical nature of the issue. Compared to the other cases, 
governmental officials at lower levels were more intensively involved. As a result, 
Presidential actors tend to be represented to a lesser degree. 
 
Integration 
The comparison of the interaction frequency (2a) exposes a divergence mainly between 
NRC and SES. The average interaction frequency is relatively high with regard to the first 
issue and remarkably contrasts against the comparatively low SES value. This gap 
perfectly reflects the difference between a policy community and an issue network. 
Whereas policy community actors intensively interact with each other to arrive at a 
decision, links between issue network members are less frequent and concentrated or 
sometimes even inexistent. 
In contrast to the interaction frequency, the centralisation parameter (2b) is not that 
suitable for identifying policy network types. Principally, the relative values reflect the 
difference between policy communities and issue networks. Whereas the NRC network is 
relatively centralised, the SES structure comparatively lacks a clear midpoint. However, in 
absolute terms, all four numbers lie well below the defined threshold. Therefore, all four 
networks have to be considered as decentralised patterns. 
When comparing the third integration parameter (2c), it is again the SES index that 
deviates. The executive authority’s position in the SES net is rather peripheral and hence 
characteristic for issue networks. In contrast, the other three issues are addressed by 
Presidential actors, who are located at the very centre of their communities. In the degree 
centrality ranking, they occupy at least the first two ranks. This means that the NRC, 
CSTO and CEES networks do not only involve a considerable number of Presidential 
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actors. In terms of activity, these executive players are also centrally located within the 
decision-making structures. 
 
Resources 
With regard to the quantity and distribution of resources (3a+b), the NRC case diverges 
compared to the other three issues. As it may be expected for a classic policy community, 
scientific, legal, political or other information and knowledge as well as money, labour 
power, facilities or other resources are sufficiently available and more or less evenly 
distributed. Indeed, the NRC issue was addressed by the two small far abroad and security 
subfields, which were able to contribute and control resources within an exclusive circle 
of decision-makers. In contrast, information and resources within the CSTO, CEES and 
SES networks are limited and unequally allocated. It seems as if all other subfield 
combinations including near abroad – economy lead to heterogeneous and unstable 
arrangements within the policy network. 
 
Power 
When comparing the quantity and distribution of power (4a+b) within the four decision-
making networks, the two security issues NRC and CSTO show similar, policy 
community-like parameters. Even if some actors may dominate the network, there exists a 
balance of high power between members. They have easy and more or less equal access to 
each other. The opposite can be stated with regard to the two economic issues CEES and 
SES. Even if mutual access between network members may be provided sometimes, low 
and unequal power generally reflects limited and asymmetrical access among actors. 
After having examined the power dimension, the comparative analysis of the policy 
network parameters comes to an end. The extensive and detailed comparison provides a 
rather confusing and inconsistent impression, because the dividing lines between policy 
community and issue network coloured values are not congruent. In changing 
configurations, far abroad or security issues for instance reveal similar parameters, 
whereas other values highlight a clear distinction of one particular case. However, the 
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comparison is not as bewildering as it seems. As the next subchapter will prove, 
regularities may be clearly identified if all parameters or the four cases are considered 
from a more abstract and distant perspective. 
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11.2 Evaluation of hypotheses 
 
Taking a look at Table 50 from a greater distance, it becomes clear that the left hand side 
(NRC) is by and large lightly shaded. In contrast, dark grey dominates the picture on the 
right hand side (SES). In the middle, both colorations are represented more or less equally. 
This impression is telling with regard to the present study’s hypotheses. Apparently, the 
policy network type varies depending on the issue and hence on the involved domain 
subfields. This finding reflects the postulation made by the main hypothesis. The 
involvement of the far and near abroad, security and economy subfields determines the 
shape of policy networks dealing with specific issues. 
Concerning the NRC network, eight of ten parameters lie on the policy community 
side, whereas one (3b) is located exactly on the threshold. Only one value (2b) deviates in 
an atypical manner. However, in spite of this deficiency, it is possible to make a clear 
statement. The NRC network composed of the far abroad and security subfields tends to 
take the shape of a policy community. It is characterised by a limited number of actors, a 
small range of interests, frequent and high-quality interactions of all actors, a central 
position of the executive authority, a generally high quantity of information and resources, 
a more or less even distribution of information and resources, a generally high quantity of 
power and a balance of power between network members. Therefore, sub hypothesis A 
can be principally confirmed. 
In contrast to the NRC case, the SES issue is mainly shaded dark grey. As Table 50 
reveals, nine of ten parameters are located on the issue network side. The only thing, 
which can be called in question, is the quantity of power (4a). Nevertheless, the SES – an 
issue that has been addressed by the near abroad and economic subfields – was decided by 
an issue network type. It was characterised by a large number of participants, a wide range 
of affected interests, the involvement of economic, legislative and other bodies, low 
interactions fluctuating in frequency and intensity, low centralisation, a non-central 
position of the executive authority, a generally limited quantity of information and 
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resources, unequally distributed information and resources and unequal powers between 
members. Based on these findings, sub hypothesis B can by and large be confirmed as 
well. 
The CSTO policy network may be located somewhere between the two poles and 
hence be regarded as a hybrid type. In fact, four policy community coloured parameters 
are balanced by four issue network-like values, whereas two indices (1b+c) lie right on the 
thresholds. Essentially, the same holds true for the CEES network. The two sides are more 
or less equally represented (4:5) and one parameter is ambiguous (1a). Therefore, both 
cases stand in line with sub hypothesis C. If Russian foreign policy issues are addressed 
by any other subfield combination than far abroad – security and near abroad - economy, 
the resulting policy network types hardly correspond to the defined extreme patterns. They 
tend to take the shape of hybrid forms, which may incorporate features from both policy 
network poles. 
In sum, the main hypothesis as well as the three subhypotheses can basically be 
confirmed. Yet, one major question remains unanswered. Do four case studies suffice to 
prove a systematic correlation between involved subfields and policy networks? It has not 
been disregarded that a greater amount of investigated cases could reject the hypotheses of 
the present study. It may be that regular patterns or systematic relationships simply do not 
exist in Russian foreign policy-making. Given the vast array of variables and 
uncertainties, decision-making in Moscow could be compared with mountain creek water 
randomly finding its way downhill through stones, wood and mud at different speeds. If 
this metaphor concisely described Russian foreign policy-making, every issue would then 
have to be regarded as a unique case. However, as numerous expert interviews have 
revealed, there are plentiful procedures, structures and characteristics, which can be 
recognized across most decision-making cases.325 These regular connections and common 
features back and complement the formulated hypotheses and shall therefore be identified 
and developed more clearly within the next two sections. Subchapter 11.3 will 
additionally discuss the wider effects of near abroad, far abroad, security and economy 
                                                 
 
325  Representatively: Expert interview, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 16.02.2006. 
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subfield involvement. It thereby further clarifies the hypothetical correlations and their 
repercussions. Subsequently, Chapter 12 will assemble and outline general characteristics 
of Russian foreign policy-making. 
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11.3 Policy domain subfields and their wider effects on decision-making 
 
The previous subchapter has evaluated and confirmed the present study’s hypotheses with 
the help of policy network parameters. The testing of hypotheses with reference to mere 
quantitative data is practical and fully corresponds to the analytical framework according 
to Chapter 2. Yet, it can give an artificial and sterile impression, because it is ultimately 
not satisfactory to explain highly dynamic matters on the basis of pure numbers and 
calculations – even if they are accurate. Therefore, it is necessary to support, balance and 
interpret statistical findings with qualitative facts. This subchapter is dedicated to precisely 
this requirement. It discusses the present study’s main hypothesis in a qualitative context 
and thereby explains the wider effects of policy domain subfields on Russian decision-
making. 
Figure 14 constitutes a remake of Figure 7 (see 3.3) and graphically illustrates the 
main hypothesis: Russia’s foreign policy domain consists of four basic overlapping 
subfields: near abroad, far abroad, security and economy. The involvement of these 
subfields determines the shape of policy networks dealing with specific issues. Further on, 
this relationship shall be discussed with reference to the two dividing lines. 
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Figure 14: Resulting policy networks in comparison 
 
 
Near abroad issues versus far abroad issues 
First of all, it has to be stated that the ‘near and far abroad’-bifurcation does not 
compellingly demonstrate opposing features. Decision-making (polity and politics) as well 
as contents (policy) are often interdependent and manifest common traits. Actually, the 
four case studies perfectly illustrate this point. The NRC issue had a direct effect on the 
CSTO case. In light of growing NATO influence in Europe, within the Arab world and in 
Central Asia, Russia basically created a post-Soviet counterpart by transforming the CST 
into a full-fledged international organisation.326 Thereby, the Russian administration – the 
Ministries of Defiance and Foreign Affairs in particular - were inspired by and profited 
from technical expertise gained thanks to the NRC process (see Chapters 7 and 8). 
Similarly, Moscow took advantage of the CEES concept when addressing the SES project. 
                                                 
 
326  Expert interview, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow: 21.02.2006. 
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Various principle drafts, ideas and procedures were duplicated and implemented within 
the framework of SES decision-making. Obviously, the Prime Ministry direction – 
especially vice-Premier Viktor Khristenko - acted as a coordinator and ‘transfer unit’ 
between the two issues.327 
Despite these convergences, an issue immediately receives a distinct coloration as 
soon as either the near or far abroad subfield becomes involved. Namely, the far abroad 
issues are by and large pushed by external actors, whereas near abroad matters are usually 
triggered and moved forward by Russian actors.328 In fact, all four case studies exemplify 
this point. Both the NRC and CEES issue were set on the agenda and drafted by Western 
actors. In contrast, the two post-Soviet integration projects were initiated and implemented 
by Moscow.329 Hence, the Russian foreign policy-domain – at least between 2000 and 
2004 – is simultaneously exposed to two gravity fields. Actors play a rather passive role in 
one field, which is mainly dominated by a few powerful far abroad nations. Within this 
environment, Russia makes every effort to be conceived as an equal partner. Conversely, 
Russian decision-makers are located at the centre of the near-abroad field. In this 
surrounding, Moscow usually assumes active leadership as a regional power and 
noticeably considers former Soviet Republics as junior partners.330 Due to its broad 
variety of foreign policy tools, it has more leverage in the near abroad than in the far 
abroad.331 
The handling of far and near abroad matters differs also in terms of decision-making 
style. In this respect, the NRC and CEES cases noticeably diverge from the CSTO and 
SES issues. On the international stage, Russian actors usually appear in a rational, calm 
and deliberate way. Particularly if they address Western foreign policy issues, 
transparency, foreign languages, exposure to the international public, time constraints, 
fixed institutions, planned processes and other factors to a certain degree force them to 
                                                 
 
327  Expert interview, Ministry of Industry and Energetics, Moscow: 22.02.2006. See also Chapters 9 and 10. 
328  Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006. 
329  See Part III. This point was also particularly mentioned in an expert interview, Fonda ‚Politika’, 
Moscow: 01.07.2005. 
330  Expert interview, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 29.03.2005. 
331  Expert interview, The Moscow Times, 29.04.2005. 
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adapt. Contrastingly, Russian policy-makers change diplomatic behaviour as soon as they 
deal with ‘one’s own kind’ – with their in many respects close neighbours. Debates, 
negotiations, official statements and other activities typically contain an emotional, 
rigorous, temperamental and sometimes captious touch. Clashes between actors are often 
designed as PR-campaigns for domestic purposes and do not reveal serious disputes about 
policy contents. For this reason, near abroad policies regularly become highly political 
issues, even if they mainly address economic aspects that lie in the interest of all involved 
countries. As a result, near abroad decision-making processes potentially contain a higher 
number of (open) conflicts and stretch over longer periods of time.332 The creation of the 
SES illustrates this tendency. Decision-makers from all four countries did not manage to 
treat the issue as a non-political tool aiming at economic development. Inter alia, mutual 
mistrust strengthened the omnipresent ‘politics’ factor.333 
An additional diverging element between far and near abroad foreign policy-making 
has so far not been discussed. Due to the analytical focus on organisations (see 2.2), the 
present study was not able to trace the involvement of individuals in decision-making. 
However, qualitative expert interviews have revealed that the influence of individual 
players is comparatively higher with regard to near abroad issues.334 Private friendships 
and personal preferences play a considerable role when Moscow deals with CIS-member 
states, whereas these elements are mostly absent in Russia’s far abroad relations. 
Primarily, the Russian elite has particular interests and ties within the post-Soviet space 
that need to be protected, such as Rogozin in Kaliningrad, Fridman in Ukraine, Alekperov 
in Azerbajian335 or Vekselberg in Switzerland. But also on lower bureaucratic levels, the 
individual component may have an impact. Near abroad issues are more often than not 
addressed by old-fashioned officials who continue to fulfil past administrational 
functions.336 All these factors tend to be reinforced by a President who is personally rather 
oriented towards the far abroad. Putin, as a representative of the young generation, does 
                                                 
 
332  Expert interview, Financial Times, Zurich: 19.03.2005. 
333  Expert interview, Ministry of Industry and Energetics, Moscow: 22.02.2006. 
334  Representatively: expert interviews, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 29.03.2005 & 19.05.2005. 
335  Expert interview, The Moscow Times, Moscow: 29.04.2005. 
336  Expert interview, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 14.02.2006. 
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not feel very comfortable with near abroad dossiers and Soviet-style conduct.337 He 
therefore typically leaves more manoeuvring space for second rate bureaucrats.338 
All the above-mentioned effects of near abroad subfield involvement contribute to a 
poorer overall effectiveness and efficiency of decision-making. Often, Russian CIS 
policies turn out to be more smoke than fire.339 It is characteristic that SES or CSTO 
actors, for instance, continuously measure the development progress of the integration 
issues in percentage of signed documents. Yet, this number is misleading, since it does not 
reflect the real status of the project.340 Even if all agreements are in effect, bilateral trade 
indices, economic figures or concrete military-technical cooperation may remain 
unchanged. 
Finally, the four case studies and the qualitative interviews revealed that near abroad 
subfield involvement usually results in less transparent decision-making. Contrastingly, 
far abroad issues are more exposed to the public. The events within the framework of the 
300th anniversary of St. Petersburg nicely illustrate this point. On May 30th 2003, no media 
coverage was allowed when near abroad leaders convened for the CIS summit. Only one 
day later, Putin himself proposed on the spot to televise the Russia-EU summit.341 
                                                 
 
337  Expert interview, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow: 10.05.2005. 
338  Expert interview, MGIMO, Moscow: 14.04.2005. 
339  Expert interview, Swedish Embassy, Moscow: 02.05.2005. 
340  See, for instance, „Only 75% of CSTO agreements have come into effect“, Kazakhstan today, 27.8.2005, 
www.gazeta.kz, 09.11.2005. 
341  Expert interview, Financial Times, Zurich: 19.03.2005. 
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Security issues versus economic issues 
Compared to the near and far abroad distinction, the sectoral divide is less obvious. As 
stated earlier, it is sometimes impossible to clearly determine security or economic 
subfield participation.342 Often, geopolitical and economic interests go hand in hand. 
Nevertheless, it is basically possible to assess the shares of the security and economic 
subfields. Some issues are more security-related like the NRC or CSTO cases, whereas 
other issues predominantly address economic aspects like the CEES or SES projects. Yet, 
there are also issues which are more difficult to judge: Moscow’s policy-making with 
respect to Iran, Russia’s position towards the U.S.-led war in Iraq, the gas conflicts with 
Ukraine and Belarus in 2006 and 2007 exemplify decision-making processes presumably 
influenced by both subfields.  
Doubtlessly, the four case studies demonstrate that the involvement of the two 
subfields has an impact on decision-making procedures and structures. As the security and 
economic communities are of quite a different nature (see 3.1) their influence either 
amplifies or softens features that characterise far or near abroad issues (see above). Issues 
dominated by the security subfield are generally easier to decide than questions addressed 
by the economic collective. They can be decided by few actors in a rather ‘medieval’ 
manner.343 Processes are usually more impulsive, personal and less planned. Both cases 
(NRC and CSTO) also illustrate that security issues can be decided within relatively short 
time frames. Additionally, the relevant and subtle interconnections between the two issues 
(see above) and other foreign policy questions344 clearly expose the fact that security 
matters are coordinated from the very top of the state hierarchy. Lower governmental 
levels like the MoD departments would not be able to successfully synchronize foreign 
policy activities. 
                                                 
 
342  Expert interview, JSC ‚SOGLASIYE’, Moscow: 16.02.2006. 
343  Expert interview, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 16.02.2006. 
344  See, for instance, K. Knox „Russia: CIS Military-Alliance Upgrade Plan Faces Numerous Obstacles“, 
Johnson’s Russia List No. 6246, 16.05.2002. 
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In contrast, economic subfield participation leads towards ‘modern’ policy-making 
involving a large number of comparatively skilled, flexible and open-minded officials. 
Economic-related issues are highly complex and require extensive technical expertise.345 
The CEES and SES policy-making cases both contained relatively institutionalized and 
planned processes with coordinated group activities on multiple levels. However, it should 
not be forgotten that this kind of decision-making is not only a result of economic subfield 
involvement. It also has to do with the Kremlin’s relative disinterest in complex economic 
matters. In fact, the will of the President to streamline and restrict economic policy-
making is limited when issues of lesser strategic significance are concerned. 
 
 
                                                 
 
345  Expert interview, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 16.02.2006. 
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12. Characteristics of Russian Foreign Policy-Making 
 
Within the scope of the last chapter, the four policy networks were analysed in a 
comparative perspective. It has been revealed that policy-formulation adopts specific 
properties depending on far and near abroad, security and economic subfield 
combinations. Yet, it would be wrong to interpret Russian foreign policy-making cases 
exclusively in terms of disparities and variations. Numerous elements may be specified 
that are to some degree common to all issues addressed by Moscow. This chapter focuses 
on precisely these characteristics and differentiates between structural attributes 
(subchapter 12.1) and procedural attributes (subchapter 12.2). 
At the onset of this chapter, three crucial preliminary remarks have to be made. 
First, it has to be reiterated (see introduction) and emphasized that decision-making in 
Moscow is nothing extraordinary. It basically corresponds to ‘international standards’346 
in foreign policy-formulation and does not constitute a sinister system ruled by a ruthless 
dictator – as it is sometimes portrayed by the international media. Second, it has to be 
noted that the following listing of characteristics does not claim to be complete and 
applicable to every single foreign policy issue. Rather, these facets reflect some general 
properties of Russian foreign policy-making that have consistently attracted attention upon 
the analysis of the four cases. To some extent, they have also been discussed by existing 
literature. Thirdly, all of the following structural and procedural characteristics of foreign 
policy-making are highly interconnected. Often, they are cause as well as effect all at once 
and are, hence, difficult to present as separate aspects. Nevertheless, they provide a useful 
synopsis about typical facets of decision-making in Moscow. 
 
                                                 
 
346  Of course, international standards of foreign policy-making as such do not exist, but some features can 
nevertheless be identified (see Chapter 1). 
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12.1 Structural attributes 
 
This section presents five structural attributes347 that characterise Russian foreign policy-
making. Thereby, the sequence of the following points has no meaning and does not 
reflect a special hierarchy or any other systematic arrangement. 
 
Accentuated vertical layout of the political system 
One major characteristic of Russian foreign policy-making is the importance of vertical 
distribution of might. This factor may be observed across central, regional and local 
governmental levels and across all administrational sectors. It may inter alia be explained 
by the long authoritarian history and by the strong belief in state institutions that is deeply 
rooted in Russian culture (Voss 2004: 70-73). Actually, the Russian state can be conceived 
as a huge pyramid, where President Putin stands lonely on top and the Russian citizens 
occupy the very bottom. In between these two poles, a massive bureaucratic machinery 
makes up the substance of the pyramid. It reaches from the presidential administration 
over endless chains of command to the local and peripheral state offices. Even if decisions 
in foreign affairs are supposedly taken within the uppermost twentieth part, the vertical 
layout has considerable implications for Moscow’s foreign policy-making. 
As the policy network analysis has shown (see Part III), most of the powers are 
concentrated in the hands of Presidential actors, whereas lower administrational units are 
strictly submissive and essentially dependent from the very top. Even high officials may 
be considered as powerless bureaucrats dealing with often futile legal documents, laws, 
single articles, sub articles and their paragraphs. E. Lucas (2006) tellingly describes this 
important point. “[The Russian state] may be corrupt, lethargic, and stunningly 
incompetent in general. But when the man at the top wants something done, it happens 
                                                 
 
347  The notion ‚structure’ is used here according to the definition presented in subchapter 1.1. 
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fast and ruthlessly.” The top-down approach within the Russian state structures can be 
observed with all four case studies. Putin and his immediate surrounding usually order and 
control foreign policy activities - other drives hardly exist.348 Without doubts, this state 
verticality has positive effects on decision-making. In particular, the concentration on a 
single point and the effectiveness on top generally lead to more stringent and coherent 
foreign policies as well as to shorter decision-making processes.349 Yet, centralisation also 
has major negative effects: first and foremost, administrational units have almost no 
freedom of action to coordinate, negotiate or decide technical matters on a horizontal 
level. Even if officials bring up good ideas and will – and that’s what they often do - their 
hands are principally tied, as most subjects have to be approved from above.350 
In addition to these thoughts, it has to be added that particularly the top of the 
Russian state pyramid has been sharpened under Putin.351 Between 2000 and 2003, the 
President was accurately advised by his immediate subordinates, since he consulted 
different actors and their various information sources. However, after 2004, the top 
decision-making circle started to shrink as the President lost confidence in some of his 
comrades. In 2006, foreign policy issues were often discussed just between Putin and his 
chief of staff Dmitri Medvedev.352 This constant narrowing of Putin’s surrounding created 
serious problems for the President as he reduced his distinguished bases of decision-
making.353 Misinformation by a few technocrats seems to have played an important role, 
for example, with regard to the Russian position towards the Ukrainian presidential 
elections in 2004.354 
                                                 
 
348  Expert interview, Ministry of Industry and Energy, Moscow: 22.02.2006. 
349  Korobeinikov (2005: 75). See also Williams (2004) and Gürbey (2005). 
350  Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006. 
351  Expert interview, Konrad Adenauer Fond, Zurich, 27.10.2006. 
352  Expert interview, Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Science, 
Moscow: 24.05.2005. 
353  Expert interview, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow: 04.07.2005. 
354  Expert interview, Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Science, 
Moscow: 24.05.2005. 
Characteristics of Russian Foreign Policy-Making 245 
 
 
Substantial impact of bureaucracy 
However, despite the vertical layout of the Russian state, lower levels were not completely 
at the mercy of Putin. The President himself depends on the support of the political elite 
and bureaucracy.355 Hence, the Kremlin’s wish to create the NRC, for example, was not 
“fully shared by the foreign and defence officials whom he had to rely on to make the 
whole thing work”.356 In addition to that, the verticality has insofar a reverse effect as the 
technical development of foreign policy issues lies mainly in the hands of government 
officials. This gives them a considerable amount of influence, as the CEES and SES case 
studies and their policy networks have confirmed. Decision-making basically follows a 
strong top-down approach. Yet the governmental bureaucracies play a dominant role in 
both cases.357 Generally, the bureaucratic impact becomes stronger if an issue requires 
technical expertise and therefore more time to make a decision. Additionally, 
bureaucracies are by and large responsible for the implementation of foreign policies, 
which gives them extra weight. Sometimes, the formulation of policies and their 
implementation are two separate affairs.358 A certain policy may completely change face 
after it has been inconspicuously transformed by bureaucracy and its manifold instruments 
such as biased expertise, sophisticated communication strategies, crime and corruption.  
 
Shortage of qualified governmental staff 
The influence of Russian bureaucracy has somewhat been reduced due to an acute 
shortage of qualified governmental staff. This factor may be considered as another, 
                                                 
 
355  See, for instance, Dresen (2004), who discusses the important role of bureaucracy. 
356  “World politics: NATO’s moment of truth”, The Economist, 03.05.2002 (ISI database, 18.04.2005). See 
as well Chapter 7. 
357  See Chapters 9 and 10 and also Vinokurov (2004). 
358  Various sources illustrate the considerable gap between highly compex legal documents and the reality. 
See, for instance, Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, 
“Ob odobrenii I predstavlenii Presidentu Rossiiskoi Federatsii dlja vnesenija na ratifikatsiju Protokola o 
porjadke osushestvlenija kontrolija za tselevym ispolzovaniem produktsii voennovo naznachenija, 
postavljaemoi v ramkakh Coglashenija ob osnovnykh printsipakh voenno-tekhnicheskovo 
sotrudnichestva mezhdu gosudarsvami – uchastnikami dogovora o kollektivnoi bezopasnosti ot 15 Maja 
1992 goda.”, 23.07.2003.  
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separate characteristic of Russian foreign policy-making, because it regularly appeared 
within the analysis of the four case studies.359 Within the Russian administration, profound 
technical expertise is scarcely available, thus causing insufficient support for decision-
makers and a general incapability to draft complex documents.360 It also hinders an 
efficient coordination and cooperation with internal and external foreign policy actors.361 
The reason for the lack of capable personnel is obvious. At least since 1991, the most 
talented, skilled and best educated young Russians prefer to work in the private sector, 
which offers much better wages and working conditions than the Russian state.362 
 
Emphasis on Russian idiosyncrasy 
The emphasis on Russian idiosyncrasy constitutes a widespread mindset of foreign policy-
makers. It implies traditional ideas of political elite members and civil servants.363 
Whereas some may call it a ‘backward mentality’364 or a ‘latent preference for Russia’s 
great power status’, it shall be understood here as a general actor’s preference for 
‘Russianness’. In at least two respects, the accentuation of Russian peculiarities plays a 
significant role in foreign affairs. It does not only have an impact on foreign policy 
contents, but also on policy-making. The far abroad cases NRC and CEES exemplify this 
point insofar as a considerable part of foreign policy actors were opposed to Putin’s 
Western course.365 They complicated the decision-making process on a technical level by 
delaying certain activities or even denying cooperation (see 7.1 and 9.1). Even if 
                                                 
 
359  See, for instance, the assessment of D. Trenin, “Sealing a New Era in U.S.-Russian Relations”, The 
Moscow Times, 27.05.2002 (ISI database, 18.04.2005). 
360  Expert interview, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow: 04.05.2005. 
361  Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006. 
362  Expert interview, PIR-Center, Moscow: 14.04.2005. 
363  Decision-making mechanisms continuously contain a strong traditionalist component. See Carnegie 
(2004). 
364  D. Trenin, “Sealing a New Era in U.S.-Russian Relations”, The Moscow Times, 27.05.2002 (ISI 
database, 18.04.2005). 
365  See, for instance, I. Kobrinskaja „Drop Zone Kremlin: Putin, Russia in the Run-up to Summit“, Moscow 
News, 15.05.2002, in: Johnson’s Russia List, No. 6246, 16.05.2002.  
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ministerial officials rationally comprehend the necessity of cooperation with European or 
U.S. actors, they cannot understand with their heart.366 
 
Influence of individuals 
Even if the present study deliberately considers policy-network members as organisational 
actors (see 2.2) it cannot be denied that individuals play an important role in Russian 
foreign affairs. The personality and moods of one single policy-maker may have a 
significant impact on the decision-making process.367 Of course, this holds true especially 
for the President, but also on ministerial level, officials with their capacities and interests 
influence policy issues. Often, Putin assigns a top official to address a specific matter. 
This special envoy basically receives a ‘carte blanche’ to solve all problems in connection 
with the issue. In fact, there are many examples for this mechanism: Dmitri Kosak was 
entrusted to settle the Transnistria dispute. The CEES and the SES were essentially 
supervised by Viktor Khristenko (see Chapters 9 and 10) and Dmitri Medvedev mainly 
handled the Ukrainian Presidential election dossier in 2004.368 Last but not least, once the 
CSTO was established, Putin appointed Nikolaj Bordjuzha – a proved and tested Russian 
comrade with a strong character - as General Secretary to reassert Moscow’s influence 
within the CSTO-space.369 
 
 
                                                 
 
366  Expert interview, Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Science, 
Moscow: 24.05.2005. 
367  Representatively: Expert interview, Fonda ‚Politika’, Moscow: 01.07.2005. 
368  Expert interview, MGIMO, Moscow: 05.05.2005. 
369  Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, “Ob itogakh sessii 
Soveta kollektivnoi bezopasnosti gosudarstv-uchastnikov dogovora o kollektivnoi bezopasnosti”, 
29.04.2003.  
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12.2 Procedural attributes 
 
After having outlined some major structural attributes of Russian foreign policy-
formulation, this subchapter discusses procedural characteristics of Moscow’s decision-
making. Again, the factors listed below do no reflect a defined order. 
 
Continuous rivalry among elite members 
Never ending struggles among elite members are symptomatic for Russian politics in 
general and for foreign affairs in particular. Even today, as Putin’s crew has successfully 
consolidated its power basis, the rivalry on top frequently absorbs the full attention and 
energy of the key players, which makes it impossible for them to seriously and accurately 
care about daily business (Rjabov 2005). The continuous battle for access to key positions 
and policy networks is not a specific feature of Putin’s regime. It has been going on ever 
since Russia’s Czarist times. Of course, the political fight among elites is not exclusively a 
Russian phenomenon, but happens within every nation around the globe. Yet, it may be 
that Russia’s political culture accounts for the fact that battles are fought out in a more 
visible, hot tempered, ruthless and sometimes even brutal manner. Against this 
background, it is clear that Russian foreign policy-making repeatedly becomes hostage of 
domestic political fights.370 In these cases, foreign policy options simply can not be 
evaluated and decided in a serious, objective, rational and coordinated way. Decision-
making in Moscow is therefore essentially unpredictable and contains a great amount of 
incertitude and instability. 
In light of these circumstances, it is highly interesting to detect those foreign policy 
actors who have regular access to decision-making networks. In fact, only Putin and the 
direction of the presidential administration are members of all four policy networks NRC, 
                                                 
 
370  Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006. 
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CSTO, CEES and SES. Consequently, it is reasonable to state that there is principally only 
one centre of decision-making in Russian foreign affairs: the President and his 
administration. This finding stands fully in line with statements made by various 
experts.371 Conversely, the following foreign policy domain actors have usually no access 
at all to policy networks: other Federal bodies like banks or the audit chamber, the 
financial, industrial and service business sectors, regional and judiciary actors, political 
parties and miscellaneous actors such as religion, academia, media or society. Finally, 
most actors either fight – sometimes successfully, sometimes unfortunately - for access to 
decision-making networks, or they simply wait until the President sporadically calls them 
up to participate in policy-formulation. The following players typically belong to this 
category: the Security Council, the prime ministry, the MFA, MoD, MEDT and other 
Federal ministries, Federal services, the State Duma and the Federation Council as well as 
the energy business sector. 
 
Significance of unwritten rules 
Foreign policy-making takes place within the framework specified by the Russian 
constitution and the Russian legislation.372 This official perception, however, only 
captures one part of reality and does not account for two crucial aspects. First, the Russian 
legislators have not defined every single activity and potential situation with regard to 
decision-making. Particularly in the field of foreign affairs, there exist relatively few 
regulations, which are composed by and large in an abstract and cloudy way. This of 
course leaves considerable room for interpretations (Korobeinikov 2005). Second, laws as 
written rules do not have the same importance and meaning in Russia as they have within 
the Western hemisphere. In the context of Russian culture, official regulations are 
considered as extrinsic restrictions that artificially narrow the scope of life. In the eyes of 
most Russians, laws do not reflect justice, conscience or moral and therefore do not 
                                                 
 
371  Representatively: expert interview, Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian 
Academy of Science, Moscow: 24.05.2005. 
372  Expert interview, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 16.02.2006. See also Schneider (1998). 
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compellingly need to be respected.373 Additionally, many Russian citizens have lost 
confidence in the lawmaker. Over the past decades and centuries, the state and its 
continuously changing legislation have simply caused too much damage to the Russian 
society and its individuals. 
These specific Russian conditions have a remarkable impact on foreign policy-
making. As legal foundations are generally weak, actors resort to solid unwritten rules of 
behaviour, which are deeply anchored in Russian culture. They can be described as a 
“system of socially created and learned standards for perceiving and acting shared by 
members of an identity group” (Sampson 1987: 384-408). Hence, interactions between 
foreign policy actors correspond to a certain code, which encompasses values like 
honesty, friendship, mutual trust, faith and personal dignity. The Russian saying “my 
zhyvjom po ponjatjam”374 stands for these concepts of conduct, which are stored in 
Russian collective subconscious. Against this background, it becomes comprehensible that 
Russian foreign policy-making contains a strong personal and opinionated element. 
 
Short planning intervals 
Frequently, Russian foreign policy-making is time-critical. Consequently, planning 
intervals are short, which leads to crisis management and ad hoc as well as reactive 
decision-making. This again results in imprudent activities and short-sighted policies 
(Carnegie 2005). The four cases of the present study are less suitable to back this point, 
since they represent rather long-ranging institutional issues. Yet, interviews, literature and 
media coverage clearly reveal last-minute manoeuvres as another characteristic of 
Moscow’s decision-making.375 
These typically short planning intervals may be explained by two factors. First, it 
has to be noted that foreign policy-makers all around the world are frequently confronted 
with highly urgent issues as international relations by nature tend to be time-critical, 
                                                 
 
373  These statements are based on thoughts of Lew Tolstoj about Russians and anarchy. See Voss (2004). 
See also: Gregory Bovt „Why the Rules Don’t Rule“, The Moscow Times, 21.08.2006. 
374  Expert interview, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 14.02.2006. 
375  Representatively: Expert interview, Financial Times, Zurich: 19.03.2005. 
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reactive and unpredictable (see Chapter 1). Yet, the second cause is supposed to be self-
inflicted. In Russian political culture, last-minute decision-making is nothing bad per se.376 
After all, it leaves space and time for adequate reaction. Even if this reasoning may be 
accurate, instant policy-making has nevertheless disadvantages that have repeatedly been 
deplored by involved experts.377 Namely, it does not contribute to strategically oriented 
foreign policies that consequently follow national interests. Indeed, decisions made on 
short notice have the potential to contradict guidelines that were once formulated for the 
best.378 Conversely, a certain degree of foresight and strategy reduces the number of ad 
hoc decisions and therefore result in longer time frames available for preparation and 
planning of more consistent policies. 
 
Lack of strategy 
Both the reconstruction of the four case studies as well as the examination of current 
expert views have repeatedly revealed a lack of strategy in Russian foreign affairs.379 In 
spite of a foreign policy concept, Moscow was not able to pursuit a consistent course and 
to adhere to it over a longer period of time. It seems as if this verdict is the price Putin 
pays for increased rationalism and opportunism in foreign matters (see 5.1). What are the 
reasons for Russia’s heading changes? 
First and foremost, the determination of national interests and foreign policy 
strategies is a highly complex political task. The definition of the national individuality 
and its interests bother all societies around the world. Of course, hardly any country will 
be able to carry this omnipresent political debate to an end and arrive at a full consent. 
Rather, the degree of national unity fluctuates by nature over extended time frames. 
Insofar, the lack of a coherent strategy is not a Moscow-specific problem. Yet, the Russian 
                                                 
 
376  Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006. 
377  See, for instance, the two round table discussions at Carnegie (2004) and at the Federation-Council 
(2004). 
378  As a NATO puts it: „You get different signals from different sides several times a day” (expert 
interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006). 
379  See Part III of the present study. Consider also, for instance, Carnegie (2004), Carnegie (2005), 
Federation-Council (2004) and Nikonov (2005). 
252 Characteristics of Russian Foreign Policy-Making 
 
Federation has gone through turbulent times since the breakdown of the Soviet Union in 
1991. In addition to external impulses, it has been swayed by the drop out of communist 
ideology, chaotic Yeltsin years, privatisation processes, economic crisis, Chechen wars, 
terrorism, soaring GDP growth rates, high energy prices and much more. Accordingly, the 
questions about ‘what is Russia?’ and ‘what should Russia do?’ have essentially remained 
open and hotly contested – at least during Putin’s first term. Even nowadays, foreign 
policy-makers in Moscow seem to lack of ‘a certain idea of Russia’.380 In a globalising 
world, Moscow struggles with its role which continues to be rather diffuse and 
ambiguous.381 
Yet, in addition to these external factors, one part of the Russian disorientation is 
housemaid. Namely, Putin and the foreign policy domain as a whole have not done 
enough to bring about a consensus over a foreign policy strategy. Given the generally low 
number of actors and interests involved in policy networks (see Chapter 11), the course of 
action can hardly be balanced and backed by a majority. Moscow’s zigzag path cannot be 
straightened out if policy networks change too much depending on the issue while 
excluding important elements of Russian society. This point is tightly connected to the 
next characteristic of policy-formulation: the fluctuating coordination mechanisms. 
                                                 
 
380  John Coles Coles (2000), an experienced British diplomat, points out that it is of utmost importance to 
have ‘a certain idea of Britain’ when making foreign policies. 
381  Lo (2004: 46) has identified „five critical dualities that, in various interlocking ways, inform the world-
view of Putin and the Russian elite. See also Carnegie (2004). 
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Fluctuating coordination mechanisms 
Some experts and actors claim that coordination mechanisms in Russian foreign policy-
making do not exist at all. In their view, it is even overrated to label decision-making in 
Moscow with the term ‘process’, because they conceive Russia’s external affairs as a set 
of random-like actions.382 Other analysts argue more carefully. Although they can 
perceive coordination mechanisms, they believe that these efforts are insufficiently 
institutionalized. According to their assessment, the only functioning and coordinating 
institution in present-day Russia is the President (Trenin 2005), who doubtlessly managed 
to stop Russia’s multi-voiced foreign policy of the Yeltsin period. Although beside the 
President, a more specialized, fully authorized and responsible organ on an intermediate 
level is basically missing (Korobeinikov 2005: 76). 
Even if these assessments may be appropriate and true, they are not entirely correct 
in light of Douglass North’s pertinent definition of institutions. Institutions do not only 
subsume formal rules, but also informal constraints such as culturally derived, stable and 
path dependent traditions and customs (North 2002: 40). Insofar, Russian unwritten rules, 
as they described above, have to be understood as institutions. Every single interaction 
reconstructed between policy network members does ultimately represent an 
institutionalized coordination mechanism. It provides a functional, flexible, effective and 
efficient tool to organise and manage foreign policy issues.  
However, this kind of coordination mechanism has at least one major disadvantage: 
interactions based on a traditional Russian code of behaviour are essentially unpredictable, 
since the access to policy networks and their central actors is not systematically regulated. 
Thus, decision-making procedures and structures do not guarantee that all available 
information, expertise, opinions and interests are included and coordinated in the policy 
networks. Against this background, it would be helpful to enhance the institutionalisation 
of policy coordination by introducing new mechanisms based on formal and written rules. 
                                                 
 
382  Representatively: expert interview, Fonda ‚Politika’, Moscow: 01.07.2005. See also Carnegie (2004). 
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Improvements in this respect are definitely visible on lower administrational levels. 
Russian administrations, ministerial departments, agencies, commission etc. are relatively 
well organised and the coordination of issues essentially functions as in Western countries. 
With regard to the CEES, for instance, the interplay between the high level group, expert 
teams and interministerial coordination units seemed to be relatively smooth.383 
 
Distinctive secrecy and opacity 
Another characteristic of Russian foreign policy-making is the pronounced secret and 
opaque acting of all domain members. Whereas Western states and international 
organisations provide a massive amount of open source information on all possible issues 
in world politics, Moscow and its actors are comparatively locked. Although certain 
Federal Ministries like the MFA or the MEDT make considerable efforts to furnish as 
many facts as possible, the Russian state remains under seal. This closeness may have two 
reasons: first, the handling of foreign affairs usually implies negotiations that require a 
certain degree of secrecy. Actually, no negotiation strategy would lead to success, if 
positions and options were relinquished to the public. Thus, every world nation treats 
sensitive political information with care. Second, Russians typically favour discrete and 
silent action. Mutual distrust between human beings in general as well as between the state 
and the citizen in particular has grown over hundreds of years and constitutes an integral 
part of Russian culture. 
It goes without saying that secrecy and opacity have considerable repercussions on 
foreign policy-making. On many occasions, they serve as a convenient tool to mask the 
political accountability of decision-makers. If only scarce information is made available to 
the public, it is difficult to hold actors responsible for failures and misconduct. The CSTO 
issue exemplifies this point insofar as deadlines set by working groups to present certain 
                                                 
 
383  Expert interview, The European Commission’s Delegation to Russia, Economics and Trade Section, 
Moscow: 17.05.2005. 
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documents - in contrast, for instance, to the CEES case - were not published publicly.384 
Additionally, reticence creates surprise and unpredictability, which further exacerbates 
communication and coordination. This effect is certainly not in the interest of the Russian 
nation and its people, but it eventually may be beneficial for a few actors who follow their 
private agenda. 
                                                 
 
384  See, for instance: Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, 
“O pervom zasedanii Rabochei gruppy predstavitelei gosudarstv-uchastnikov Dogovora o kollektivnoi 
bezopasnosti (DKB)”, 05.08.2002. 
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13. Consequences for Internal and External Players 
 
Within the framework of Part IV, two crucial resulting insights have so far been discussed: 
the comparison of the four policy networks and their variations (Chapter 11) as well as the 
cardinal characteristics of Russian decision-making in foreign affairs (Chapter 12). These 
raw cognitions shall not just be deposited and left behind without further thinking. In this 
chapter, the consequences of the present study’s main findings will be deduced and 
reflected. In particular, ramifications for internal and external actors will be outlined and 
explained. Subchapter 13.1 tries to identify potentials to improve the Russian foreign 
policy-making process. Even if decision-making in Moscow is not ineffective, inefficient 
and unfair, there’s considerable room for improvement. After that, subchapter 13.2 
addresses external players, who regularly deal with Moscow. It tries to delineate some 
important principles and advisable rules of conduct which might help to avoid 
misunderstandings. 
It is important to point out that this chapter does not claim to offer fixed recipes and 
strategies. Given the amount of uncertainties and the dynamic developments in Russian 
foreign policy-making, it is difficult to provide comprehensive concepts on how to reform 
decision-making or on how to interact with Moscow. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to 
draft some relevant points that could be helpful for practitioners. 
 
 
13.1 Potentials to improve the Russian foreign policy-making process 
 
In his article about Putin’s strategy, Vyacheslav Nikonov concludes with the section 
‘What is to be done’. Thereby, he points out at first, that mechanisms for preparing, 
making and implementing decisions have to be improved (Nikonov 2005: 80). This 
certainly holds true for the field of foreign affairs. As the previous sections have shown, 
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there exist many aspects that hinder smooth and consistent decision-making. Instead of 
addressing these problems and their potential solutions one-by-one, the present study 
aggregates them into three different thematic complexes: strategy building, governmental 
reform and coordination upgrade. Every complex comprehends a set of measures that are 
suggested in order to improve foreign policy-making in Moscow. As a matter of course, 
the sequence of the three approaches contributes to the textual flow and does not reflect in 
any way a certain order of priority. 
 
1) Strategy building 
What kind of measures would contribute to a more consistent strategy, to a more visible 
and predictable foreign policy course, to clear and well defined red bottom lines? One 
could argue that the main obstacle to strategy building constitutes the diverging ideas 
about Russia and its role on the international stage. Yet, this fact is nothing bad or unusual 
per se. Due to its vast geographical size, multicultural society and its mixed historical 
legacy, the Russian national identity will always remain a disputable and dynamic concept 
(see 12.2). The relative lack of strategy is the result of insufficient inclusion, absorption 
and harmonisation of actors, their interests and ideas within the political process. The 
definition of ‘Russianness’ requires an exhaustive, open, and less emotional national 
dialogue about what the Russian Federation actually is and what it realistically can do. 
On a smaller scale, this national debate should be led within the domain of external 
affairs. A foreign policy concept cannot be developed by technocrats within one division 
of the Foreign Ministry only. It has to be synchronized with a broad variety of other 
actors. In so doing, objectives and means of the Russian foreign policy have to be limited 
to a realistic level and brought in a coherent line. This, of course, is a democratic process 
which needs time, patience, mutual respect and confidence. 
Finally, every single issue should be decided in accordance with this foreign policy 
concept. Yet, as policy networks usually include only a few actors and interests (see Part 
III and Chapter 11), this is difficult to achieve under current conditions. A greater number 
of really involved actors and interests would not primarily lead to a broader spectrum of 
opinions and hence to ineffective policy-making. It would first of all result in a better 
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anchoring of all activities in the foreign policy strategy. The inclusion of a variety of 
different actors from diverse sectors would also lead to a broader range of critical 
opinions, which would sometimes help to keep the predefined track. First and foremost, 
this would imply a more active role of legislative bodies and non-energy business actors in 
foreign policy-making (Korobeinikov 2005). 
 
2) Governmental reform 
A second approach towards improving foreign policy-making implies another 
comprehensive governmental reform. It should aim primarily at reducing corruption.385 
Even if this is a highly difficult task, it is not an impossible mission. The following 
measures could contribute to this end. The reform should diminish the amount of 
administrational units that do not fulfil immediate and vital public services. Although 
Russian bureaucracy has been somewhat streamlined by the last governmental reform in 
2004, it is still largely oversized.386 Furthermore, the reform should lead to a better and 
performance-based remuneration for state officials. As section 12.1 pointed out, Russia 
lacks proficient civil servants, who are able to effectively solve complex tasks like 
drafting legal texts for the establishment of free trade areas (see also 9.1 and 10.1). 
Moreover, transparency should be enhanced by making as much information as possible 
available to the public. Protocols, concepts and other documents should accessible for the 
interested audience unless they contain vital contents. In this respect, the MFA and the 
MEDT provide good examples for ministries that take advantage of the internet and other 
forms of communication. Additionally, corruption will never drop back if it is not 
punished by independent judicial organs. The consequent disclosure and pursuit of covert, 
illegal activities is indispensable for the effective function of the state apparatus. 
In addition to the above-mentioned, rather technical measures, the governmental 
reform should address a problem which is even more difficult to solve since it implies a 
                                                 
 
385  This aim stands in line with the assessment of Nikonov (2005), who identifies corruption as the second 
cardinal problem in Russian politics. 
386  See, for instance, Dresen (2004). Issues and problems of Russia’s administration have earlier been 
discussed by Parison (2000). 
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partial alteration of Russian political culture: the softening of the vertical state layout. As 
subchapter 12.1 revealed, the verticality of the Russian state has various negative impacts 
on foreign policy-making. Therefore, an attempt should be made to place greater emphasis 
on horizontal mechanisms. In particular, the transition from authoritative to a more 
participatory style of leadership and command should be envisaged on every state level. If 
initiatives, creativity and independent problem solving of subordinate unites are accepted 
and supported from above, blind obedience and passivity can be decreased. This will 
gradually lead to shared responsibilities, more confidence and better cooperation 
mechanisms. A general atmosphere of mistrust and fear could be replaced by an ambience 
of mutual trust’. Admittedly, this all sounds quite unrealistic or even utopian. But if no 
improvements are achieved in this respect, Russian foreign policy-making will essentially 
remain a reactive machinery with a gigantic inertia. 
 
3) Coordination upgrade 
The third set of measures that might improve Russian foreign policy-making concerns 
coordination mechanisms. By introducing more formal and binding rules about actor’s 
involvement and interaction, policies would be subject to a fuller and more systematic 
debate. This is especially required when the President is confronted with conflicting 
advice on fundamental issues.387 The coordination upgrade is closely interlinked with the 
first complex ‘strategy building’, because enhanced cooperation mechanisms 
simultaneously also facilitate the formulation of a coherent foreign policy concept. 
Actually, the better coordination of decision-making is an issue which has already been 
discussed many times. In 1991, the State Council was created to coordinate inter alia 
foreign policy. Yet, within a short time frame this body turned out to be ineffective. Then, 
in 1992, the Security Council was established in order to prepare all Russian foreign and 
security-related policies. However, the latest under Putin, the highly institutionalized 
organisation of decision-making was undermined by parallel mechanisms within the 
                                                 
 
387  This statement corresponds to the key lesson Hess (2001: 224) draws from different paths to war by three 
U.S. Presidents: Truman – N Korea, Johnson – Vietnam and Bush Senior – Iraq. 
260 Consequences for Internal and External Players 
 
presidential sphere (Carnegie 2004: 19). At an earlier stage already, between 1994 and 
1996, the creation of a foreign policy council within the presidential administration was 
intended. Boris Yeltsin, however, did not approve this idea and insisted on the 
coordinating role of the Security Council and its General Secretary.388 Last but not least, a 
series of additional options to ameliorate the system as a whole have been discussed by the 
Council for Foreign and Defence Policy.389  
The most recent initiative to upgrade coordination mechanisms in foreign policy-
making has been taken by experts of the Federation Council’s international committee. 
They submitted a legislative proposal390 that aims at the inclusion and harmonization of a 
broader range of actors and their interests. Essentially, the project stipulates the creation of 
a foreign policy council, that would be responsible for preparing and coordinating 
decisions within the field of Russian external affairs (Korobeinikov 2005: 76). The 
President, the Prime Minister, the two speakers of the parliamentary chambers, the 
Secretary General of the Security Council, the Foreign and Defence Ministers and the 
directors of FSB and SVR would collectively elaborate coherent Russia’s foreign policies 
(Korobeinikov 2005). This would not only lead to a better shielding of the policy-making 
process vis-à-vis political rivalries, moods of decision-makers and lobbying of big 
business (Federation-Council 2004: 5). The ‘democratisation of foreign policy-making’ 
would also separate powers, assign clear responsibilities and define a minimum of fixed 
institutional guidelines. 
However, the draft legislation received mixed feedbacks in 2005: out of 88 
responses, 28 were supportive, 22 declining, whereas 38 had doubts about the project. In 
particular, the presidential administration did not take notice of the project with 
enthusiasm (Korobeinikov 2005). Of course, the initiative would ultimately deprive the 
President of power in a sensitive field, which could also have negative effects. Namely, a 
                                                 
 
388  Expert interview, JSC ‚SOGLASIYE’, Moscow: 16.02.2006. 
389  This Russian non-governmental organisation CВОП was founded in 1992 and associates experts and 
actors of foreign and defense policy. 
390  Projekt sakona „O koordinatsii dejatelnosti zakonodatelnykh i.S.v. isponitelnykh organov 
gosudarstvennoi vlasti pri podgogovke reshenii v sfere upravlenija vneshnei politikoi Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii“. 
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centralisation of foreign policy-making within the governmental orbit could lead to 
“exacerbated rather than diminished incoherence and inconsistency, by encouraging 
competition and conflict between the presidency, on the one hand, and the executive 
branch departments and agencies constituting the permanent foreign affairs government, 
on the other” (Yetiv 2004: 10-11). Given these circumstances, the draft legislation’s 
prospects of adoption are dusky at best.  
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13.2 How to deal with Moscow 
 
Given the above-mentioned decision-making characteristics, outsiders often do not 
understand Moscow’s patterns of behaviour. For foreigners, ‘reading Russia right’ (Trenin 
2005) is a highly difficult task as information about contemporary conditions and trends 
contradict and simply do not match. To deal with Moscow constitutes an even more 
complex venture, which contains a relatively large potential of misunderstanding and 
frustration. What kinds of principles and points should politicians, diplomats, political 
advisors, academics, journalists and other external actors keep in mind when interacting 
with the Russian foreign policy domain and its players? 
The most important principle that should be considered when dealing with Moscow 
was accurately formulated by Dmitri Trenin (2005): 
[...]Russian politics, still intensely personal and largely nontransparent, should be left to the 
Russians themselves. The West needs to stop thinking about what is good for Russia and focus 
on what is good for itself. At some point down the road, there may be a surprisingly large 
overlap between the two. 
 
Indeed, foreigners and especially Europe and the U.S. too often presume to judge the 
Russian reality on the basis of their own standards and values. This, however, will not lead 
to a better mutual understanding and least of all to any changes in Moscow. On the 
contrary, perpetual deeming and nagging could even have counterproductive effects. As 
the four cases of the present study have shown, it is of utmost importance to treat Moscow 
as an equal partner and not from above nor from below.391 
The second major principle is based on the fact that numerous menacing stereotypes 
or misinterpretations about Russia dominate the foreigner’s mindset. From an external 
perspective, today’s Russia continues to be ‘a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an 
                                                 
 
391  See in particular Chapters 7 and 9. 
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enigma’.392 These perceptions are usually accompanied by bequeathed historical 
experiences, which seem to darken the picture even more. Yet, there are no reasons to be 
daunted or even scared when dealing with Moscow. If Russian actors nowadays 
occasionally choose a more offensive rhetoric, make increased direct foreign investments 
or engage in emotional debates with immediate neighbours, it does not signify the rebirth 
of the imperialist great power. A strong, prospering and globally integrated Russian 
Federation is in the interest of the state community. External actors, above all, lack a 
certain amount of sangfroid, tranquillity and relaxation when associating with Russia. 
The third principle to deal with Moscow stipulates that external actors should 
approach the Russian foreign policy domain at the highest possible level. The biggest 
impact on Russia’s foreign policy can obviously be achieved by addressing the 
presidential sphere in a direct, horizontal and personal manner. In fact, leaders of other 
nations, for example, may have a larger influence on the Russian President than any 
domestic actor. This can be explained by the distinct vertical nature of the Russian state, 
which implies that the President is often a lonely man at the top.393 Some pleasures and 
solicitudes apparently can only be shared within the solidarity club of state leaders. 
Especially during his first four years in office, Putin was eager to gain, cultivate and rely 
upon presidential friendships.394 However, the amicable leverage of external state leaders 
on Putin creates political tensions within the domestic arena. At least between 2000 and 
2004, it resulted in considerable cleavages between the President and Russia’s elite 
circles. On the long-run, Putin cannot afford to disregard important sub-presidential actors 
and Russian public opinion in order to ensure his friendship with Western leaders. 
Surely, the majority of external actors do not deal with the presidential sphere. 
Diplomats, governmental officials, academics, journalists, NGO representatives and other 
                                                 
 
392  Famous comment made by Winston Churchill on Russia (BBC, 1.10.1939). 
393  See Aslund (2004) as well as subchapter 12.1. 
394  The importance of the outside world’s leaders for Putin was particularly pointed out on the occasion of 
the expert interview, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Moscow: 05.05.2005. It may also be illustrated by the 
two far abroad issues (see Chapters 7 and 8). The NRC and the CEES both appeared on the agenda 
thanks to personal relations and friendships between Putin and Western leaders. Blair, Prodi, Bush, 
Berlusconi, Chirac, Schröder & Co. managed to commit the Russian President for two ideas, which 
institutionally engage Moscow on the long-run. 
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players usually interact with lower levels of the Russian foreign policy domain. In these 
cases, it is more difficult to come to arrangements, because lower administrational units 
are largely dependent from above (see 12.1). Since Russian bureaucratic entities normally 
lack of an appropriate mandate to negotiate directly, even insignificant technical 
agreements have to be approved from aloft. This, of course, leads to major 
misunderstandings, especially if the Russian side – intentionally or not - conceals the fact 
that it is not authorized to sign any documents. During the NRC and CEES decision-
making processes, this kind of situation repeatedly appeared.395 Therefore, it is advisable 
to tentatively and patiently but nevertheless openly and friendly interact with these units. 
As a fourth principle, it is important for external actors to partially adapt to the 
Russian foreign policy-making culture. As Chapter 12 of the present study has revealed, 
the way decisions are taken in Moscow differs in many respects from other styles of 
policy-formulation. In particular, the Russian mode can be tagged as ‘instant – personal’, 
whereas the Western style could be denoted as ‘planned – institutional’.396 Moscow puts 
an emphasis on faithful contacts and flexibility while Westerners prefer the rule of law 
and binding long-term commitments. Indeed, these two approaches are not compatible, 
which often causes irritation. However, nobody should prejudge about the expedience of 
the other culture, since both have their strengths and weaknesses. Even if things in 
Russian foreign policy-making sometimes look chaotic, they follow some specific cultural 
patterns. Against this background, external actors should most notably be respectful, 
patient, serious, honest and straight forward. Sometimes, it may even be advisable to 
circumnavigate the system and take into account the personal factor. This certainly does 
not mean to play according to criminal and corrupt rules, which should be avoided by all 
means. Rather, it considers a typical Russian way of interacting. 
Nonetheless, the cultural adaptation of external players has to be limited due to at 
least two aspects. First, the two far abroad issues NRC and CEES have demonstrated the 
benefits of involving Moscow institutionally. By indirectly including numerous actors 
                                                 
 
395  Expert interview, The European Commission’s Delegation to Russia, Political Section, Moscow: 
27.01.2006 & Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006. 
396  Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006. 
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from different sectors and various levels, cooperation with Russia can be remarkably 
enhanced. And also, these initiatives have additional positive effects as Moscow indirectly 
continues to apply gained expertise and experience within the post-Soviet space. This has 
been illustrated by the two other cases CSTO and SES (see 11.3). Second, it is advisable 
for Russian partners to insist on a maximum amount of transparency. The provision of free 
and objective information from both sides creates an atmosphere of mutual trust. If facts 
are openly available for actors on all levels, they often find their way to the top in briefing 
papers and documents. Transparency also contributes to a livelier and more objective 
debate among decision-makers, academics and media-players. 
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Summary 
 
This final part has presented the resulting insights on Russian foreign policy-making. The 
comparison of the four case studies revealed that decision-making networks in fact vary in 
dependence of the involved subfields. The NRC network, consisting of the far abroad and 
security subfields, essentially shows typical features of a stringent policy community. In 
contrast, the compared parameters indicate that the SES network accounts to a typical, 
rather loose issue network, whereas the other two cases (CSTO and CEES) may be 
regarded as hybrid policy network types. Therefore, the main and subhypotheses can 
basically be corroborated and confirmed by various qualitative findings regarding the 
effects of near and far abroad, security and economy subfield involvement. Yet, some 
reservations remain as the small number of analysed issues may not suffice to entirely 
prove the stipulated correlation. 
The analyses and the comparison of the four issues have shown that Russian foreign 
policy-making in principle corresponds to international standards. Nevertheless, it exhibits 
a few distinctive characteristics. The accentuated vertical layout of the political system, 
the substantial impact of bureaucracy, the shortage of qualified governmental staff, the 
emphasis on Russian idiosyncrasy and the influence of individuals may be regarded as 
structural attributes of decision-making. Typical procedural properties of policy-
formulation encompass the continuous rivalry among elite members, the significance of 
unwritten rules, short planning intervals, a lack of strategy, fluctuating coordination 
mechanisms as well as secrecy and opacity.  
Against this background, Russian foreign policy-making could be significantly 
improved by a better harmonization of ideas about Russian’s national identity and 
interests (strategy building), by implementing drastic measures with regard to bureaucracy 
(governmental reform) and by creating some additional distinct organisational 
mechanisms (coordination upgrade). External actors dealing with Moscow would be well 
advised to regard Russia as an equal partner, to keep a certain amount of sangfroid, 
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tranquillity and relaxation, to approach the Russian foreign policy domain at the highest 
possible level and to partially adapt to values of Russian political culture. 
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Conclusion 
 
The present study has aimed at answering the following core research questions: what 
types of decision-making networks define Russia’s foreign policies under Putin and to 
what extent, how and why do they vary depending on the policy problem? In order to 
answer this set of questions, four case studies have been quantitatively and qualitatively 
analysed: the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), the Collective Security 
Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the Common European Economic Space (CEES) and the 
Single Economic Space (SES). The structural and procedural investigation of these 
different Russian foreign policy issues allows drawing the following major conclusion: 
Moscow’s decision-making in the field of external affairs during Putin’s tenure is neither 
a one man show nor the exclusive field of a closed kitchen cabinet. All four cases have 
revealed that policy-making in today’s Russia is far more complex. It involves networks 
with changing memberships and fluctuating as well as qualitatively versatile interactions. 
Whereas the NRC network, for example, involved 8 closely interlinked actors, the SES 
decision-making community encompassed 19 loosely connected players. Hence, even if 
Putin reinforced state verticality and narrowed Russia’s top political elite over the past few 
years, Moscow’s foreign policy-making has remained a process that includes various 
competing groups of actors. The following paragraphs discuss the present study’s findings 
and their implications in more detail. 
 
Quantitative findings and their implications 
Based on the theories of Knoke and Pappi (1996), Rhodes and Marsh (1992) as well as 
practical observations, the main hypothesis of the present study has stipulated that 
Russia’s foreign policy domain under Vladimir Putin consists of four basic overlapping 
subfields: near abroad, far abroad, security and economy. The involvement of these 
subfields determines the shape of policy networks dealing with specific issues. This 
supposed correlation has been specified by three subhypotheses: (A) If an issue is 
addressed by the far abroad and security subfields, policy networks tend to take the shape 
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of small, tight and homogeneous policy communities holding considerable amounts of 
resources and power. (B) Conversely, if the near abroad and economic subfields approach 
an issue, then policy networks have a tendency to constitute large, loose and 
heterogeneous issue networks with marginal means and potentials. (C) Other subfield 
combinations produce hybrid forms of policy networks. 
The four analysed Russian foreign policy issues confirmed the relationships 
stipulated by the hypotheses. The establishment of the NRC - a matter addressed by the far 
abroad and security subfields – was decided by a small and highly integrated network. It 
was dominated by presidential actors and possessed a considerable quantity of resources 
and power. Apparently, Putin’s establishment makes Moscow’s strategic position on the 
farther international stage a top priority, which results in tense and limited policy 
networks. This typical policy community stands in contrast to the SES case. The SES 
network was composed of near abroad and economy subfield members and constituted a 
classic issue network. It encompassed a large number of decentralised actors and interests 
with comparatively few resources and power. Moreover, presidential actors played a 
moderate role. It seems that Moscow tends to neglect economic-related near abroad issues, 
which leads to slack and frayed patterns of decision-making. In between these two 
extremes, policy networks addressing geopolitical issues in Russia’s neighbourhood (the 
CSTO case), or far abroad economic matters (the CEES case) exhibit inconsistent 
characteristics such as a small number of network members coupled with a high quantity 
of resources. 
These findings have implications for the interpretation of Moscow’s political arena 
and its international relations. Two aspects, in particular, need to be highlighted. First, 
foreign policy-making in Putin’s Russia is not as dictatorial as it is sometimes portrayed 
by the Western media. The understanding that policy networks change, depending on 
policy issues calls into doubt the assumption that the President himself or a small circle of 
individuals decide upon all major external and internal political questions. Decision-
making patterns are not rigid and constant at all. As the four case studies have shown, 
foreign policy networks significantly vary in terms of actors, their potentials and ties. 
Continuously fluctuating influences and relative strengths allow players from different 
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spheres and levels to sway policy formulation. The Russian foreign policy domain is a 
highly dynamic and fragile environment. Against this background, decision-making in 
Moscow essentially corresponds to international standards. As in other world capitals - be 
it Washington, London, Paris, Beijing, Kuala Lumpur or Berne - foreign policy-making is 
characterised by varying networks, by a limited range of involved actors and interests, by 
assertive executive bodies and by enhanced concealment. These features lie in the nature 
of foreign affairs and do not represent Russian peculiarities. 
Secondly, the present study’s main findings demonstrate that domestic political 
factors play an essential role in Russian foreign policy-making. This aspect has, so far, 
been generally underestimated. Policies are formulated by domestic networks, their 
members, interactions, resources and powers, which vary depending on the issue. 
Consequently, Moscow’s distinct policies - whether they address the post-Soviet space, far 
abroad nations, security or economic matters - cannot exclusively be explained by external 
aspects such as actions of other nations, macro-economic figures or geopolitical facts and 
developments. The way Russia handled the gas conflicts with Ukraine and Belarus in 
2006 and 2007, for instance, does not only reflect Moscow’s strategic interests or 
ambivalent and emotional relations between sister and mother nations. It also, to a 
considerable extent, is a sign of a heterogeneous (hybrid) policy network in Moscow that 
decided incoherently, on short notice and without taking into account a broader range of 
internal opinions, interests or policy alternatives. Insofar, the present study confirms and 
validates the sizeable amount of theoretical studies in the field of foreign policy analysis, 
which emphasize the cross-fertilization and interlocking of exogenous and endogenous 
variables. Foreign affairs cannot be understood without taking into account domestic 
matters. This statement applies particularly to Russia’s activities abroad. 
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Qualitative findings and their implications 
Beside the above-discussed quantitative findings on policy-networks, the present study has 
also identified and analysed the paramount qualitative properties of Russian foreign 
policy-making and its networks. It has revealed that, notwithstanding its normality, 
decision-making in Moscow features eleven specific structural and procedural attributes: 
• Accentuated vertical layout of the political system: 
The Russian political system is characterised by a strong top-down 
mentality. Whereas superior levels decide and retain power as well as 
freedom of action, the subordinate units are considered as implementing 
and fully dependent agents. Since the year 2000, this state verticality has 
been reinforced under Putin, which lead to an enhanced centralisation in 
foreign policy-making. Yet, as officials on lower levels are not in a 
position to decide, even insignificant issues need the approval from 
above. This complicates cooperation with external actors and hinders 
creative, self dependent as well as bottom-up activities. 
• Substantial impact of bureaucracy: 
However, despite the weakness of lower administrational units, the 
impact of bureaucracy on Russia’s foreign policies is substantial. 
Especially the CEES and the SES issues have shown that technical 
expertise highly influences decisions on the top level. In these cases, 
even specific lower ministerial departments have become network 
members due to their particular knowledge in economic matters. 
• Shortage of qualified governmental staff: 
Nevertheless, qualified governmental staff is scarce in Moscow. As the 
case studies have revealed, decision-making on the highest level can 
often not be supported from below due to a lack of detailed expertise. 
Today, highly skilled Russian graduates prefer to make their careers 
within private sector, where wages and working conditions are much 
better than within the Russian administration. 
• Emphasis on Russian idiosyncrasy: 
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Another characteristic of Moscow’s decision-making in foreign affairs is 
the emphasis on Russian idiosyncrasy. It describes a widespread 
preference for ‘Russianness’ among members of the elite and 
bureaucracy. Whereas some call it backward mentality or awareness for 
culture and tradition, idiosyncrasy has to be understood as a general 
understanding that Russia has always followed a unique and independent 
course of action, which makes any comparisons with other nation states 
impossible. This mindset has noticeable structural and procedural 
impacts on foreign policy-making. With regard to the CEES issue, for 
example, many Russian actors were reluctant to adapt parts of Russian 
legislation to the EU ‘acquis communautaire’. 
• Influence of individuals: 
Despite the fact that the present study focused on organisational actors, 
individuals are an important factor in Russian foreign policy-making. 
Viktor Khristenko, for instance, left his personal imprints on Russia’s 
foreign economic policies. He was fully authorised by the President to 
personally coordinate the CEES and SES issues. The influence of 
individuals, their characters and moods, goes hand in hand with a 
shortage of written rules to make decisions (see below).  
• Continuous rivalry among elite members: 
Much disconcertment in Russian foreign policy-making is due to 
continuous rivalry among elite members. Permanent battles between 
competing groups for access to decision-making hinder smooth 
teamwork based on facts and targets. This is, of course, not an exclusive 
Russian phenomenon. But political fights in Moscow are fought out in a 
more visible, passionate, rough or sometimes even brutal way.  
• Significance of unwritten rules: 
A crucial aspect of Russian foreign policy-making is the significance of 
unwritten rules. As legal decision-making procedures are either not 
existent or not respected, culturally determined ways of behaviour 
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among network members are of utmost importance. Interactions between 
foreign policy actors correspond to a certain code, which contains values 
like honesty, friendship, mutual trust, faith and personal dignity. It is 
often this characteristic of decision-making, which causes a lot of 
misunderstandings between Russians and Westerners. Whereas policy-
making in Moscow may be understood as ‘instant-personal’, Europeans 
are used to a more ‘planned-institutional’ way of taking decisions. 
• Short planning intervals; 
This feature of Moscow’s foreign policy-making is closely linked to the 
above-mentioned characteristic: Russian planning intervals are short. It 
does not only reflect the short-term nature of external affairs. Last-
minute decision-making is also rooted in Russia’s political culture and is 
nothing bad per se. From a Russian point of view, decisions on short 
notice leave capacities and time for adequate reactions. 
• Lack of strategy: 
Even if Putin has managed to stabilise and centralise the political system 
over the past years, Russia’s foreign policies continue to lack of a basic 
strategy. The reason for this lies in Moscow’s political system. Although 
the formulation and assertion of national interests is a difficult task for 
every nation, the Russian Federation has not yet fully defined its new 
identity after the collapse of the USSR. A solid consensus about ‘what is 
Russia?’ and about ‘what Russia should do?’ has so far not been 
reached. Hence, Moscow’s internal disaccord about the strategic course 
remains a characteristic of its foreign policies. 
• Fluctuating coordination mechanism; 
The problem of fluctuating coordination mechanisms in Russian foreign 
policy-making is closely linked to the above-mentioned points. 
Moscow’s system lacks of binding formal institutions to coordinate 
foreign policies. As there are no fixed rules, coordination mechanisms 
vary from issue to issue, which makes it difficult to predict policy 
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outcomes. Actually, two coordinating organs have existed and appointed 
since 1991: the Security Council and the MFA. Yet, as long as the 
President and its administration are not willing to share or even delegate 
responsibilities, important actors such as the parliament remain excluded 
from foreign policy decision-making. 
• Distinctive secrecy and opacity. 
Last but not least, Russian foreign policy-making is characterised by 
distinctive secrecy and opacity. More than in other capitals around the 
globe, Moscow keeps its decision-making processes behind the curtain. 
Hence, policy outcomes are sometimes incomprehensible; not only for 
outsiders, but also for Russian governmental officials, ministers, 
diplomats and presidential advisors.  
 
All these factors may be regarded as intrinsic Russian decision-making characteristics. 
Some of them are rooted in culture, whereas others reflect operational shortcomings. 
Combined, they create many moments of ineffectiveness, inefficiency and 
unpredictability. This in turn causes dissatisfaction among Russian actors and confusion 
for partners and external observers. Although instant and simple remedies do not exist, 
improvements are feasible. In particular, foreign policy-making structures and procedures 
should be ameliorated by embarking on a more coherent and robust strategy, by 
implementing a drastic governmental reform package and by enhancing internal 
coordination mechanisms. 
The qualitative enhancement of Moscow’s capacity to formulate effective and 
coherent foreign policies does not simply constitute an optional or desirable task. If 
current trends in world politics prove to be stable and enduring, it will be an imperative 
and urgent step. As Moscow is about to regain assertiveness and influence on the 
international stage, Russian foreign policy-making and its outcomes are gradually 
becoming more important. What are the underlying reasons and assumptions that argue for 
this development? Primarily, Russia’s high energy revenues and adept monetary policies 
have boosted almost all business sectors. Since 1999, constant economic growth has 
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accounted for the emergence of a civic middle class and for considerable impulses for 
modernisation. Even if severe problems – especially in the social sphere - persist, Russia’s 
future prospects are promising. 
In addition to internal factors, Moscow’s role in international relations is also 
enhanced by external factors. Namely, Russia profits directly from a weakening of the 
Western powers. The potential failures of the U.S. and NATO in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
stagnating EU integration process and smouldering conflicts in the Middle East or in 
Kosovo are about to bring the Western state community into an uncomfortable situation. 
This enhances Russia’s international leverage, not only rhetorically, but also substantially. 
Within the forthcoming years, the rise of the Russian Federation could even be 
accelerated, since Moscow possesses two assets, which may be decisive in global affairs: 
energy and space. If natural resources and land become scarcer and more contended in the 
future, Russia’s position will be significantly strengthened. In light of these potential 
developments, Moscow’s responsibility for global issues such as climate change, energy 
security or strategic stability will be enhanced. With rising claims in world affairs, Russia 
needs to play a more proactive, constructive and consistent role than it did as a 
marginalized regional power. This requires a foreign policy-making apparatus that is more 
strategy-oriented, integrative, unemotional and coordinated. 
 
Open questions, analytical difficulties and further research 
All of the above-discussed findings, implications and trends have emerged from an 
analysis that was performed within a restricted theoretical and methodological framework. 
This, of course, limits the academic outcome of this study. Inevitably, scientific tools, 
guidelines and processes entail results that are possibly biased and fragmentary. The 
present study has only covered a small portion of an immense and complex reality. 
Therefore, the last few paragraphs will be dedicated to open questions, analytical 
difficulties and further research. They can be subsumed under three main topics: 
‘evolution of decision-making’, ‘processes behind closed doors’ as well as ‘actors’ 
interests and ideas’. 
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The first topic addresses the question of how Russian foreign policy-making changes over 
time. The present study and the bulk of existing literature have focused on decision-
making structures and processes at a particular stage of Russian history. They all took a 
snap-shot, for instance, of the Czar’s court, Stalin’s immediate surroundings or Putin’s 
networks in order to derive conclusions about the relative time period. Yet, there exists a 
lack of longitudinal studies tracking and comparing Russian foreign policy-formulation 
along the time line. Some of the most interesting open questions are: To what extent and 
how do elements of Russian political culture evolve? To what extent do state leaders, their 
personalities and styles have an impact on foreign policy-making? To what extent do 
policy-networks, the involved actors and relations change over time? How far have 
coordination mechanisms transformed since the 18th century? These kinds of questions are 
highly relevant and their answers would be helpful to determine, for example, the 
practicability of suggested reform projects. They would also contribute to a less absolute 
interpretation of contemporary activities and developments. In sum, studies tracing the 
evolution of Russian foreign policy-making would add a real surplus to the academic 
discourse. 
Another topic that needs further academic attention is the investigation of foreign 
policy processes behind closed doors. It has already been mentioned in the introduction of 
the present study that the analysis of Russian decision-making is a highly difficult 
undertaking. For the most part, foreign policy-formulation is bound to secrecy. 
Nonetheless, key players, activities and events should not be described exclusively in 
intelligence reports, prominent memoirs or journalistic essays. They should also be 
covered systematically by academic researchers, precisely because these domestic factors 
are so crucial for the genesis of foreign policies, and hence for Russia’s international 
relations. Thereby, a multitude of open questions wait for answers: what are the social 
patterns of interactions among decision-makers? What kinds of cultural norms influence 
the behaviour of key players? To what extent can individuals be decisive for the 
formulation of foreign policies? Which coordination mechanisms determine human 
interaction on the micro-level? These types of question require further research, as they 
are crucial for a better understanding of Russian foreign policy-making. Yet, it goes 
without saying that such questions are difficult to address by outsiders. The analysis of 
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processes behind closed doors requires a higher degree of nearness and relatedness to the 
system. Former officials, close family-members, experienced advisors or well-informed 
academics and journalists would possibly be able to uncover more details of the Russian 
foreign policy domain. 
The third topic that needs further extensive research is foreign policy actor’s 
interests and ideas. Due to the restricted analytical framework, the present study has not 
been able to tackle this subject. However, it would be highly interesting to determine the 
network member’s interests and ideas in order to reveal the balance of power in Moscow. 
First and foremost, the following questions have essentially remained open so far: Which 
factors determine the interests and ideas of Russian foreign policy domain actors? How 
can actor’s coalitions be identified within Moscow’s policy networks? What kinds of 
interests and ideas have dominated Russian foreign policy-making over the last few years? 
How do actor’s interests and ideas interrelate with national interests and ideas? To what 
extent, how and why do coalitions of interests and ideas vary? Answers to these sorts of 
questions would not only help to explain Russian foreign policies more in-depth, but they 
would also bring to light the relative strengths within Moscow’s elite circles and 
especially clarify Putin’s position within the political arena. Obviously, the academic 
investigation of interests and ideas needs close ties to the Russian foreign policy domain, 
since personal or organisational motives and preferences are mostly kept private. 
The preceding three topics certainly do not exhaust the list of potential subjects for 
further research. They only point out prospective focal points for further research in the 
field of Russian foreign policy-making. Above all, for a better understanding of the 
Russian Federation and its external activities, more case studies are required. Whereas 
general interpretations of Russian foreign policy contents are virtually innumerable, 
careful examinations of concrete and specific issues have remained scarce. Henceforth, 
this gap needs to be filled. 
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Appendix I: Systematic list of actors 
 
Presidential actors 
President 
Presidential Administration 
• Direction (Chief of staff and his deputies) 
• Aides of the President 
• Advisors of the President 
• Plenipotentiary Representatives of the President 
• Presidential Services 
• Presidential Executive Divisions 
Security Council 
• Direction (Secretary, his administration and the scientific council) 
• Members of the Security Council 
 
Governmental actors 
Prime Ministry 
• Direction (Prime Minister, his deputies and plenipotentiary 
representatives) 
• Governmental Administration (Direction, Departments of International 
Cooperation, Defense Complex, Finance, Economy & Property, Energetics 
& Natural Resources) 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
• Direction (Minister and his deputies) 
• 1st European Department (Mediteranean and Western European countries) 
• 2nd European Department (Nortern European countries) 
• 3rd European Department (South-Eastern European countries) 
• 4th European Department (Central European countries) 
• Northern America Department 
• Latin America Department 
• Middle East & Northern Africa Department 
• Africa Department 
• 1st Asian Department 
• 2nd Asian Department 
• 3rd Asian Department 
• 1st CIS Department (General Cooperation) 
• 2nd CIS Department (Belarus, Moldavia, Ukraine) 
• 3rd CIS Department (Central Asian countries) 
• 4th CIS Department (Caucasian countries) 
• Relations to Federal Regions Department 
• All-European Cooperation Department 
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• International Organisation Department 
• Security & Disarmament Department 
• Humanitarian Cooperation & Human Rights Department 
• Culture & UNESCO Department 
• Economic Cooperation Department 
• Legal Department  
• Personnel Department 
• Consular Service 
• Leadership issues Department 
• Financial Department 
• Legal Department 
• Abroad Financial capital and property Department 
• Ambassadors 
Ministry of Defence (MoD) 
• Direction (Minister and his deputees) 
• General Staff 
• Departments 
Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (MEDT) 
• Direction (Minister and his deputies) 
• Department for External Economic Affairs 
• Department for Multilateral Cooperation with CIS Countries 
• Department for Trade Policy and Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
Other Federal Ministries 
• Ministry of Internal Affairs 
• Ministry of Justice 
• Ministry of Civil Defence, Emergencies and Disaster Relief 
• Ministry of Education 
• Ministry of Labour and Social Development 
• Ministry of Health Care 
• Ministry of Culture 
• Ministry of Press, Telecom and Communication 
• Ministry of Agriculture 
• Ministry of State Property 
• Ministry of Finance 
• Ministry of Tax and Duties 
• Ministry of Transport 
• Ministry of Communication 
• Ministry of Railways 
• Ministry of Natural Resources 
• Ministry of Nuclear Energy 
• Ministry of Energy 
• Ministry of Industry, Science and Technology 
• Ministry of Anti-Trust and Business Support 
Federal Services 
• Federal Security Service (FSB) 
• Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) 
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• State Courier Service 
• Federal Border Service 
• Federal Guard Service 
• Other Federal Services 
Federal Agencies, Committees and Commissions 
• Agencies (Aviation & Space, Patents & Trade Marks, etc.) 
• Committees (Fishing Industry, Statistics, etc.) 
• Commissions (Energetics, Stock Markets, etc.) 
Other Federal Bodies 
• Bank for Foreign Trade  
• Vneshekonombank 
• Savings Bank 
• Central Bank 
• Federal Assets Fond 
• Audit Chamber 
• Central Elections 
 
Parliamentary actors 
State Duma 
• Duma Council (Chair and his deputies) 
• Administration 
• Committee for Security 
• Committee for Nationality 
• Committee for CIS Cooperation 
• Committee for International Affairs 
• Committee for Defence 
• Committee for Natural Ressources 
• Committee for Economic Policy 
• Committee for Energy, Transport & Communication 
• Commission for Geopolitics 
 
Federation Council 
• Chair 
• Administration 
• Committee for Securty & Defense 
• Committee for Economic Policy 
• Committee for CIS Cooperation 
• Committee for International Affairs 
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Economic actors 
Energy sector 
• Gazprom 
• Lukoil 
• RAO UES 
• Transneft 
• Yukos 
• Other companies 
Financial sector 
Industrial sector 
Service sector 
 
Other actors 
Regional actors 
• Republics 
• Oblasti 
• Autonomous Okrugy & Oblasti 
• Krai 
• Cities of federal importance (Moscow, St. Petersburg) 
Judiciary actors 
• Supreme Court 
• Supreme Arbitration Court 
• General Prosecutor 
• Constitutional Court 
Political parties 
• United Russia 
• Communist Party 
• Liberal-democratic Party 
• Motherland 
Miscellaneous actors 
• Religious actors (Orthodox, Muslim) 
• Academic actors 
• Media 
• Societal actors 
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Quantitative questionnaire: working steps 2 and 3 
 
1. Please consider the systematic list of actors (Appendix I) and assess the influence 
of every actor on the particular case.  
1 = no influence 
2 = minimal influence 
3 = considerable influence 
4 = high influence 
5 = don’t know 
 
Definition ‘influence’: 
The term influence is defined as the possibility of an actor to manipulate other 
actors or events. 
 
 
2. Please consider the matrix showing the most influential actors of the particular 
case in the first row and column. Which actors were linked with each other and 
how strong do you assess their interaction during the appropriate decision-making 
process? 
0 = no or weak/rare interaction 
1 = medium interaction 
2 = intense/frequent interaction  
 
Definition ‘interaction’: 
An interaction is defined as any contact (official or informal meeting, 
conference, exchange of mail, phone call etc.) between actors, which are 
related to a particular case. Through interactions, actors solve conflicts, 
exchange all kinds of resources, information as well as opinions and coordinate 
their positions. Interactions are assessed in terms of intensity and frequency.  
 
 
Appendix II: Questionnaires  295 
 
 
Sample of qualitative questions concerning case studies 
 
1. Who brought up the idea to create the NRC/CSTO/CEES/SES? 
 
 
2. How was this idea brought up and how was it developed further? 
 
 
3. Which milestones can be identified along the decision-making process? 
 
 
4. How exactly did the most influential actors interact? 
 
 
5. What kinds of mechanisms contributed to the coordination of the issue, its actors 
and events? 
 
 
6. What kind of role played the presidential, governmental, parliamentary, economic 
and other actors? 
 
 
7. Did some actors follow a hidden agenda? 
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Sample of qualitative questions concerning general foreign policy-making 
 
1. Who informs Putin about a specific foreign policy issue? 
 
 
2. What kind of role does the presidential administration play within the foreign policy 
decision-making process? 
 
 
3. What kind of role do intelligence services play within the foreign policy decision-
making process? 
 
 
4. How do business interests translate into the foreign policy decision-making process? 
 
 
5. To what extent and how does foreign policy decision-making varies depending on 
the involvement of the near abroad and far abroad subfields? 
 
 
6. To what extent and how does foreign policy decision-making varies depending on 
the involvement of the security and economic subfield? 
 
 
